THE ARMED FORCES OF PAKISTAN

The Armed Forces of Asia

Series editor: **Professor Desmond Ball**, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University

This groundbreaking series is the first to examine the military capabilities of nations in Asia. Spanning the arc from Pakistan in the west to the Russian Far East in the north, each book provides a succinct survey of each service of the armed forces, including territorial and paramilitary formations. Written by military and defence strategy experts from around the world, the books assess the role of the armed forces in relation to national defence and security policy, and their social, political and economic functions. Up-to-the-minute research is drawn upon to present, in many cases, the first unclassified accounts of nations' defensive and offensive capabilities, as well as the ambitions of sectors within the armed forces establishments.

The Armed Forces of Asia series

You Ji	*China*
James Rolfe	*New Zealand*
Joseph Bermudez Jr	*North Korea*
Greg Austin & Alexey D. Muraviev	*Russia in Asia*
Tim Huxley	*Singapore*
Stanley Weeks & Charles Meconis	*The USA in the Asia–Pacific Region*

THE ARMED FORCES OF PAKISTAN

PERVAIZ IQBAL CHEEMA

ALLEN&UNWIN

First published in 2002

Allen & Unwin
83 Alexander St
Crows Nest NSW 2065
Australia
Phone: (61 2) 8425 0100
Fax: (61 2) 9906 2218
Email: info@allenandunwin.com
Web: www.allenandunwin.com

National Library of Australia
Cataloguing-in-Publication entry:

Cheema, Pervaiz Iqbal, 1940– .
The armed forces of Pakistan.

Bibliography.
Includes index.
ISBN 1 86508 119 1.

1. Pakistan—Armed Forces. I. Title. (Series : Armed forces of Asia).

355.309549

Maps by Ian Faulkner
Set in 12/13.5 pt Trump by Midland Typesetters, Victoria
Printed by South Wind Production (Singapore) Private Limited

10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

Dedicated to the memory of
my father (the late Ch. Mohammad Iqbal Cheema)
and my father-in-law (the late Dr M. A. Alvie)

Foreword

Professor Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, Pakistan's leading strategic and defence analyst, is probably the only person who could have written an authoritative, comprehensive, detailed and balanced account of Pakistan's armed forces. The subject is vast, complex and controversial and has heretofore defied rendition in a single volume.

With a total active armed forces exceeding 600 000 and a reserve of more than half a million, Pakistan has one of the ten largest armed forces in the world. But its defence expenditure accounts for almost one-quarter of government spending, and has undoubtedly contributed to the country's perennial economic difficulties.

Pakistan has the eighth largest nuclear weapons capability in the world. Its Ghauri missile has a range of 1500 kilometres. However, its nuclear command and control system is fairly primitive—it is vulnerable, has little redundancy and poor technical capability, and invites pre-emption in crisis situations. It also raises the spectre of inadvertent or unauthorised use of nuclear weapons.

The subcontinent is prone to wars and crisis situations. In addition to the three major wars between Pakistan and India—the wars over Kashmir in 1947–49 and in 1965, and the 1971 war which resulted in the dismemberment of East Pakistan (Bangladesh)—there have been innumerable border skirmishes as well as almost continuous conflicts in Kashmir itself.

And since 11 September 2001, Pakistan is on the frontline of the US-led war against terrorism, with

members of the Taliban, of al Queda and other fundamentalist Islamic groups moving back and forth between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Cooperating with the US in this war is unpopular in many parts of Pakistan, greatly adding to the political stresses within the country.

Nuclear weapons have figured in crises between India and Pakistan on several occasions since the late 1980s, persuading many analysts (although Professor Cheema does not share this view) that the risk of use of nuclear weapons here is greater than it ever was between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War.

The Pakistani armed forces have been much more directly involved in domestic politics than those of most other large countries. Four generals have taken over the government since independence—Ayub Khan in 1958, Yahya Khan in 1969, Zia-ul-Haq in 1977 and Pervez Musharraf in 1999—between them ruling for more than twenty-five years. Professor Cheema argues that military intervention has been necessitated by the failure of the civil processes and that the armed forces themselves have maintained a high level of internal discipline, but the military has evinced no better economic or developmental performance than the displaced civilians and has done little to allay concerns about the command and control of Pakistan's nuclear weapons.

I first met Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema in 1979, when he was a Visiting Fellow in the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre at the Australian National University. He was then a lecturer in the Department of International Relations at Quaid-i-Azam University in Islamabad. He was later to head that Department, as well as the Department of Defence and Strategic Studies for fourteen years. He has taught at all the military staff colleges in Pakistan. He is the author of many books and monographs dealing with strategic and defence issues in South Asia, including *Conflict and Co-operation in the Indian Ocean* (1980), *Afghanistan Since 1978* (1980),

Pakistan's Defence Policy 1947–58 (1990), and *Brasstacks and Beyond: Perceptions and Management of Crisis in South Asia* (1995). He has also written numerous articles on more specialised aspects of Pakistan's armed forces.

The extent to which Professor Cheema's knowledge of the Pakistani armed forces is peerless comes out time and again through this volume—whether it is the discussion of officer training programs, internal security incidents, the nuclear infrastructure, or the weaknesses of command and control and joint service planning.

This book will have its critics. The subject is extremely controversial. The roles of the Pakistani armed forces in national politics and internal security are contentious issues. But more fundamentally, the discourse on South Asian security matters is inevitably politicised. Where war is always a real possibility, where different Muslim and Hindu beliefs and perspectives obtain, and where emotional tides sometimes become overwhelming, then even 'facts' will be contested.

Professor Cheema will be accused of bias. That is unfair. His arguments are erudite, but they are informed by the Pakistani perspective. Readers will want to appreciate this perspective as much as to learn the number of new Agosta class submarines in the Navy or the number of F-7 fighter aircraft in the Air Force.

This is an important and timely book, as one of the world's major armed forces takes a beleaguered country into the nuclear club. It is also a courageous book, which exposes the Pakistani strategic culture to public scrutiny.

I sincerely hope that the criticisms which Professor Cheema will inevitably receive are outweighed by the thanks which he deserves for this immense contribution to our understanding of Pakistan's self-appointed 'guardians'.

Professor Des Ball
Strategic and Defence Studies Centre
Australian National University
Canberra

Contents

Preface

This book examines the evolution of Pakistan's armed forces—how, starting from scratch, the three arms developed into disciplined and well-trained organisations. This major part of the book is preceded by a review of the South Asian environment in which Pakistan was born and how that setting influenced the nation's perceptions of its own security. Other elements of the defence system—overall administration and production and procurement—are discussed, as are the armed forces' role in internal security and in politics, and the advent of nuclear capability.

While most of the material used in this study was obtained from Pakistani institutions, the book itself was written in Heidelberg, Germany. I left Heidelberg towards the end of 2000 and resumed my work in Pakistan. The publication of this book was delayed because of the procedural complexities. Although a few paragraphs have been added in one of the chapters in order to bring it up to date, the bulk of information is derived from sources that were available until the end of 1999. While attempting to update information, I discovered that not much was required except in one specific chapter, 'The armed forces and politics'. Since the original draft only mentioned the developments that took place soon after the fourth military takeover which had taken place in October 1999, it only seems appropriate to discuss some key aspects of the policies during the last two years.

The tragic events of 11 September 2001 in New York

and Washington causing the loss of thousands of innocent lives, resulted in the formation of an international coalition against terrorism. Not only did Pakistan decide to join the international coalition against terrorism and extend cooperation to the United States in the execution of America's Afghan war, but its policies, both internal as well as external, underwent radical transformation. Since Pakistan began to play an important role in a collective fight against terrorism, almost all types of sanctions were lifted, the international financial institutions began to view Pakistan's cases rather sympathetically, and Pakistan was also able to renew contact with the American military establishment. However, it needs to be mentioned here that Pakistan's participation in the American–Afghan war was not without cost. Not only were many religious groups annoyed over Pakistan's new Afghan policy, but it was also hit economically. Being next door to a war zone, it was somewhat inevitable that Pakistan would have to bear the adverse consequences. Thus it was imperative to add few paragraphs to the chapter on 'The armed forces and politics'.

A word of appreciation is due to all those whose guidance and assistance helped me in preparing the manuscript. Several individuals and institutions provided vital assistance, especially Dr Zafar Iqbal Cheema, whose comments and help were of particular value. I would also like to express my deep gratitude to the public relations directorate of the army, navy and air force for their quick responsiveness in supplying the requisite material. I would also like to extend my profound thanks to my wife, Dr Asma Pervaiz Cheema, and my daughter, Azeema-Noor Pervaiz Cheema, for their continuing encouragement in the manuscript's preparation.

Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema
Islamabad, Pakistan

Glossary

AFRC	Armed Forces Reconstitution Committee
APC	Armoured personnel carrier
ARV	Armoured recovery vehicle
ASP	Army Supply Corps
AVM	Air Vice Marshal
BBC	British Broadcasting Corporation
BDs	Basic Democrats
CAR	Central Asian Republics
CAS	Chief of Air Staff
CENTO	Central Treaty Organization
CGS	Chief of the General Staff
C-in-C	Commander-in-Chief
CMLA	Chief Martial Law Administrator
COAS	Chief of Army Staff
COC	Command Operation Centre
COP	Combined Opposition Parties
DAC	Democratic Action Committee
DC	Defence Council
DCC	Defence Committee of the Cabinet
DESTO	Defence Science and Technology Organisation
DGDP	Directorate-General, Defence Purchases
DP	Director Purchases
DRDO	Defence Research and Development Organisation
EEZ	Exclusive Economic Zone
GG	Governor-General
GHQ	General Headquarters
GOC	General Officer Commanding
HIT	Heavy Industries Taxila
HQ	Headquarters
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
IAF	Indian Air Force
IJI	Islami Jamhoori Itehad
Indo	India
IOK	Indian Occupied Kashmir
ISI	Inter Services Intelligence
ISSB	Inter Services Selection Board

JCSC	Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee
JDC	Joint Defence Council
KARF	Kamra Avionics and Radar Factory
LFO	Legal Framework Order
LOC	Line of Control
Lt. Gen.	Lieutenant General
MAAG	Military Assistance Advisory Group
Maj. Gen.	Major General
MBT	Main battle tank
MQM	Mohajir Quami Mohaz
MRD	Movement for the Restoration of Democracy
MRF	Mirage Rebuild Factory
MTCR	Missile Technology Control Regime
NAH	Northern Army Headquarters
NAM	Non-Aligned Movement
NAP	National Awami Party
NDC	National Defence College
NDP	National Democratic Party
NGOs	Non-government organisations
NHQ	Naval Headquarters
NPT	Non-Proliferation Treaty
NSC	National Security Council
NWFP	North West Frontier Province
OIC	Organization of Islamic Countries
PAC	Pakistan Aeronautical Complex
PAF	Pakistan Air Force
Pak	Pakistan
PBUH	Peace Be Upon Him
PCO	Provisional Constitutional Order
PIA	Pakistan International Airlines
PMA	Pakistan Military Academy
PML	Pakistan Muslim League
PN	Pakistan Navy
PNE	Peaceful nuclear explosion
POF	Pakistan Ordnance Factories Complex
PPP	Pakistan Peoples Party
RAC	Regional Air Command
R&D	Research and development
RAW	Research and Analysis Wing (India)
RCD	Regional Cooperation for Development
RCO	Revival of the Constitution 1973 Order
RPAF	Royal Pakistan Air Force
SEATO	South East Asia Treaty Organization
SUPARCO	Space and Upper Atmosphere Research Commission
UN	United Nations
WAPDA	Water and Power Development Authority


SOUTH ASIA
TURKMENISTAN
TAJIKISTAN
Tehran
Bagdad
IRAQ
IRAN
Kabul
Islamabad
KASHMIR
Srinagar
AFGHANISTAN
CHINA
KUWAIT
PAKISTAN
Delhi
NEPAL
Kathmandu
BHUTAN
ASSAM
Shillong
BAHRAIN
BANGLA DESH
Dhaka
Karachi
INDIA
VIETNAM
Hanoi
SAUDI ARABIA
UAE
OMAN
MYANMAR
LAOS
Vientiane
BAY OF BENGAL
Yangon
THAILAND
Bangkok
CAMBODIA
ARABIAN SEA
ANDAMAN SEA
SOMALIA
0
1000 km
SRI LANKA
Colombo
MALAYSIA
Kuala Lumpur
INDIAN OCEAN


THE SUBCONTINENT
BEFORE PARTITION (1947)
TURKMENISTAN
IRAN
AFGHANISTAN
Kabul
Srinagar
Islamabad
JAMMU
AND
KASHMIR
NWFP
Jhelum R.
Chenab R.
Ravi R.
PUNJAB
Indus R.
Sutlej River
CHINA
KUWAIT
BALUCHISTAN
Delhi
NEPAL
BHUTAN
Brahmaputra R.
ASSAM
SYLHET
Ganges River
BAHRAIN
SIND
Karachi
INDIA
BENGAL
UAE
SAUDI
ARABIA
OMAN
MYANMAR
LAOS
BAY OF
BENGAL
THAILAND
ARABIAN
SEA
ANDAMAN
SEA
0
1000 km
SRI LANKA
INDIAN
OCEAN


THE SUBCONTINENT
AFTER PARTITION (1947)
N
W
E
S
TURKMENISTAN
IRAN
AFGHANISTAN
Kabul
Srinagar
JAMMU
AND
KASHMIR
Jhelum River
Chenab R.
Beas R.
Sutlej River
Indus River
CHINA
KUWAIT
Delhi
NEPAL
BHUTAN
Brahmaputra R.
ASSAM
INDIA
BANGLA
-DESH
Ganges
River
BAHRAIN
Karachi
INDIA
UAE
SAUDI
ARABIA
OMAN
MYANMAR
LAOS
BAY OF
BENGAL
THAILAND
ARABIAN
SEA
ANDAMAN
SEA
0
1000 km
SRI LANKA
INDIAN
OCEAN


JAMMU & KASHMIR
TAJIKISTAN
CHINA
JAMMU
AND
KASHMIR
AFGHANISTAN
PAKISTAN
INDIA
CHINA
Kabul
Srinagar
Uri
Pir Panjal Range
Bhimbar
Akhnur
Jammu
Chamba
Siakotl
Lahore
Amritsar
Indus River
Jhelum River
Chenab River
AREA ENLARGED
IRAN
IRAQ
SAUDI ARABIA
PAKISTAN
NEPAL
INDIA
MYANMAR
LAOS
THAILAND
SRI LANKA
INDIAN OCEAN
SOMALIA
AFGHANISTAN
0
200
KILOMETRES
Line of Control

1

Introduction

The major factor influencing a nation to maximise its military power within the limits of available resources is invariably a sense of insecurity, stemming either from the overwhelming posture of a known adversary or from acute consciousness of its own defence weaknesses. Another contributor to a sense of insecurity is internal instability and disorder. As a nation never feels comfortable in such circumstances, it will usually employ one or more strategies to deal with them. It may strengthen its own defence forces both in quantitative and in qualitative terms; join a multilateral alliance or forge a bilateral alliance with a friendly country; promote a regional grouping; induce an interested outsider to come to the area and act as a balancer; reconcile itself with the adversary or at least establish a working relationship; perhaps enthusiastically support the logic of enforcing arms control or disarmament. While most developing countries were and many still are confronted with the dilemma of limited resources, one finds that most of them tend to opt for strengthening their own defence establishment. The creation and preservation of the kind of equilibrium (or disequilibrium) that affords the maximum security to one's own country is regularly favoured. A nation might say that it's all very fine to have an even, 50–50 balance, but if our side is a little bit stronger than *their* side that's to be preferred. And

so, a good many developing countries chose the option of military preparedness, a condition equated with having well-disciplined armed forces equipped with the latest weaponry and support devices.

All the same, some nations joined a defence alliance, either for reasons of *added* security or because on their own they lacked the resources needed for adequate military preparedness. Some wanted the support of a powerful country that was dominant in the alliance they chose to join; others simply felt more comfortable with a collective approach to security. And it is not surprising to find that many nations that have joined a particular defence alliance have participated in it in a way that caters for their own objectives—which may well differ from the dominant country's objectives. Take for example the South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO). The Americans' objective was to foster collective efforts in the region in order to check the perceived expansion of communism, but the objectives of the local members of SEATO were all different. Thailand's main reason for joining the alliance was perhaps closer to that of the Americans: it wanted help and protection against external and domestic communist forces. For the Philippines the major influencing factor was to gain partnership with a wider group of regional and global powers. Pakistan participated in SEATO in order to procure much needed arms and to gain a kind of psychological defence against India.[1]

Nations confronted with security threats right from the outset of their independent career, or nations born with some geographical peculiarity, are more likely to seek quick military preparedness through individual efforts or through collective efforts generated by an alliance partnership. Pakistan is one such country. It was not only born with an acute geographical peculiarity (two widely separated parts), but also perceived a security problem right at the beginning—both external and internal threats to its independence and territorial

integrity. Added pressures arising from periodic domestic upheavals and ethnic movements coupled with internal subversive upsurges from time to time further complicated the situation for the security planners of the country. Sandwiched between hostile India and unfriendly Afghanistan, Pakistan's security perceptions have largely been influenced by the state of its relationships with those two countries. More specifically, the single largest determining factor has been and in many ways still is the continuous hostility of India. The fear of India has overshadowed almost all other considerations from the start; according to its first Prime Minister, who was also its first Defence Minister, defence dominated all other activities.[2] Even prior to the 1971 dismemberment, when East Pakistan became Bangladesh, hostilities with India played a much greater role than the geographical peculiarity of East Pakistan.

A number of factors intensified Pakistan's sense of insecurity during the early phase. First, its territory lacked adequate depth. Its main communication lines ran parallel to the manmade Indo–Pak border and most of its major cities were (and still are) situated close to this border. Second, Pakistan lacked a well-trained, adequately equipped, well-disciplined and numerically sufficient Army. Third, Pakistan had no arms industry; besides, not much in the way of arms, even the legitimately allocated share of arms, were transferred to Pakistan at the time of partition with India. Fourth, a very large border with India, amounting to 2250 kilometres, was inherited by Pakistan's western part; and East Pakistan, which was separated from the west by over 1600 kilometres of Indian territory, was almost entirely surrounded by India. Pakistan also shared 950 kilometres of border with Iran and 1920 kilometres with Afghanistan. Fifth, the unresolved issues and problems that were the product of hasty and ill-planned partition processes contributed enormously towards the sense of unease.

Pakistan's search for security manifested itself in the form of alignment policy. For Pakistan the search became intense as its earlier efforts to find security in close ties with the leading Muslim countries were frustrated by their leaders' cold and rather unkind attitudes. But Pakistan's participation in western defence alliance systems angered and frustrated the Indians and they accelerated the consolidation of their military hold over Kashmir. Instead of resolving the Kashmir dispute, India initiated a process of erosion of Kashmir's special status and gradually integrated the area into the Indian Union. Pakistan's repeated protests were totally ignored by the Indians. Strangely enough, Pakistan's western allies and other friends except China were not as forthcoming over the Kashmir dispute as Pakistan expected them to be.

With the passage of time, the Kashmir dispute became a more serious source of friction and antagonism between the two neighbours and shaped up as a major facet of the Indian threat to the security of Pakistan. With the Indo–Pak war of 1971, and the subsequent signing of the Simla Accord of 1972 by a weak and demoralised nation, Pakistan was obliged to adopt a low profile on Kashmir in its Indian policy; and consequently Indian attitudes towards Pakistan also became a little more relaxed. Not only did the Indians begin to be more realistic in their appraisal of apprehensions arising from Pakistan's quest for security but the average Indian began to shed his obsession with the Pakistan factor. Similarly, with the dismemberment of Pakistan and disillusionment with its Western Alliance partners, the Pakistanis began to acknowledge the vastly improved position of India in the region. Negotiating from a position of strength, India was able to secure the transformation of the UN-arranged ceasefire line into a bilaterally agreed Line of Control (LOC) at the Simla meeting of 1972. For India the new line meant that she had disconnected the Kashmir dispute from its UN linkages and also retained a few strategically important border posts in the Kargil area.

For Pakistan the new line reflected a diplomatic success in a manifestly weak position and the ability to successfully resist Indian efforts to resolve the Kashmir dispute on its own terms. To many Pakistanis the new line symbolised Pakistan's ability to keep the issue alive in the face of overwhelming odds.

Following the signing of the Simla Accord, Pakistan's security environment registered some marginal improvement. While the East Pakistan crisis demonstrated India's unabashed willingness to intervene militarily in Pakistan's internal affairs, the separation of East Pakistan improved Pakistan's security situation. The defence of East Pakistan had been viewed as a logistical nightmare for all security planners of Pakistan, whereas the new Pakistan was a geographically more compact area with a well-developed communications network. As a result of the 1971 debacle, Pakistan was reduced in size and population but not reduced significantly in military strength.

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 and consequent installation of a puppet regime, coupled with a massive refugee influx into Pakistan, not only transformed what was initially an irritable relationship into a major threat on Pakistan's western borders but caused accelerated deterioration in its overall security environment. It was constantly facing a security threat on its eastern borders from India; now the Soviet forces on its western boundary confronted Pakistan with a two-front threat scenario. Until February 1989 when the Soviet forces withdrew from Afghanistan in accordance with the Geneva Accord, Pakistan was forced to cope with the Soviet onslaught, which had three major objectives: first, to gain control over Pakistani decision-making in order to eliminate all possibility of threat to the Soviet position in Afghanistan; second, to disrupt or block the emerging Pakistan–US relationship; and third, to gain direct air and naval access to the Arabian Sea through the 'Balkanisation' of Pakistan.[3] Even with the departure

of the Soviet forces, the situation on Pakistan's western border did not improve all that much. The withdrawal of these forces was followed by continual struggles for power among the various contending Afghan factions. Before pulling out of Afghanistan the Soviets had left behind an enormous arsenal of weapons in order to support their favoured faction, and even continued to supply deadly weapons including Scud missiles to the client regime. The ongoing civil war in Afghanistan continues to generate acute headaches for the security planners of Pakistan.

Apart from catering for the external security needs of a country, armed forces have from time to time played an active role in internal political/administrative processes. The circumstances leading to military intervention have varied with the country but include, for example, political instability, breakdown of law and order, the creeping influence of undesired ideology, value conflicts caused by pressures of modernisation, perceived impending economic ruin, and rapidly increasing corruption. Being professionally disciplined with well-developed organisational skills, the armed forces are generally able to take over state control with very little effort in most developing countries. In many ways the soldiers' professional competency and efficiency are admired by their countrymen, especially in times of crisis and where politicians' incompetence drives the ordinary people to look to the military as a saviour—at least during the initial stages of a military takeover. In such cases the military may simply be regarded as the best organised political party. For their part, the armed forces may justify intervention in terms of and as part of their sacred duty to defend their country.

The death of the Cold War and the resulting global transformation of power configurations have (despite introducing new types of conflict in some areas) considerably improved the overall security environment—with one major exception. The security situation

within South Asia has not displayed any noticeable difference. In fact, Pakistan's situation has further deteriorated. While potential external threats are viewed as still very much alive, the advent of new threats arising mostly from internal sources has begun to take its toll. A good example is the ongoing ethnic violence in the province of Sindh, which, coupled with sectarianism, has been effectively preventing any semblance of social stability and has been generating a strong sense of insecurity among the citizens. To make things more complex, the outsiders' interference—outsiders are involved too—goes on unabated. Thus one finds that the armed forces are frequently called upon to undertake internal security functions in addition to their main task of defending the country from external aggression.

Confronted with persistent external threats together with such internal instability, Pakistan seems to be perennially engaged in its search for security. In addition, its continuing search for a suitable political system—a search studded with periodic military takeovers—has precluded any lessening of the importance of its armed forces. Having ruled the country for some twenty-five of its post-independence years, the armed forces have acquired a position of considerable influence in the Pakistan polity. They have a very large pool of skilled manpower and they are an institution that is widely viewed among the public as a well-knit and effective functional unit. The role of the military in nation building, economic development and internal and external security has earned it respect and a dignified place in Pakistani society.

The major portion of this book concerns the evolution of the armed forces. Before we come to that, though, it is helpful to review the South Asian environment from 1947 onward and its impact on the way Pakistan perceived its security situation right from the beginning.

This is done in Chapter 2. Chapter 3 then looks at defence administration, with a special focus on higher defence organisation. With the scene set in this way, Chapters 4, 5 and 6 discuss the development of the Army, Navy and Air Force respectively. Since the armed forces have been periodically called upon to assist in the maintenance of law and order, Chapter 7 examines this additional burden on Pakistan's armed forces. Chapter 8, 'The armed forces and politics', offers an understanding of the influence that the military enjoys in Pakistan. Defence production and procurement are covered in Chapter 9. This is followed by a chapter which highlights nuclear and missile developments. The concluding chapter considers defence policy and strategy, and evaluates the overall role of the armed forces in Pakistan.

2

Development of Pakistan and its strategic environment

THE STRUGGLE FOR INDEPENDENCE

Pakistan came into existence as a result of the partition of the British Indian subcontinent on 14 August 1947. Many theories exist regarding the origin of the movement for an independent Pakistan. Some link it with the First War of Independence (1857), which most British historians refer to as the Sepoy Mutiny. There are others who credit Sir Syed Ahmad Khan's farsightedness and enlightenment in initiating the Aligarh Movement, an entity devoted to the welfare of the Indian Muslims. Another influential group of writers see the movement for a separate homeland as starting in 1906 with the birth of the All India Muslim League. The leaders of the Muslim League claimed that it spoke for the entire Muslim community of India, but it was never able to do that; indeed, in the end millions of Muslims opted to stay in India following partition. But perhaps the most convincing group of writers are those who nominate the date at which the idea of a separate homeland was injected into the ongoing freedom movement by a poet philosopher of the East, Sir Muhammad Iqbal, in an address in 1930. His view of the matter became the

conceptual basis for a state of Pakistan. It was eventually given realistic and concrete shape in the form of the Muslim League's Lahore Resolution of 1940. The Hindu press, which sought to project the idea in an alarming and derogatory way, began to refer to the Lahore Resolution as the 'Pakistan Resolution'. And in so doing the Hindu press assisted, though inadvertently, the League's efforts to convey to the Muslim masses of India what the idea of Pakistan meant and what the movement was striving for.

In forming the Aligarh Movement decades before this, Sir Syed Ahmad Khan had wanted to encourage Indian Muslims to come to terms with the West.[1] His main message to them was to take up western education and to revitalise their social, political and economic activity in order to assume their rightful place in public life.[2] For these purposes he laid the foundations of the Indian Patriotic Association, the Mohammedan Educational Conference, the Mohammedan Defence Association of Upper India and the Mohammedan Anglo-Oriental College at Aligarh which eventually became the nucleus of Muslim activities in India.[3] Confronted with the political challenge posed by the formation of the Indian National Congress in 1885, Khan advised Muslims not to participate actively in political activities organised by the Congress until they had acquired the modern education levels of the Hindus and had secured adequate political safeguards for their interests. The Congress's demand for the introduction of a representative form of government based on the majority principle was not at all liked by Khan, as he saw in it the replacement of the British raj with Hindu rule. He had already declared that the Hindus and the Muslims of the subcontinent were two separate nations and should be treated as such. Eventually the desired safeguards were introduced in the form of separate electorates—something for which the All India Muslim League had also been pressing—in the *Government of India Act 1919*.

The Congress was opposed to almost all such moves that strengthened Indian Muslims' separate identity, but the British did not agree with Congress views on this particular point at least. Instead of recognising the genuine needs of Indian Muslims and opting for a realistic approach, the Hindus expressed their intense dislike for separate electorates. The matter became the subject of major controversy in Indian politics and the rift between the two communities began to surface. Despite moderate Hindu leaders' concerted efforts, and repeated assertions that Muslim fears of being dominated by the Hindu majority should not be dismissed lightly as an insignificant issue, the impetuous hawkish leadership within the Congress and the Hindu hardliners continued to ignore Muslims' apprehensions. Such an attitude eventually drove many Muslim leaders out of the Congress fold. However, the World War I period saw a certain *rapprochement* between the Muslim League and the Congress, largely thanks to the efforts of Mohammed Ali Jinnah—who at the time was hailed as the ambassador of Hindu–Muslim unity—and also to developments such as the Lucknow Pact of 1916 between the League and the Congress.

After the passage of many years, and the deliberations of a number of commissions of inquiry and Round Table Conferences, the British Government passed the *Government of India Act 1935*. This not only incorporated the principle of separate electorates and introduced diarchy (a system of joint government) at the centre but also created a degree of autonomy at the provincial level.

The first elections held under the new constitutional arrangements, in 1937, proved to be crucial in widening the gulf between the League and the Congress. While the Congress did very well in the elections, the Muslim League did not. Overwhelmed by its unexpected success, the Congress decided not to opt for coalition with the

League, a decision that was regarded by many authorities as extremely unwise and one that would contribute substantially towards laying the foundations of Pakistan.[4] To make things worse, the Congress ministries not only tried to divide the Muslims and deny them equal opportunities but decided to use symbols of Hindu culture in government institutions and generally to promote Hindu interests only.[5] Alienated by Congress attitudes, Jinnah now hammered the dangers of Hinduisation of India and the untrustworthiness of the Hindus, and promoted the separate identity of the Indian Muslims. In this, he achieved massive success among the Muslims.[6]

On 23 March 1940 the Muslim League in its annual session passed the historic Lahore Resolution reflecting its quest for a separate homeland. The resolution stressed that no constitutional arrangements would be workable in India or acceptable to the Muslim community unless designed on the principle that predominantly Muslim regions (notably the North West and Eastern zones of India) would in effect be autonomous and sovereign.[7] But now World War II intervened. Anticipating a Japanese invasion of India and comprehending the increasing British apprehensions, the Congress started its 'Quit India' Movement aimed at Britain, with the objective of capitalising on the moment and coercing the British Government into handing over power to a Hindu oligarchy. The Muslim League's response to this movement was to push the idea of '*divide* and quit'.

Following the failure of yet another British-sponsored conference, at Simla on 25 June 1945, a general election was held in the winter of 1945–46 in which the Muslim League performed well by capturing all the Muslim seats at the centre and securing an overwhelming majority of seats in provincial assemblies. This election reinforced the League's assertion that it was the sole representative of the Indian Muslims. In 1946 the British Government sent a Cabinet Mission to consult with the Indian leaders

and to recommend a future political plan for India. Unable to secure the desired consensus among the Indians, the Mission announced its own plan envisaging an arrangement deemed to be a kind of confederation. The plan stressed that there would be a weak centre dealing with foreign affairs, defence and communications, along with three strong regional groupings consisting of areas physically situated in the North West, Eastern and Central & Southern regions. Of the three envisaged groupings, one was predominantly Hindu (Central & Southern), one predominantly Muslim (North West), and the third (Eastern) had a more mixed population. The Cabinet Mission plan was a compromise designed to preserve some semblance of unity in India. The Muslim League initially accepted the plan but later decided to withdraw its acceptance, mainly because of Nehru's assertion in July 1946 that the powers of the centre would be enlarged and that there would be no grouping of areas. Nehru's speech again revealed the real intentions of the Congress. While Jinnah had agreed to sacrifice the idea of full sovereignty of the mooted Pakistan at the risk of his own popularity, the Congress policy more or less forced the Muslim League to opt out. Once again the impetuous Congress leadership wasted an opportunity to secure at least some form of loose unity in India.

In 1946 an interim government was formed which the League eventually decided to join. By the end of the year the Hindu–Muslim rivalry had intensified, with a rapidly increasing frequency of communal riots. The struggle for independence gained dangerously alarming proportions and within the interim government acute bitterness and division developed between the Congress and the League. Recognising the grave situation in India, the British Prime Minister declared on 20 February 1947 that power would be transferred to the Indians by not later than June 1948. However, in early June 1947 the new Viceroy, Lord Mountbatten, not only advanced the timing of the

transfer of power but decided to partition India, setting the date of 14 August 1947. Thus India was awarded independence, and Pakistan was established, without any possibility of adequate preparations for the innumerable and complex tasks involved. The time allowed was the ridiculously short span of ten weeks.

PARTITION

Once the British had decided to leave the Indian subcontinent, their interest in arranging a tension-free transfer of power declined rapidly. The processes of partition were badly handled and concern for human life seemed to have withered away. The British left a legacy of hatred and persistent antagonism, partly the product of their policy of 'divide and rule' which sabotaged almost all efforts towards harmonious juxtaposition of the Indian communities. The British departure from the subcontinent was accompanied by the killings of millions of innocent people, massive two-way migration of Hindus and Sikhs to India and Muslims to Pakistan, loss of property, dislocation of public services, disruption of trade and industry and a mass of complex, unresolved problems like the sharing of river waters, the division of financial and military assets and the integration of regions into India or Pakistan. While the British took utmost care in preserving and maintaining their own interests in the colonies, they rarely demonstrated similar devotion to or even responsibility for the interests of the natives.

One of the unresolved problems was the definition of the border between India and Pakistan. It is of particular relevance here as its ramifications would involve the armed forces of the two countries to the present day.

Both the Congress and the Muslim League had agreed to the partitioning of Punjab as well as Bengal in accordance with the June 1947 partition plan. Accordingly, a

Boundary Commission under the chairmanship of an Englishman, Sir Cyril Radcliffe, with equal numbers of pro-Indian and pro-Pakistan judges was established. When the judges were unable to evolve the desired consensus, the determinations were left to the chairman—and consequently it was an Englishman who divided each of the two provinces.[8] Not only had the chairman never visited India before; he also decided not to take part in the public hearings.[9] No border has caused so much trouble and so effectively impeded peace in South Asia as has the Indo–Pak border that resulted from the Radcliffe decision. But perhaps we shouldn't be surprised. Most colonial borders were defined in accordance with the then strategic or resource needs of the paramount powers. Not much weight was attached to the aspirations of the people involved. The boundaries of the British Indian territories ran through cultural and ethnic groups of the same stock: Pakhtoons cut off from Pakhtoons, Baluchs cut off from Baluchs, Sindhis cut off from Sindhis, Punjabis cut off from Punjabis, Bengalis cut off from Bengalis, and Assamese cut off from Assamese. The inability of the British to partition the provinces in congruence with principles of justice and fair play—especially in the case of the Punjab boundary award—produced unnecessarily a large pile of complex problems.

The Boundary Commission started its work in July 1947 and finalised the award by 8 August, but did not announce it until 17 August. In almost all cases Radcliffe, in determining the award, strictly adhered to the religious affinity factor and awarded Muslim majority areas to Pakistan and non-Muslim majority areas to India—except in the most important case of Gurdaspur district of Punjab, which was a clear Muslim majority area and which he gave to India.[10] While there were in fact many areas unjustly awarded to India, as they had Muslim majorities and were physically situated next to Pakistan territories, the award of Gurdaspur to India was

a great blow inflicted deliberately on Pakistan. The loss of the district gave India the much desired access to the state of Jammu and Kashmir. A knowledgeable Englishman has stressed that if Gurdaspur had not been awarded to India, India could never have fought a war in Kashmir.[11]

Why did Radcliffe go for such an award? Was he influenced or induced by Mountbatten? Why was the award not announced a day after its finalisation by the commission? For a very long time these questions and the award itself remained the subject of intense controversy, but recent researches throw some light on them. While differences of opinion still exist over whether or not the award was changed and who changed it or who caused the change, recently released documents point in the direction of Lord Mountbatten's dubious role.[12] Most Pakistani analysts and writers believe that Mountbatten either changed the award or influenced Radcliffe to change it before it was finally announced on 17 August. At the time, it was commonly believed that Mountbatten wanted to be the first Governor-General of both dominions and that the Muslim League's decision to opt for Jinnah instead had wounded Mountbatten's pride.[13] Attempts were made even after the League's decision to devise a formula by which Mountbatten could continue as the Governor-General of both dominions.[14] But once it became clear that neither the League nor Jinnah would change their mind, many observers noticed a distinct change in Mountbatten's attitude towards Pakistan.[15]

A second major source of tension that the British left unresolved was the division of assets. This episode damaged Pakistan's interests enormously. While one can understand that the division of military assets was a somewhat complicated business which certainly required much more time than was available, the division of financial assets was a relatively simple matter that could have been easily resolved, yet the British seemed to make no special effort to do so. India was in

much the stronger position as it had physical control of almost all the assets; Pakistan had to have its legitimately allocated share transferred to its territories. Since the division of assets did not take place before the announced date of independence, India managed to deprive Pakistan of a very large portion of its share. Had the British made a little extra effort to speed up the process of transfer prior to 14 August, Pakistan could have received at least a major part of its share.

At the time of partition the cash balances of the British Indian Government stood at Rs 4000 million. Pakistan claimed Rs 1000 million as its share, which the Indians refused to accept. Later it was agreed by the two sides that Rs 750 million should be given to Pakistan as its share, but only Rs 200 million was transferred soon after the agreement; the large balance was withheld by the Indian Government for quite some time. In fact, the Indian Deputy Prime Minister, Sardar V.B. Patel, eventually began to threaten that the release of the remainder would depend on a settlement of the Kashmir dispute.[16] This was remarkable, to say the least. Hostilities in Kashmir had begun in the last week of October 1947 and the agreement over financial assets was signed in December. India's failure to honour its agreement made the most important Hindu leader, Mahatma Gandhi, extremely perturbed and dismayed, and he decided to start a fast early in 1948. Confronted with this action, India announced that it would release the withheld amount and within two days transferred another Rs 500 million, but it still retained Rs 50 million as an advance adjustment of certain claims against Pakistan. Gandhi's stand on the release of Pakistan's share of the financial assets deeply angered Hindu extremists and a few weeks afterwards he was assassinated by a member of the extremist group RSS (Rashtriya Swayam Sewak Sangh).[17]

The division of *military* assets was a far more complex undertaking, involving the division of weapons

and other equipment and the very complicated problem of dividing the military personnel. (The British Indian forces were entirely mixed, as there existed no separate Muslim or Christian or Hindu units.) In addition, there were problems revolving around ordnance factories and various support groups. Lord Mountbatten established a Joint Defence Council (JDC) consisting of himself (as chairman), the defence ministers of India and Pakistan, and Field Marshal Auchinleck, C-in-C of the British Indian forces who was also appointed Supreme Commander on 15 August 1947.[18] The JDC was given until the end of March 1948 to complete the huge task,[19] assisted by a number of high-ranking committees.[20] However, the JDC could not function properly, as the attitudes of the Indians underwent a radical transformation immediately after the transfer of power on 15 August. The first Governor-General of the independent dominion of India, Mountbatten was subjected to concerted pressure by the Indian cabinet to abolish the JDC and it was soon abolished by the same man who had established it.

Auchinleck had predicted that Pakistan would not get its due share of military assets, and that proved to be the case. Pakistan's Foreign Minister later informed the UN Security Council that the Indians as well as Lord Mountbatten had failed to honour their pledges to deliver Pakistan its proper share, and 'out of 165 000 tons of ordnance stores due to Pakistan only 4703 tons were delivered by 31st March 1948'. This meant that only 3 per cent of the total allocated stores were delivered.[21] Not a single one out of 249 allocated tanks was delivered and whatever Pakistan received in terms of ammunition or other items of military stores was either damaged or unserviceable or obsolete.[22] Moreover, India inherited all the ordnance factories, as these were situated in areas that formed part of India, and Pakistan was deprived of the compensation that would enable it to build its own.

The lopsided division of armed forces and military assets could have easily been avoided had the British seriously considered a proposal advanced by Liaquat Ali Khan, who was to become Pakistan's first Prime Minister. In April 1947, before the main political parties of India agreed to partition, Liaquat had proposed that a plan for the division of the armed forces be drawn up. But the proposal was vehemently opposed by all concerned, including Mountbatten and the other officials, despite the fact that they had already realised the inevitability of partition.[23] Liaquat had not asked for the actual division of forces at that juncture, merely a plan. The Sikh Defence Minister opposed the suggestion because he fully comprehended its implications. The British opposed it because the thought of dividing the Indian Army, the pride of the British Empire, was abhorrent to them; they also failed to recognise the merits of the proposal and the dictates of the time.

A third source of tension about which the British did not make adequate preparations was the anticipated two-way movement of huge numbers of people. Despite the rapidly increasing frequency of communal riots, the British took no steps to protect refugees moving from one dominion to the other. A systematic and well-planned massacre of Muslims in the Indian Punjab not only hurt the leaders in Pakistan but was viewed almost like genocide. It was not genocide in the formal sense, as the central Government of India was not involved, 'but it was organised and executed by the state troops and officials of the Princely States and it had the blessings and support of the civil authorities in East Punjab'.[24] Despite the fact that Mountbatten was fully familiar with Sikh plans for mass killings of Muslims and was also advised by the Muslim League leaders to take adequate precautionary measures, not much was done to prevent the massacre. Admittedly a Boundary Force was established under the command of General Rees to maintain law and order in Punjab, but Rees was not very

successful in preventing the transformation of Punjab into a killing field, largely because of the sinister role played by some Indian political leaders and the thorough advance planning of the Sikh gangs.[25] The systematic massacre of refugees trekking their way to Pakistan invoked a violent reaction in Pakistan and in consequence many non-Muslims were killed too. According to Ian Stephens the large-scale slaughter of the Muslims had been carefully planned, whereas hardly any evidence of a similar kind of wickedness was found in Pakistani Punjab.[26]

The Boundary Force was soon disbanded as the Hindu leaders and the Indian press continuously opposed its existence and consistently attacked its ability to contain communal violence. One wonders why Mountbatten didn't use the well-disciplined Indian Army or even British forces in India to contain the communal riots. This question becomes intriguing if viewed in the context of assurances Mountbatten gave Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, who had been president of the Congress for many years. According to Azad, Mountbatten not only assured him that there would be no bloodshed but even went on to stress that he would not hesitate to use tanks and aeroplanes against those creating the troubles.[27] Similar assurances were given to Raja Ghazanfar Ali Khan, also a minister in the government, that he would take the strongest measures against the troublemakers.[28] The killings on a massive scale, along with the mass migration, gave the two dominions the worst possible start. Gory details of the killings on both sides continued to haunt many people for a very long time and substantially contributed towards the mutual hardening of attitudes. The problems of refugee rehabilitation and evacuee property settlements only added to the bitter feelings.

A fourth major source of friction was the unresolved issue of water sharing. While it would be unfair to blame the British for giving birth to the problem, as it was an

inherent element of partition, it is equally difficult to absolve the British altogether for not making prior water-sharing arrangements with the parties concerned. The Indus river and its five main tributaries catered for almost 15 million hectares, of which 12.5 million hectares became part of Pakistan. Almost the entire flow of waters in the Indus basin was used for a vast irrigation system built before partition, at a time when no one visualised a divided Punjab even in the distant future—the system was built in accordance with the requirements of a *united* Punjab. The irrigation network with its innumerable canals was built by the British and was regarded as one of the greatest achievements of the British raj; 'yet it received very scant attention at the time of partition'.[29] While the system itself was working efficiently despite certain shortcomings, partition introduced a most complex problem which in fact brought the two nations to the brink of war. In many ways the Indus waters dispute had originated with the Radcliffe award. The unimaginative boundary award left most of the headworks of the Punjab irrigation system to India. This in turn meant that a little over 35 million people in Pakistan who were dependent on the flow of river waters were at the mercy of the Indians, who merely had to turn the tap off at the headworks to starve most of them. To make things even more complex most of the waters flowed into Pakistan from the disputed territories of Jammu and Kashmir.

The dispute surfaced when Indian Punjab cut off the flow of waters in April 1948. Radcliffe had given control of the headworks to India on the simple assurance that existing arrangements concerning sharing of waters would continue until new joint arrangements were made. The flow of water continued while the Arbitration Tribunal (which was established to deal with disputed cases) remained in existence. The day after dissolution of the Tribunal on 1 April 1948 India stopped the flow of waters to Pakistan without any

advance warning, depriving millions of Pakistani cultivators. This act totally eroded Indian credibility and also made the Pakistanis acutely aware of their vulnerability. 'No army, with bombs and shellfire, could devastate a land so thoroughly as Pakistan could be devastated by the simple expedient of India's permanently shutting off sources of water that keep the fields and people of Pakistan alive', wrote David E. Lilienthal, former chairman of the US Tennessee Valley Authority.[30] This is precisely what Radcliffe failed to anticipate.

India and Pakistan attempted to resolve the issue but were unable to find a permanent solution, though interim arrangements provided a temporary respite for Pakistani farmers. In the end, the president of the World Bank, Eugene Black, approached the leaders of the two governments and offered the good offices of the Bank in helping to resolve the dispute. Both governments accepted the offer and thus was initiated a long process of negotiations culminating in the signing of the Indus Water Treaty in 1960. The treaty allotted the waters of the three western rivers (Indus, Jhelum and Chenab) to Pakistan and those of the three eastern rivers (Ravi, Sutlej and Beas) to India. It also envisaged the construction of link canal systems, storage dams, power generators and an elaborate network of tubewells for drainage purposes.[31] To finance the construction the Indus Basin Development Fund was created, and to ensure smooth operation of the treaty a permanent India–Pakistan Indus Commission was established.

THE KASHMIR DISPUTE

Pakistanis, half a century after independence, have mostly forgotten the massive problems that accompanied partition. The Kashmir dispute, however, has survived the passage of time and is still viewed as a

reminder of India's duplicity and highhandedness. For the last 50 years the dispute has dogged Indo–Pak relations, causing wearisome debates and several outbreaks of fighting.

The origin of the dispute lies not just in the hurried and ill-prepared partition processes but also in the biased role played by Mountbatten in securing accession of most of the Princely States for India—disregarding when necessary the principles he himself had laid down governing such accession. There were perhaps 562 Princely States covering an area of approximately 1 850 000 square kilometres with a total population of around 93 million at the time of partition.[32] It was the Cabinet Mission that first made public the likely constitutional status of these states after independence. The Mission stressed that, after independence, 'His Majesty's Government will cease to exercise the powers of paramountcy', which implied that all rights surrendered by the states to the paramount power would be returned to them.[33] Consequently, in accord with the *Indian Independence Act 1947* all states theoretically became independent. Technically the fundamental principle of accession was that the power to accede to one or the other of the new dominions was vested in the ruler. But the rulers were categorically and repeatedly told by the British that their decision should take into consideration geographical contiguity and the communal composition of the population. This meant that if a state was located next to Pakistan and the majority of its population was Muslim, a case for accession to Pakistan would be extremely difficult to refute. On the other hand, if a state was next to Indian territory or was encircled by Indian territory and had a majority Hindu population, a case for its joining India could be easily made out.

By 14 August 1947 almost all states had acceded to one dominion or to the other. The most prominent states that had not joined either India or Pakistan were Junagadh, Hyderabad and Kashmir. Junagadh had a majority

Hindu population and was located some 480 kilometres from Karachi, but the ruler decided to accede to Pakistan. India refused to accept the decision of the ruler and forcibly occupied the state. Pakistan, which had accepted the accession, lodged a complaint with the United Nations; it is still gathering dust in the UN offices. Hyderabad's ruler entertained the idea of independent status, but India once again refused to respect the wishes of a ruler and invaded the state. Kashmir was the third and perhaps most important state in this category. It not only had an overwhelmingly Muslim population but was located on the border of Pakistan. The ruler of Kashmir was a Hindu who initially entertained the idea of remaining independent but later gave in to concerted pressure applied by Mountbatten, Indian Congress leaders and his fellow Hindu rulers of other Indian states, and decided to accede to India.

India insisted on the retention of Junagadh and Hyderabad because of the Hindu majority in those states. By this criterion, Kashmir should automatically have been able to join Pakistan. Cognisant of Kashmir's geographical position and communal composition, both Mountbatten and India's Prime Minister Nehru repeatedly pledged that the question of Kashmir's accession would be decided in accordance with the wishes of the Kashmiris.[34] The pledge was incorporated in UN resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949, in connection with which both India and Pakistan accepted that the question of accession of Kashmir would be decided through the democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite.[35] But the plebiscite was never held and the Indians never honoured their promise. Pakistan considers the Indian pledge to be as binding today as it was when first voluntarily made in 1947. India usually justifies its refusal to honour the pledge on the grounds that new developments have taken place during the last 50 years. The current Indian argument is that the Simla Accord, which was signed following the Indo–Pak war of

1971, and more specifically the principle of bilateralism that is part of the agreement, should be the basis of solving the Kashmir dispute. Pakistan, on the other hand, insists that the promised plebiscite be held in accordance with the UN resolutions accepted by both India and Pakistan. What is intriguing is that both nations, even after the passage of so many years and so many historic events, continue to adhere to their original viewpoints. Both countries seem oblivious to existing realities and tend to ignore the developments that have given new impetus to Kashmiri nationalism. Although some Kashmiris emphasise that their struggle for freedom started long before partition, the Kashmiris' desire for *independent* status has manifested itself in an articulate way only during the last ten years or so and has yet to draw a large number of supporters. For some Kashmiris, the holding of a plebiscite with only two options (India or Pakistan) appears to be a restricted choice, but it needs to be stressed that the vast majority of Kashmiris continue to insist on being allowed to exercise their legitimate right of self-determination.

STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT

The decade immediately following the end of World War II not only witnessed rapidly increasing superpower rivalry but also saw the emergence of the UN system along with the accelerated decolonisation process that swept over the entire globe. Numerous independent states came into existence. Most of these had already been subjected to systematic resource bleeding and indiscriminate exploitation. Consequently, most of the newly decolonised states emerged as weak, confused and insecure entities. As long as the paramount European powers were ruling the colonies, there were restraints on conflict arising from regional rivalries. With the Europeans' departure the restraints ceased to exist and

the newly independent states suddenly acquired new strategic needs and faced the task of providing their own security. Their low levels of armament, accompanied by lack of resources, effectively prevented them from building viable defence systems of their own. The emergent bipolar world and rapidly increasing intensity of the Cold War confronted these states with three options: to join the American-led group and participate in a western-sponsored defence alliance; to side with the Communist bloc; or to opt out and become part of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). It needs to be mentioned that many states that opted to join the NAM also developed close ties with the Soviet Union, including treaty relationships which covered defence linkages. While most of the new states preferred to remain outside the East–West struggle, some that were facing acute security threats and lacked resources to develop a satisfactory security structure of their own decided to join an existing military alliance. One such state was Pakistan, which opted to join the western-sponsored defence alliance.

Pakistan inherited much of British India's external defence problems, but with drastically lower defence capabilities. A combination of this and other factors were to make the inherited strategic environment extremely depressing. First, for the British Indian Government the main defence problem had concerned control and defence of the North West Frontier Province.[36] The province had been viewed as part of the traditional invasion route into India. Despite the employment of both political strategies (subsidies to the local tribesmen and the creation of Political Agencies) and military strategies (garrisons at strategic points and almost regular military expeditions), the British had been unable to subdue the tribesmen and enjoy satisfactory control over the northern frontier.[37] Partition bequeathed this unwelcome legacy to the newly created state of Pakistan, whose defence capabilities were

almost negligible during the early years of independence. Prior to partition Jinnah had often argued that the establishment of Pakistan would provide several important security advantages to an independent India, including shielding India from pressures emanating from any state that might gain a foothold in Afghanistan.[38] But unfortunately, instead of according serious and sincere consideration to Jinnah's view, independent India opted for a Kautilyan theory of statecraft: 'Do not trust your neighbour who is your natural enemy but rather look for support from the states beyond who are your natural allies'.[39] Consequently, India opted for close collaboration with Afghanistan on the one hand and the Soviet Union on the other.

Second, Pakistan inherited extremely insecure borders. While the British were mainly concerned with the north west frontier, Pakistan's entire border was problematic. Pakistan emerged as an independent entity comprising two wings separated by large tracts of Indian territory. The western wing (current Pakistan) was and is bounded by Iran on the west, by Afghanistan on the north and north west, by China and the disputed territory of Kashmir on the north east, by India on the east and by the Arabian Sea on the south. The then East Pakistan (now independent Bangladesh) was and is surrounded by India on all sides except for a small strip in the south east that borders Myanmar (Burma) and faces the Bay of Bengal. Pakistan was separated from the then Soviet Union by a small Afghani territory commonly referred to as the Wakhan corridor. Since the width of the corridor is almost negligible, the Soviet Union was practically a next door neighbour for Pakistan. Furthermore, Pakistan's inherited borders were not only very long but for much of the total length were not even properly demarcated, having been 'man-made'.

A third factor that contributed to the hostile environment confronting Pakistan was another product of the hurriedly contrived partition of the Indian

subcontinent. As we have seen, instead of producing two friendly neighbours the partition gave birth to two extremely hostile states. With a view to coping with Indian threats, Pakistan decided to align itself with the West. The Indians interpreted Pakistan's joining the western-sponsored defence alliances SEATO (South East Asia Treaty Organization) and CENTO (Central Treaty Organization; originally the Baghdad Pact) as an attempt to attain parity with India and to challenge what the Indians regarded as the natural power hierarchy in the subcontinent. India envisaged for itself a position of pre-eminence in the region and expected to be acknowledged accordingly by its regional neighbours. To strengthen its hand, India wasted no time in forming a closer relationship with the Soviets and encouraging them to play a greater role in South Asia. Pakistan's quest to remove the existing sense of insecurity and to modernise its armed forces was regarded by the Indians as a dangerous pursuit aimed at distorting the existing regional balance. This difference in perceptions helps to explain the intensity of the subsequent arms race and the three wars the two countries have fought, along with countless border clashes, some of them major ones. The last Indo–Pak war, in 1971, dismembered Pakistan when India intervened in support of East Pakistan, leading to the creation of Bangladesh.

A fourth factor that complicated Pakistan's security environment was the behaviour and policies of Afghanistan towards Pakistan. But the threat from Pakistan's western border did not acquire alarming proportions until the Soviets invaded Afghanistan in December 1979. The Soviet–Afghan linkage and perceived Soviet ambitions in the region generated considerable apprehension and compelled both Iran and Pakistan to seriously wonder whether their longstanding fears of Russian/Soviet desire to gain access to the warm waters of the Gulf and the Arabian Sea were about to materialise. Many to the West as well as in Pakistan believed

that their country would be the next target. The argument that the Soviets would use Afghanistan as a springboard to destabilise Pakistan in order to gain the much desired access to the Arabian Sea appeared convincing. For Pakistanis, sandwiched between Soviet-occupied Afghanistan and the Soviets' ally India, such apprehensions did not appear farfetched, especially if viewed in the context of close Indo–Soviet ties. The influx of 3.5 million Afghan refugees into Pakistan and the fiercely active resistance movement inside Afghanistan likewise meant that Pakistan could not overlook the risk of being drawn into the cauldron. And the danger of the Soviets exploiting Pakistan's internal dissensions were very real, especially in the North West Frontier Province and in Baluchistan. Even the withdrawal of the Soviets did not alleviate the situation. The ongoing civil war in Afghanistan has created an extremely complex and difficult situation for Pakistan, with the danger of possible fallout from Afghanistan's instability. Pakistan's domestic troubles are a further source of concern. They include the continuing search for a viable political system, a lack of national cohesiveness, and frequently alleged inequalities and disparities among the federated units. The end of the Cold War tended if anything to heighten ethnic conflicts, while Pakistan is also lumbered with periodic insurgencies, sectarianism, terrorist acts, drug trafficking, etc. In addition, India has fairly regularly exploited Pakistan's internal troubles.

The factors affecting Pakistan's security outlook were not improved when, disillusioned with its alliance partners following its 1965 (Kashmir) and 1971 wars, Pakistan decided during the 1970s to withdraw from the western-sponsored alliances. With its withdrawal the procurement of sophisticated arms became rather more difficult. Sophisticated arms are extremely costly and Pakistan's economy is still not strong enough to sustain a regular flow of such weapons. With a limited intake

of modern arms, Pakistan's military strength is far less today than that of India, which not only makes most of its own weaponry but has had a dependable external provider—formerly the Soviet Union, now Russia.

Another dimension of the Indian threat arises from India's acquisition of nuclear capability, first manifested in the Rajasthan explosion in 1974. Fearful of possible future nuclear blackmail, Pakistan made frantic efforts to secure a protective nuclear umbrella from one or other of the major nuclear powers. No such guarantee came from anyone, so Pakistan began to push vigorously the concept of a nuclear-free zone under the auspices of the United Nations, only to experience repeated rebuffs. Consequently Pakistan accelerated its own efforts to develop nuclear technology, primarily for 'ploughshare' purposes. While this was immediately interpreted in some quarters as a reactive move to match India's nuclear weapons capability, there were in fact several other reasons for Pakistan following the path it did. One was that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan caused the Americans to exempt Pakistan from the application of US prohibitions (the Glenn–Symington Amendment) for strategic reasons. More broadly, it was considered in Pakistan that the acquisition of nuclear technology would reduce the country's heavy dependence on external sources of fuel and make it more self-sufficient as far as its power requirements were concerned. The numerous power shortages in Pakistan and almost continuous load-shedding in all the major cities compelled the Pakistanis to tap this source of energy as well. Moreover, as one of the few Muslim countries with a reasonable nuclear base, the acquisition of advanced nuclear technology would make Pakistan one of the most important and respected members of the Islamic bloc. Despite these and other arguments for the acquisition of nuclear capability, Pakistan refrained from fully showing its hand until India conducted nuclear tests (in order to acquire weapons capability) on 11 and

13 May 1998. Pakistan conducted its own tests two weeks later.

Like other nations, for many years Pakistan was caught up in the Cold War rivalry of the superpowers. America's early policy was directly linked with its global position. More specifically, containment of communism was the mainstay of the policy, and was to be served by a system of military alliances. Pakistan was inducted, in part because of the Indians' refusal to participate in Cold War defence arrangements. While America was willing to sign up all those players who exhibited some interest in checking the perceived onward march of communism, it didn't bother to properly comprehend the intensity of deeprooted regional hostilities between the local states. Although both the Pakistanis and the Americans went into an alliance with a view to serving their national interests, neither fully understood the implications and consequences of an alliance between unequal partners. The Americans never committed or even contemplated the deployment of US troops or the use of American-supplied equipment against India. The Pakistanis, on the other hand, expected that the Americans would not only extend diplomatic support to Pakistan's case on Kashmir but would also back Pakistan in the event of a war with India. The Pakistanis' expectations, though a little on the high side, were natural enough as they thought the Americans were fully conscious of the Indian threat to Pakistan's security and realised that this was the main reason why Pakistan joined the western camp.

Three major letdowns by the Americans completely disillusioned the Pakistanis regarding the alliance partnership. The first came in the wake of the Sino–Indian border clash in the 1950s when the US began to supply arms to Pakistan's main adversary, India. The Americans had promised to consult Pakistan before actually supplying weapons to India, but in fact they were supplied and Pakistan was merely informed.[40] Second, the

Americans imposed an arms embargo in the 1965 Indo–Pak war. The embargo was particularly pinching for Pakistan as its main source of weapon supplies was the US, whereas India's dependence on the West was no more than 20 per cent of its total arms procurements. Third, the Americans did not come to the assistance of Pakistan even in the 1971 Indo–Pak war, despite the fact that India was generally viewed as the aggressor by most Americans and their western partners. Besides, in the 1971 war the Soviets not only supplied weapons to India but their pilots and reconnaissance planes participated. Yet the Americans did not take any effective measures to assist Pakistan. Pakistan's disenchantment with the US, if viewed in the context of Indo–Soviet relations and the support that the Soviets had consistently extended to India over the years, is quite understandable. Perhaps the only redeeming feature of alignment with the Americans was the economic and technical assistance that flowed from it, which certainly contributed towards Pakistan's economic development.

Following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan the Americans once again moved closer to Pakistan, primarily because Pakistan had now become in the eyes of American decision makers a 'Front Line State' that could make things difficult for the Soviets. (The Pakistanis were far more realistic this time: the Zia regime moved carefully and signed an aid-cum-sales package with the Americans without compromising its expressed policy of non-alignment.) Then, once the Afghanistan crisis was over in the sense that the Soviets withdrew, the Americans began to pressurise Pakistan to abandon its quest for nuclear capability and in 1990 stopped the military sales and economic assistance. While Pakistan was once again pushed to look for alternative sources for arms procurement, it refused to abandon its nuclear policy.

Compared to its relations with the Americans (and the Soviets), Pakistan's relations with China have been

remarkably smooth. Friendship with China has in fact become the cornerstone of Pakistan's foreign policy. China has not only consistently stood by Pakistan in economic and political affairs but has always firmly supported Pakistan's territorial integrity and has supplied modest amounts of arms from time to time.

THREAT PERCEPTIONS

For our purposes, a threat is a geopolitical condition of the strategic environment, in the face of which a penalty has to be paid by the target state if it fails to create a warding-off mechanism.[41] It is often the *perception* of threat that is crucial and, just as the relations among nations are never static, perceptions undergo changes. Moreover, threats are perceived by those in power, and a replacement of the ruling party or group may well change the perceptions. Sometimes the change is radical and at other times it may turn out to be only marginal, even though a major transformation may have taken place at the decision-making level. As well, dissimilar political units are likely to generate different perceptions of the same threat; even groups belonging to the same political party may have different perceptions.[42]

To define a threat is perhaps not difficult but to measure its intensity is. Among the few available formulas with which we can measure a perceived threat, perhaps the most appropriate and convincing is one provided by David Singer.[43] Singer stresses that threat perception is a product of a situation of armed hostility in which the policy makers assume that the adversary entertains aggressive designs and that such designs would be pursued by direct physical means if the estimated gains seem to outweigh the estimated losses. In cold arithmetic terms Singer's formula amounts to: Perceived Threat = Estimated Capability $\times$ Estimated

Intentions. Employing this formula in order to measure the threat, one can conclude that if a nation is able to accurately calculate the adversary's physical capabilities and correctly assess its intentions, then the intensity of perceived threat can be measured to a considerable degree. However, it needs to be stressed that 'estimated intentions' is often greatly dependent upon correct/incorrect information, misinformation, disinformation and deliberately contrived distortion of facts, along with preconceived notions and biases of the perceiver. In addition, both threats and capabilities are relational and are not assessed in a vacuum, but in the contextual framework of a specific situation. Accurate assessment of a potential aggressor's threatening intentions is quite a complex business as it involves hardnosed scrutiny and careful analysis of the adversary's recent behaviour and past attitudes in similar circumstances, including the long-term objectives. Similarly, 'estimated capability' is affected by one's ability to defend and to inflict unacceptable damage on the adversary.

For much of Pakistan's independent existence three main things, as we have seen, have contributed to the nation's threat perceptions: the asymmetrical power balances arising from Britain's departure; the persistence of regional conflicts; and the intrusion of outsiders. Let's focus on the first of these, looking in particular at the military situation. Following partition India emerged as the largest and most powerful state in the region. It was blessed with a large territory, massive population and abundant resources, and it acquired over the years a very powerful military machine. Compared to India, Pakistan started its independent career as a weak nation with no state institutions and deprived of its legitimate share of financial and military assets.

Despite the top priority given to the defence sector by almost all of Pakistan's regimes since partition, the nation's current defence capability is not much of a match for India's strength. A simple comparison of

Indian and Pakistani force levels clearly indicates the massive difference. Compared to Pakistan's total armed forces of 587 000 personnel, India maintains 1 175 000; and it enjoys extremely impressive numerical superiority in items like tanks, aircraft, ships, guns, missiles, etc.[44] India maintains 1 090 000 active paramilitary personnel whereas Pakistan has only 247 000.[45] In the area of indigenous defence production, Pakistan is nowhere near the level India has attained. India's local defence industries produce a wide variety of weaponry, including rockets, mortars, anti-tank guns, anti-aircraft guns, long-range and short-range missiles, ships and a comprehensive range of aircraft. In the field of nuclear and missile development, India is far ahead of Pakistan.

The magnitude of this difference in military strength has always kept the Pakistanis busy exploring avenues that could strengthen their security. Thus, while Pakistan's quest for security led it into the arms of the West in the 1950s, its gradual disenchantment with its alliance partners led in due course to the opening up of the China option. Over the years China has provided Pakistan with substantial economic and military aid as well as diplomatic and political support. Admittedly, the Chinese arms were not qualitatively as good and effective as the western weaponry, but the regular supply in impressive quantities made the Chinese arms the mainstay of Pakistan's armed forces, especially after the 1965 western arms embargo. With the 1970s came a period of relative calm, in which the threat from India was viewed as less acute than before. The security situation during the 1980s was totally dominated by the perceived imminent threat from Soviet-controlled Afghanistan. The 1990s once again witnessed an upsurge of the Indian threat, primarily because of the ongoing Kashmiri struggle for self-determination.

Thus a nation's perceptions of threat are likely to change over time in the face of changing circumstances. But for Pakistan there has been one constant: India has

always loomed large on the horizon. It is no wonder that only limited and muted objections are raised in Pakistan against the substantial allocations that are regularly made to the nation's defence sector.

3

Defence administration

ADMINISTRATIVE SETUP

Until the end of the 1971 war, a debacle in which Pakistan was dismembered, decision making on defence affairs was solely in the hands of the military's top brass. While the earlier wars of 1948 and 1965 had also shown the need for institutionalisation of defence decision making, little effort had been devoted to it. The 1965 and 1971 wars, in particular, clearly highlighted how the lack of coordination among the three services affected the overall performance of the armed forces. In fact, joint planning had remained an alien concept to defence planners and managers for almost three decades. Each service used to have its own plans of war, though bilateral discussions did take place periodically among the three services. The Army, being the largest and most senior service, would invariably sponsor the main plan. Since there was no joint staff headquarters for the three services, objectives of the government of the day were translated into military plans by the Military Operations Directorate working under direct supervision of the Army's Chief of General Staff and equivalent officers from other services.[1] Realising the need for greater coordination among the three services, the Z.A. Bhutto regime initiated a study of civil–military relations and defence decision-making processes. The study highlighted serious flaws in the defence organisation and in

military performance, especially in 1971.[2] One eminent writer stressed that the 1971 war was 'fought without a purpose and with total lack of coordination between the civil effort and the armed forces and between the three fighting services'.[3] Not only were Bhutto's steps to reform the decision-making structure strongly supported by the military but they were even implemented (in part) by Zia's military regime, which took over from Bhutto in 1977.

Notwithstanding the circumstances of Bhutto's departure from office, and the concurrent suspension of the Constitution, the 1973 Constitution had strongly supported the principle of civilian control of the armed forces and introduced harsh penalties for those challenging civilian rule. The 1976 White Paper on Defence Organisation was part of the effort to further strengthen civilian control, and laid down intellectual justification for the constitutional provisions. It emphasised that 'national defence policy is no longer a military affair alone' and that:

> The evolution of national defence policy and its administration requires (a) effective political control at the top, to secure the proper integration of the various relevant elements in the nation's defence effort; and (b) a number of institutions and agencies at the base, to produce the necessary data and appreciations on which political decisions can be based, and to translate the overall policy into specific, mutually consistent plans for implementation by the Armed Services and other agencies concerned.[4]

The Constitution gave control and command of the armed forces to the federal Government. The Prime Minister, being the Chief Executive, is responsible to the nation for safeguarding the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Pakistan and for

preserving and protecting the Constitution. The PM's specific duties include:

- allocation of the necessary resources to defence within the existing capacity of the state
- establishing, expanding and/or reorganising institutions to ensure the coordinated application of such resources
- ensuring the raising and development of armed forces commensurate with national requirements, resources and priorities
- coordinating defence policy with domestic and external policies[5]

The PM is assisted by the Minister of Defence, and if there is no Minister of Defence the Minister of State for Defence performs the functions and exercises the powers that may be transferred or delegated.

The most important body in the entire structure of defence administration is the DCC (Defence Committee of the Cabinet). (The central hierarchy is outlined in Figure 3.1.) The DCC is headed by the Prime Minister and includes as permanent members the Ministers of Defence, Interior, Foreign Affairs, Finance, States and Frontier Regions, Kashmir Affairs, Information and Broadcasting, Communications and Transport, Commerce, Industries and Production. The Chairman of JCSC, the three service chiefs, the Secretaries General of Defence and Finance, and the Secretaries of Defence, Foreign Affairs, and Finance also attend the meetings. If a matter under discussion deals with a ministry that is not regularly represented in DCC meetings, the Secretary of that particular ministry is also called to attend.

The main function of the DCC is to determine and approve the country's defence policy. Specific functions are to:

- define from time to time the task of the armed forces in accordance with the national strategy and overall policy of the Cabinet, and secure the necessary assessments and plans for the fulfillment of defence policy from the Chairman of JCSC
- consider these assessments and plans and keep under constant review the organisation for the country's defence and its preparedness for war
- undertake appropriate actions through various ministries on matters relating to foreign, political, economic and administrative policies which have a bearing on the country's defence potential, and coordinate plans and actions of the ministries in this respect
- supervise the conduct of war during hostilities[6]

The charter of the DCC implied that the Committee would be responsible to evaluate any threat, to decide the minimum force requirements to meet the threat, to define the task of the armed forces in congruence with the national strategy and policy of the Government, to determine future goals, and to review periodically the preparedness of each service.

Figure 3.1 Pakistan's defence hierarchy



Source: The Herald, July 1989

While the DCC is empowered to determine and approve defence policy, the Defence Council is entrusted with the task of translating the approved policy into military policy. The Council is chaired by the PM as Defence Minister, and includes the Minister of Finance, Ministers of State for Defence and Foreign Affairs, Chairman of JCSC, Chiefs of Staff of the three services, Secretary General of Defence and of Finance, and Secretaries of Foreign Affairs, Defence, and Finance. Other officials may be called when required. (It is of interest that most PMs in Pakistan's history have held the defence portfolio themselves.) According to the charter, the Defence Council is expected to:

- examine, and recommend for approval to the DCC, the role, size, shape and development of each of the three services and other defence establishments, as well as the budgetary allocations for each
- review all assessments and plans concerning defence presented by JCSC and other departments to the DCC for approval
- formulate policies for indigenous production, research and development and for defence procurements[7]

The Ministry of Defence is headed by the Defence Minister. As the latter is almost invariably the Prime Minister, the Secretary of Defence is a crucial link between the ministry and the PM. (It does seem strange that, while defence takes the largest chunk of the national budget, it has rarely had its own separate minister. Arguably, it deserves the services of a full-time Minister as well as a Minister of State or a Deputy Minister.) The ministry consists of the defence division, defence production division, Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee, and the three service headquarters. The Defence Secretary is assisted by four additional Secretaries responsible for the three services and for military

finance. In the past the aviation division was also part of the ministry but currently it exists as a separate division with a secretary at the top working directly to the Minister of Defence. The defence production division has its own Secretary. Whenever there is a Secretary General of Defence all the defence divisions work under him, otherwise each division is headed by a Secretary.

Technically JCSC is the highest *military* body; and its Chairman serves as Principal Staff Officer to the Prime Minister. Created in 1976, JCSC is entrusted with the task of considering all problems relating to military aspects of national defence. The need for proper integration of various elements in order to secure the desired level of military coordination was the driving force that led to its creation. It is responsible for preparing joint strategic and integrated logistic plans, providing for strategic direction of the armed forces, reviewing periodically the role, size and shape of the three services, advising Government on strategic communications and industrial mobilisation plans, and formulating and reviewing defence plans.[8] In many ways JCSC provides an important link between the political and military organs of the state.

JCSC consists of a Chairman, the three service chiefs and the Secretary of Defence. The chairmanship rotates among the three services. Under the Chairman there is a Director General Joint Staff who is invariably a senior Army general. The Director General Joint Staff is assisted by three additional Directors General who look after plans, logistics, and training. While planning is headed by a senior officer from the Army, logistics and training are supervised by senior officers from the Air Force and the Navy. Under the Director General Joint Staff, joint operations planning, joint logistics planning and joint training planning are formulated and reviewed. The principal training institution, the National Defence College (NDC), functions directly under the supervision of JCSC. Senior officers (often with the rank of brigadier

or colonel or an equivalent civilian rank) from the three services and the civilian bureaucracy and from friendly countries attend NDC courses. Two main courses are run: National Defence and War. Instructors are seconded from the three services. In addition, eminent civilians are invited to give lectures.

While each of the services has its own intelligence network, there is a central body known as Inter Services Intelligence (ISI). Over the years ISI became a very powerful and influential agency, especially during the Zia regime. It began to keep an eye on political developments within the country, in addition to its main functions, and also began to actively participate in the political arena and to extend support to preferred groups.[9] ISI 'gained prominence due to its association with the Afghan War and the close link it cultivated with the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in 1979–80, which enabled it to amass sizable material resources'.[10] Following the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, ISI began to focus more on the domestic scene. In the 1990 elections it played an extremely important role in setting up a right-wing electoral alliance known as Islami Jamhoori Itehad to counterbalance the expected victory of the Pakistan Peoples Party.[11] ISI works under the Chief of Army Staff, and information provided by the agency is often used to develop strategies to counter internal as well as external threats. Usually the chief of ISI is a serving senior Army officer; occasionally the position has been held by a retired officer.

Under the Constitution there is also a parliamentary standing committee on defence affairs. It consists of ten members drawn from the National Assembly and belonging to different political parties. The Minister of Defence is an ex-officio member. Like other committees of the National Assembly, it elects its own chairman. It monitors defence developments and reviews budgetary inputs.

BUDGETING FOR DEFENCE

While almost all developing countries are confronted with the dilemma of how to meet defence requirements within their limited resources, and simultaneously maintain a steady pace of development, the plight of those developing countries that were caught in a cobweb of conflict was, and in some ways still is, acute. South Asia is a region that has so far been unable to resolve its internal conflicts and consequently one finds that a greater portion of the scarce resources is allocated to defence outlays. Even with the end of the Cold War some South Asian nations have felt unable to reduce their defence allocations. While global military spending decreased 6 per cent annually between 1987 and 1994, it went up in South Asia by 1.6 per cent in real terms.[12]

Lack of transparency seems to be the hallmark of most defence budgets in the region. Many defence items are camouflaged and are listed under some other ministry's budgetary allocation. These are known as hidden allocations—resources allocated to the non-defence sector but whose outcome forms a significant part of the overall defence activity. For instance, funds for the construction of strategic border roads may be listed under the Ministry of Communications and Transport but these roads are used and controlled only by the armed forces. Similarly, all the paramilitary forces get their budgets from ministries other than Defence—mostly the Interior or Home Ministries. Lack of transparency impedes the analysis of actual budgetary allocations to a particular sector. In addition, the release of information is not a common phenomenon in South Asia. Even those countries which publish annual defence reports refrain from giving the full picture. For a very long time the defence sector was viewed as a taboo area. Neither the officials nor the public representatives were keen to discuss the defence budget in detail. Even the media has only fairly recently started analysing defence

matters, although everybody recognises that debate and open discussion can help in maximising the utility of limited resources.

Since its creation, Pakistan's defence allocations have remained substantial, primarily because of the perceived threat from India. A look at the allocations over the years clearly shows a steady increase overall instead of a desired decrease, although at times there have been marginal dips.[13] Three factors have contributed more than others to this: the continuing Indian threat, the inability of the two nations to resolve the ongoing Kashmir dispute, and periodic action/reaction arising from increases in defence spending—that is, an increase in India's defence budget tends automatically to strengthen the case for an increase in Pakistan's budget.

While all Finance Ministers have almost routinely announced increased allocations to the defence sector in line with perceived security threats and annual levels of inflation, the parliament has often ritually approved such increases without tangible debate. Admittedly the defence sector is a relatively sensitive area and there are many aspects that cannot be discussed publicly, but it is equally imperative that the broad social and economic cost (to other sectors of national life) created by high defence spending be debated frankly and openly. This does not mean that one has to compromise on security; rather, security requirements and national development needs have somehow to be balanced in such a way that neither unduly damages the other, and efforts have to be made to ensure that resources allocated to defence activities are not in excess of what is legitimately required. Nonetheless, while security threats remain, Pakistan is unable to slash its defence budget by any great amount.

4

Evolution of the Army

PRESENT STRUCTURE AND STRENGTH

The Army is divided into two broad functional categories: the fighting arms and the services. The fighting arms include infantry, armoured units, artillery, aviation, engineers and signals, whereas the services include administrative personnel, medical staff, ordnance, electrical and mechanical engineers, education, military police, remount units (horses and mules) and veterinary units. Looked at another way, the Army is organised into corps, divisions and brigades. A corps consists of two or more divisions and a division is made up of three or more brigades. While a corps has a lieutenant general as its commanding officer, a division is commanded by a major general and a brigade by a brigadier. 'An infantry division, the major ground force combat unit, consists of infantry, artillery, engineers, signals, communication, supply and other support services required for sustained independent action' and is generally organised 'with three or more brigades, each consisting of three battalions'.[1] 'Armoured divisions consist of tank regiments, mobile artillery and elements of backup services.'[2]

The Army's current strength is around 520 000, out of a total armed forces strength of some 587 000. (Reserves account for a further 513 000.)[3] The Army's main tactical components are shown in Table 4.1.

Table 4.1 Army: tactical components

Armoured Divisions	2
Independent Armoured Brigades	7
Infantry Divisions	19
Independent Infantry Brigades	9
Corps Artillery Brigades	7
Engineering Brigades	7
Armed Recce Regiments	3
Axa Command Division	1
Special Forces Group (3 battalions)	1
Air Defence Command	1
Equipment	
MBT	2120 +
Towed Artillery	1590
Support Artillery	240
Aircraft	93
Helicopters	117

Source: The Military Balance 1998–99, IISS, 1998

The Army is headed by the chief of Army staff, who is assisted by four main officers: the chief of general staff, the adjutant general, the quartermaster general, and the master general of ordnance. Other principal officers also work directly under the chief of Army staff in GHQ: the engineer in chief, the military secretary, the judge advocate general, and the controller of civilian personnel.[4] Sometimes a vice chief is also appointed.

While they are not part of the Army, mention may be made here of Pakistan's paramilitary forces, whose current strength stands at 247 000. They include National Guard (185 000, including Janbaz Forces, Mujahid Forces, National Cadet Corps, Women Guards),

Frontier Corps (35 000), Pakistan Rangers (25 000), Maritime Security Agency (2000) and a small Coast Guard.[5] The overall number of paramilitary personnel has grown since the beginning of the 1990s.[6]

BEGINNINGS

The origin of Pakistan's Army lies in the splitting up of the British Indian Army following the partition of British India. Since no contingency plan for the transfer of forces had been drawn up and no requisite preparations made, the actual division was undertaken in haste, leaving many complex issues unresolved. This happened, as we have seen, despite the efforts of Liaquat Ali Khan, who was to become Pakistan's first Prime Minister and Defence Minister.

It was not until their final acceptance of partition that reality began to dawn upon the British and that any serious thought was given to this delicate and difficult problem. On 30 June 1947 the Partition Council met and agreed upon principles dealing with the division of the armed forces. Among the principles were:

- a single administrative head of the Indian armed forces would continue until partitioning of the forces was finalised
- Field Marshal Sir Claude Auchinleck would become the Supreme Commander until the division was completed
- heads of forces for both India and Pakistan would be selected and authorised to set up headquarters in order to take over the command of their respective forces by 15 August
- the initial division would be rough and ready in nature and based on communal composition, with Muslim majority units to be moved to Pakistani territories and Hindu majority units to Indian territories

- a second stage of division would involve combing out units on the basis of voluntary transfers[7]

Lord Ismay, a leading figure of the time, had aptly described the task of dividing the armed forces as the 'biggest headache', reflecting the magnitude of the undertaking and the complexities involved. Just before partition of the subcontinent, the British Indian Army consisted of approximately 11 800 Indian officers and civilian officials and 450 000 other personnel.[8] The Army was deployed all over the vast tracts of the subcontinent and a considerable portion of its officers and soldiers were serving in units stationed outside India in countries like Iraq, Malaya and Burma and with the Allied forces in Japan. In addition, of the then 46 training institutions and sixteen ammunition factories, seven training institutions at most and not a single ammunition factory were located in the territories that would form Pakistan. Almost all medical and other stores were outside those territories. Besides, of many ordnance depots and sub-depots only five small sub-depots for retail issues to troops were actually located in Pakistan. Since Bombay, Calcutta and Madras were part of the main supply routes during World War II, major stocks of stores, equipment and ammunition were kept in those cities.

In accordance with the agreed principles, the first stage of dividing the Army was the division and transfer of units on a broad communal basis. It was mostly completed by 15 August, thereby enabling the two dominions to assume operational control of their respective forces. The second stage took longer, being concerned with 'the redistribution of individuals and units, on a voluntary basis, to the dominion they preferred, thus enabling the officers and the soldiers to opt for the country of their choice'.[9] Although the reconstitution of forces involved a fairly complicated procedure of separating the Muslim sub-units and

transporting them to Pakistan at a time when the railway system was already overburdened, the task of dividing the forces was almost finalised by the end of October 1947.

Pakistan's share of the Army was much smaller. Whereas India got fourteen armoured corps regiments, 40 artillery regiments and 21 infantry regiments, Pakistan was allocated six armoured corps regiments, eight artillery regiments, and eight infantry regiments.[10] (A similar situation applied in the case of the Navy and the Air Force.[11]) Since all Army units were mixed and no unit consisted of either Muslims or Hindus or Christians only, none of the allocated regiments was at normal strength. As to training establishments, Pakistan received only a handful.[12]

While the division of manpower did not encounter any major hurdle, the overall division of military assets was studded with complex impediments. In fact, the Pakistanis were cleverly outwitted by their Indian counterparts and were deprived of their legitimate share of the assets as a result of the Indians' politicking and delaying tactics. To give just one example, the Partition Council on 30 June 1947 had clearly laid down that movable stores and equipment should be divided between the two dominions in the same proportions as the strength of their armies. Accordingly, the Army sub-committee handling partition matters unanimously decided that ordnance stores should also be divided in the proportions of 36 to Pakistan and 64 to India, proportions reflecting the pre-partition communal composition of the Army. When this recommendation was presented to the Joint Defence Council, the Indian members insisted that it should be referred to the full Partition Council—which in turn sent it back to the JDC. All this wasted much time unnecessarily. In fact, the whole month of September was lost, with no serious attention being given to the problem itself.

ORGANISING THE PAKISTAN ARMY

Early phase

At the time of partition the Muslim representation in the British Indian armed forces was approximately 30 per cent in the Army, 40 per cent in the Navy and 20 per cent in the Air Force.[13] Compared to 48 per cent Hindu officers, the Muslim officers formed around 24 per cent. Other ranks consisted of 56 per cent Hindus and 34 per cent Muslims.[14] Of the 461 800 Army personnel, Pakistan's agreed total inheritance was around 150 000 (including officers), in a little over 500 units of varying sizes. This number reflected the total allocation of personnel who were supposed to go to Pakistan, but about 40 per cent of the units were stationed outside the territories that formed Pakistan. Consequently a large number of soldiers and officers took quite some time in reporting to the temporary GHQ in Rawalpindi. Delays were further caused by the communal killings in Punjab and the early outbreak of the Kashmir dispute. Many Army men were naturally concerned with moving their families to a safe place in Pakistan before reporting to GHQ. Those who reported first often went on leave in order to find and settle their families.

Since the Indian Government had delayed handing over the funds allocated to Pakistan, GHQ was facing an acute financial shortage and was unable to set itself up properly. Despite the specific orders of the Supreme Commander for the quick division of important documents and files, nothing arrived at Rawalpindi as the Indian Government had put an embargo on the despatch of all documents without its sanction, on the grounds that the decision of the JDC only covered the division of publications held by the Publication Department.[15] And as the communal situation grew worse each day, the Muslim personnel left almost all their records behind as they hurried to reach Pakistan. Thus the new GHQ was nothing more than a building with scant

furniture. Equally problematic was the task of establishing a new GHQ at Dhaka in East Pakistan for the newly created East Pakistan Command. In fact, the situation in Dhaka was far worse than in Rawalpindi. The only space the newly designated commander, Maj. Gen. Mould, was able to find initially was in the High Court building.[16]

Lt. Gen. Sir Frank Masservy, GOC Northern Command, was appointed the first C-in-C of the Pakistan Army on 30 July 1947, and assumed command on 14 August. It took six months to a year to organise a major portion of the new structure. For months a large number of officers and soldiers were holed up in Delhi Fort, where they had taken refuge for security purposes. Lack of proper transport, continuously intensifying communal carnage, and non-cooperation on the part of many Indian officials delayed the arrival of all those officers and soldiers who had opted to join the Pakistan Army. Those who managed to report to Rawalpindi were grouped into a rough structure in order to create some semblance of an organised army. It included three infantry regiments and an armoured corps.[17] Pakistan started off, of course, with the inherited organisation of the British Indian Army, which was 'based on static rather than operational considerations'.[18] With the changed conditions and emerging needs of the newly carved-out nation, the Army was then reorganised with operational considerations in mind. Within a few months its divisional structure was:

7th Division, Rawalpindi area
8th Division, Karachi/Quetta area
9th Division, North West Frontier area
10th Division, Lahore area
14th Division, East Pakistan
3rd Armoured Brigade, Risalpur

Another important change is worthy of mention here. During the British rule, several Army divisions as

well as Scouts and Levies (recruited mostly from the local population) were stationed in the tribal areas. Instead of eliciting the desired cooperation of the tribesmen, the presence of such a large regular and semi-regular force was proving to be a great source of irritation to them. Hit and run tactics were regularly experienced by the stationed British force. Just before partition a committee under the leadership of Lt. Gen. Sir Francis Tucker was formed to study the problem and to make recommendations; it eventually recommended the withdrawal of forces from the tribal areas of Waziristan.[19] Despite the recommendation, the British Indian Government continued to maintain its forces there. The new Government of Pakistan, however, decided to immediately abandon the British 'forward policy' and ordered the withdrawal of forces from Waziristan. The tribesmen were delighted over this and pledged their loyalty to Pakistan. The actual withdrawal began on 6 December and was successfully completed by the end of the month under the codename 'Operation Curzon'—Curzon being the British Viceroy who had created the tribal areas in pursuit of his forward policy. The tribal leaders then fully cooperated with the Pakistani GOC in the region.

For Pakistan's inherited 150 000 strong Army it was considered imperative to have at least 4000 officers, but at the time only 2500 were available.[20] To fill this deficiency, the administration took four steps: first, it retained more than 500 British officers, especially in the special and technical branches; second, accelerated promotions were given to competent officers in order to fill the higher ranks; third, it tightened its release policy and made it difficult for Army officers seeking release; and fourth, it introduced a temporary and short service commissioning policy.[21] These measures proved to be a constructive solution to the problem.

A second major problem confronting the Army was lack of equipment. In the case of heavy equipment such

as tanks, nothing was delivered to Pakistan. Just before partition almost all tanks were sent far away from Pakistan's borders, under the orders of the then Defence Minister Sardar Beldav Singh, to cantonments of southern India with the objective of preventing or at least delaying the delivery as far as possible.[22] In addition, some Hindu and Sikh soldiers deliberately sabotaged their tanks and other vehicles, rendering them useless for the Pakistanis, by putting sand into the engines.[23] Since Pakistan was unable to influence the Indians to deliver the allocated equipment, it was completely deprived of its share. The Pakistanis, on the other hand, adopted the correct attitude and delivered to India all the equipment that was its due although located on Pakistani soil. Faced with acute shortages, Pakistan approached the British initially in order to get heavy equipment but later also tried American sources. While Pakistan was able to get some equipment from the British, it was unable to procure any from the Americans. America responded much more positively to the Indian requests.[24] Pakistan's equipment shortages were exacerbated by its lack of repair facilities.

Ammunition was another significant problem, as there was no ammunition factory in Pakistan. Since no physical division of the British Indian ordnance factories was possible, the Pakistanis pressed for some sort of compensation in lieu of their legitimate share. The Indians eventually agreed to pay a paltry sum of six crores (Rs 60 million). Realising the dire need to construct their own ammunition factory, the Pakistanis moved quickly. With the help of the British, they soon had a factory at Wah which started functioning towards the end of 1951.[25] However, further British help was not forthcoming, because Britain feared that in the end its technical knowhow regarding guns, explosives and ammunition could fall into Soviet hands.[26] Realising the validity of the argument, the Pakistanis decided to abandon their search for European assistance.

If ammunition was in short supply, so were military training facilities. At the time of partition, of the 46 major training establishments only the Staff College (Quetta), School of Military Intelligence (Karachi), Anti-Aircraft Artillery School (Karachi), Royal Indian Army Service Corps School (Kakul), Armament Artificer Wing (Chaklala) and Military Farms Department Training Centre (Lahore) were situated in Pakistani areas.[27] But Pakistan did not inherit a single basic-training centre and had to start from scratch. As well, a training centre for engineering staff was set up at Sialkot in 1948, which was later upgraded to the School of Military Engineers. A Signals Training Centre at Kuldars, a School of Signals at Rawalpindi and an Electrical and Mechanical Engineering School at Quetta were also soon established.[28] Among other new institutions, the Pakistan Military Academy was set up at Kakul in 1948 with 207 cadets in its first intake, of which 61 came from the Indian Military Academy at Dehra Doon.[29] The training pattern of the Pakistan army continued to be similar to that of the British. Apart from the familiarity, it was not deemed wise to switch over to another training pattern during the initial phase in which there were so many other more important problems. And with many British officers retained in technical branches and at senior levels, it was obvious that they would opt for the British system.

Reconstruction

With all the massive complications, the first three years did not see any major development in terms of reconstruction of the Pakistan Army. In fact it began to shape itself only after the appointment of a Pakistani Commander-in-Chief, General Mohammad Ayub Khan. Ayub took over as the third C-in-C on 17 January 1951, an appointment which reflected the nationalisation of the Army in a real sense. By this time it had become

quite clear that Pakistan would be continually confronted with an imminent Indian threat and therefore it was imperative to maintain a reasonably strong force. By the beginning of the 1950s most of the problems that were the product of the ill-planned partition had been at least temporarily resolved. Most of the refugees were settled and a rudimentary caucus of civil servants had begun to look after administration. The Pakistanis had also managed to learn to live with problems that were not even temporarily resolved.

Acutely aware of the limited resources, Ayub had to apply strict priorities and in consequence operational planning and training of the Army topped the priority list. In view of the almost constant concentration of the Indian Army on the borders of Pakistan, the plans that were originally formulated following partition had to be abandoned to make way for new ones devised to meet the requirements of the changed situation. Ayub also assumed control of training and soon evolved a mechanism to ensure uniformity of standards throughout the Army.[30] In addition he started an annual exercise at GHQ which was to be attended by 'the general officers, commanders of independent formations and the main military institutions along with their senior staff officers and directors of different arms and services at the GHQ'.[31] Through this exercise the C-in-C was able to regularly communicate with his officers at almost all significant levels. He even decided to create a Training Advisory Staff in March 1951 which was headed by a British major general. Its functions were to coordinate and conduct exercises at GHQ level as desired by the C-in-C and also to assist and advise divisional and brigade commanders in congruence with the policies of the C-in-C.[32] Ayub's consistent emphasis on training was popularised through slogans like 'Training, more training, and still more training'. One major reason for the stress on training was the changed strategic orientation of the Army. Long before partition, the British

Indian Army had been trained to deal with the perceived threat from the north west that accompanied the 'Great Game' played out between Britain and Russia. Almost all the concentration of forces, logistic infrastructure and establishment of cantonments were in line with the Russian threat via Afghanistan. The situation radically changed after partition as the Pakistanis perceived their main security threat as coming from India; it was logical to transform the existing strategic orientation from Russia/Afghanistan to India. Thus the entire logistic infrastructure had to be rebuilt, and old cantonments built close to Afghanistan had to be abandoned or thinned out and new ones established.

While many important reforms were introduced in order to make the Army more disciplined and effective, perhaps the most significant was that which taught the officers and men how to operate efficiently within available resources—to shed previously acquired habits of depending heavily upon the support of other arms. As the training improved, not only were the formation commanders encouraged to undertake larger and larger exercises involving units, brigades and divisions but also GHQ carried out such exercises off and on with a view to assessing standards of training and acquired efficiency.[33] The exercises began to demonstrate increased participation and interest among officers and other ranks.

Satisfied with the gradual improvement in training systems, Ayub began to concentrate on reorganisation and modernisation of the Army. The old established organisational patterns of the British Indian Army underwent change in almost all areas. An Army Planning Board, established towards the end of 1953, was reconstituted in 1955 and entrusted with the task of moulding the Army into an organisation capable of meeting the emerging requirements. The Board recognised that no organisation was perfect and that to attain maximum efficiency continual streamlining was needed,

with the retention of only those traditions that could form the basis of progressive reforms.[34] The Board worked directly under the C-in-C and was constantly engaged in analysing different problems and making recommendations to Ayub. Emphasis was placed on how to make an efficient, mobile Army within limited resources. Being smaller in size, it was a foregone conclusion that Pakistan could never hope to attain parity with India, but its objective was to develop quality capability in order to deter the perceived Indian aggression and to raise the potential cost for India to an unacceptable level.

American linkage; modernisation

Apart from reorganisation, the problem of acute shortage of equipment was haunting the decision makers in general and Ayub Khan in particular. Even after three years Pakistan was unable to acquire its desired weapons. In 1951 heavy Indian concentrations along Pakistan's border influenced the Pakistani Prime Minister, Liaquat Ali Khan, to seriously contemplate the prospect of war. But the revelation by the C-in-C that Pakistan had only thirteen tanks with limited engine life left in them effectively restrained the PM.[35] While the crisis passed without any unwanted incident, 1951 turned out to be a calamity-ridden year for Pakistan. Not only did the political and economic situation generally deteriorate along with a sharp decline in prices for jute and cotton (upon which Pakistan's foreign trade greatly depended) but Liaquat Ali Khan was assassinated on 16 October.[36] A few months before this, the PM had sent a request to the American authorities requesting US assistance in procuring defence equipment. This was not the first attempt by the Pakistanis to procure weapons from outside. In fact, Pakistan had approached the Americans in 1947 but were refused, as the Americans feared annoying India.

In 1951, Pakistan's formal request for the purchase of arms was approved by the US, but no tangible action in terms of sale and release of approved arms took place.[37]

The next major effort to get arms was made in 1952 and involved an approach to both the US and the UK, highlighting the rapidly increasing sense of insecurity among Pakistanis and the significant changes that were taking place in several of the surrounding countries. It was explained to the Americans that Pakistan was trying to develop military capabilities not merely to meet the perceived Indian threat but also to meet the communist threat that had intensified because of developments in Korea, China and the USSR.[38] Again the Americans sympathised with Pakistan's security predicament but declined to help; whereas Indian requests for aircraft and tanks were accorded much better treatment and the US State Department approved the release of tanks.

At this time (1952–53) India had an Army of 400 000 men, a Navy of 9000 men equipped with three destroyers and small escort and patrol vessels, and an Air Force of 14 000 men with 670 aircraft. By comparison, Pakistan's Army consisted of 206 000 men, the Navy had 5000 men along with three destroyers plus a few escort and patrol vessels, and the Air Force had 330 aircraft.[39]

In 1952 the new administration in Washington headed by President Eisenhower decided, in continuing with Harry S. Truman's containment policy, to adopt a deterrence strategy as a mainstay. The new Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, viewed the 'struggle against communism as a moral crusade', as he felt that the advent of communism had posed a major threat to the basic moral principles of Judaeo-Christian civilisation.[40] Accordingly, apart from America's own efforts, he believed in strengthening the local defences of all nations confronted with the threat of communism.[41] During 1953 Dulles visited many countries including Pakistan in order to ascertain their views regarding his

government's plans for coordinated defence against the communists. He found the Pakistanis receptive to his idea of collective security arrangements. Following Dulles's visit, gradually the American attitude seemed to change towards Pakistan's informal and unofficial requests for military aid. However, the Americans were still not willing to take an independent policy approach towards Pakistan without taking into consideration the likely Indian reaction. Finally, after further contacts between the two countries, President Eisenhower announced in February 1954 that the American administration had decided to give military assistance to Pakistan for the purpose of strengthening its defence capabilities.[42] Pakistan and the US signed the Mutual Defence Assistance Treaty on 19 May at Karachi, and Pakistan joined the western-sponsored multilateral military alliances SEATO (South East Asia Treaty Organization) and Baghdad Pact (later renamed CENTO following a military coup in Baghdad).

With the introduction of American military equipment and training in its use the confidence of the armed forces was considerably increased and Pakistan's sense of insecurity began gradually to disappear. In addition, the new American ideas began to influence Pakistan's strategic planning and tactical pursuits. In many ways the American linkage made Pakistan's military a hard-hitting force and substantially enhanced its mobility and general performance for years to come.

CONFLICTS WITH INDIA

Indo–Pak war of 1948

After a lengthy period of instability in Kashmir following partition of the subcontinent—a period marked by fighting among various local forces and Pathan tribesmen and by the introduction of Indian troops—the first Indo–Pak war over Kashmir started as a result of a spring

offensive initiated by the Indian military on 8 April 1948. In response to the Indian offensive Pakistan sent its troops in in May, and the limited war began. Until the mounting of their spring offensive the Indian military had used the time making necessary preparations and building a logistics network; they had used the winter of 1947–48 to improve the existing roads and to build new ones wherever these were needed. The offensive began almost simultaneously in the Jammu and Kashmir regions, with the objective of recapturing areas that had fallen to certain opposing forces (the Azad forces) and to the Pathan tribesmen during the preceding six months. The major goal of the Indian Army was to get as close to the Pakistan border as possible, especially in Jammu areas; in Kashmir they were more interested in recapturing Muzafferabad, a town held by the Pathan tribesmen.[43] Just before launching the offensive the Indian Army had moved two divisions to Jammu areas; another two divisions were already in Kashmir.[44] In the face of such a large force, the tribesmen and the Azad fighters were no match for the Indians. In order to check the advance of the Indian Army, which was then threatening Poonch, Uri, Titwal and the most important city, Mazafferabad, Pakistan decided to introduce its own troops to back up the Azad forces and the tribesmen. Once the Pakistani forces entered the war zone the Indians' progress came to an abrupt halt and in some areas they were successfully dislodged by the combined efforts of the Azad forces, tribesmen and Pakistanis.[45] Initially the latter constituted only one division but it was soon realised that this was too little to cover such a vast border and consequently another division was sent.

The Pakistanis had to fight the war in rather trying conditions.[46] The Indians had already built the necessary roads and had accumulated ammunition, medical supplies and food. At first the Pakistanis did not even have anti-aircraft guns to make life difficult for incoming

Indian aircraft and thus most of the Pakistani movements were confined to night time (in July the Pakistanis received *two* anti-aircraft guns).[47] The overall strategy of the Pakistani high command to release only minimum forces for operations in Kashmir continued to impede the effectiveness of the Pakistanis. Perhaps the fear of a major war with India was generating this restraint as the Pakistani decision makers were acutely conscious that their armed forces were still in the process of being organised. Moreover, Pakistani troops sent to fight in Kashmir came from the plains and were not really trained to fight in mountainous areas. They were asked to fight in cold northern areas, the mountains of Titwal and Uri in the west and jungle countryside in the south. The troops not only had to cope with the wide variety of terrain; they were not equipped with warm clothing and lacked adequate ammunition, food, medical supplies and auxiliary services.[48] In addition, the Pakistan Army had to cope with the unorganised and independent-minded tribesmen, who at times caused unnecessary difficulties. Indeed, the tribesmen's tendency to follow their own agenda was probably instrumental in their failing to capture Srinagar airport. Had the airport been captured, Indian troops would not have been able to land there. Finally, there was no clear strategy on the part of the Pakistani military planners. According to one eminent military writer the lack of clear definition of why the Army had been sent and what action was expected of it gave rise to many amateurish tactical theories such as 'plugging the holes'.[49] Such an approach was hardly guaranteed to succeed in preventing the Indians from deciding the fate of Kashmir.

Nevertheless, with the introduction of Pakistani forces and the resultant escalation in fighting, 'the Indians quickly realised that the war could not be brought to a close unless the Pakistani support for the Azad forces could be stopped', and they consequently

sought UN mediation, which brought the war to a close on 1 January 1949.[50]

In many ways it was a strange war. First, it was fought despite the fact that a UN resolution of 21 April 1948 had implicitly asked both parties to refrain from aggravating the Kashmir situation any further, especially given that the UN was actively engaged in securing a peaceful resolution of the dispute.[51] As if this weren't enough, the intensity of the war increased precisely at the time that UN representatives were visiting the region in order to consult both governments on the dispute. Second, Pakistan's troops were given express orders to avoid direct contact with the Indian Army as far as possible. At Chinari, addressing the soldiers in January 1949 the Pakistani Prime Minister said, 'If you were not prevented from offensive activities you might have obtained more territory. But Pakistan policy has been merely defensive and its objective was not to settle the fate of Kashmir by guns, but to enable its people to decide their fate by a peaceful and free plebiscite'.[52] Thus the Pakistani Army had decided to deploy the Azad forces for direct contact with the Indians and had meticulously avoided taking on the Indian Army directly—with a few unavoidable exceptions. Similarly, the Indian forces also tried to exercise restraint and to avoid provoking unlimited war.[53]

Third, the armies on both sides were commanded by British officers, and they not only maintained telephone contact with each other throughout the war but regularly pressed their respective governments to accept a ceasefire. The Pakistani C-in-C even tried to get his Indian counterpart 'to use the old boy network in order to prevent the fighting getting too rough'.[54] It does seem odd that while the two armies were engaged in a war the commanders were conversing with each other as if they were conducting a coordinated military exercise. But perhaps the strangest aspect was that the two armies knew each other very well. In fact, most of the soldiers

and officers had remained comrades in arms, and not many of them relished the war. While the Indian leaders were determined to conquer the entire territory of Kashmir, the Indian soldiers were not as enthusiastic.[55] And this led to some interesting stories about the behaviour of soldiers. In one case, a Sikh sentry on the Indian side of the border was listening to a concert being held on the other side and was soon unable to resist the words of a particular Punjabi folk song, 'Heer'.[56] He left his post and quietly joined the other listeners, only to be discovered by the Pakistanis at the end of the song. They found him, with his weapon, profusely weeping like the others. He was not taken prisoner but was honourably treated and allowed to rejoin his unit.

Indo–Pak war of 1965

The second major war between India and Pakistan was also over the Kashmir dispute. Following the acceptance of the UN resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949 by both India and Pakistan, and the termination of the first Kashmir war, it was expected that the promised plebiscite would soon be held in order to resolve the dispute. (It has never been held.) India initiated a well-planned strategy aimed at integrating Kashmir into the Indian Union, disregarding its repeated assertions in favour of plebiscite.[57] It effectively used the international organisations as well as the prevailing global climate to attain its objectives. In 1954, when Pakistan decided to participate in western military alliances with a view to procuring necessary arms and training for its badly equipped forces, India treated Pakistan's action as a move that had 'destroyed the status quo and [made] a plebiscite in Kashmir unthinkable'.[58] In other words, Pakistan's efforts to strengthen its defence capabilities were deliberately linked with the Kashmir dispute by the Indians.

From then on the Indians not only began to treat Kashmir as an integral part of India but moved closer to

the Soviets and introduced them to South Asia. All moves aimed at eroding the special status of Kashmir invoked an immediate and strong reaction from Pakistan. Despite repeated appeals by the UN not to undertake actions that could aggravate the situation or change the status quo, India went ahead with its plan of gradual absorption of Kashmir. This more or less compelled the UN to pass a resolution on 24 January 1957, by a vote of ten to none with the Soviet Union abstaining, categorically reaffirming the previous UN resolutions 'that the final disposition of the Kashmir would be made by a plebiscite under UN auspices' and also stressing 'that any action taken by the Constituent Assembly of Kashmir would not constitute a disposition of the state'.[59] Even the passage of this resolution could not impede India's plan.

Developments in the first half of the 1960s also contributed to the situation that eventually resulted in the second Kashmir war. The Sino–Indian war badly mauled the Indians but, much more importantly, it opened the China option for Pakistan. Following the western nations' delivery of military aid to India without even consulting Pakistan, six rounds of Indo–Pak talks over Kashmir took place, primarily because of Anglo–American pressure on India to discuss the dispute with Pakistan. The talks, as expected, failed to find a solution. In October 1963 Kashmir's Prime Minister announced moves to fully amalgamate Kashmir into the Indian Union. Among them were that six members of the Indian Parliament (Lok Sabha) would be elected from Kashmir, and that the Sadar-I-Riyasat (the constitutional head of state) and the Prime Minister of the state would be known as Governor and Chief Minister respectively, as was the case in other federating units of the Indian Union.[60]

In the face of such developments, not least the integrative efforts of their own Prime Minister, the Kashmiris more or less exploded when a sacred hair of

the Holy Prophet was stolen from a shrine in Srinagar. The disturbances in Kashmir caused rioting and killings in both East Pakistan and West Bengal, leading to talks between the two countries' Home Ministers—only to result in another deadlock because India refused to accept a proposal pertaining to the establishment of an International Tribunal. The violent uprising in Kashmir and communal riots in eastern parts of India managed to register in Nehru's mind that even after so many years the Kashmiris were not reconciled with the existing situation and the Kashmir problem needed a fresh approach. Consequently Nehru decided to release the leading Muslim figure Sheikh Abdullah, who had been languishing in jail since 1953, and sent him to Pakistan. There Abdullah discussed with President Ayub Khan his proposal for an India–Pakistan condominium as a solution to the Kashmir dispute, which Ayub dismissed as absurd.[61] But Abdullah did manage to persuade Ayub to plan a meeting with Nehru in Delhi, although Nehru died before that important meeting could take place.

The death of Nehru relaxed the tension temporarily and a short meeting between the new Indian Prime Minister, Shastri, and President Ayub took place in October 1964 at Karachi, when Shastri stopped there for a few hours on his way back to Delhi after attending a Cairo conference of nonaligned countries. The two leaders expressed their resolve to settle the outstanding disputes on an equitable basis and agreed to hold discussions at the earliest opportunity. However, by the end of the year the Indian Home Minister announced his Government's intention to apply to Kashmir Articles 356 and 357 of the Indian Constitution which enabled the Indian President to proclaim Presidential rule in Kashmir.[62] This was another important step towards the envisaged erosion of the special status. Further political complications followed. Early in 1965 the Kashmiris observed a protest day against these developments. A huge number turned up, and the police could not control

the situation and had to resort to firing in order to disperse the crowds. Thus tension began to mount sharply. At this point, India and Pakistan began to exchange fire across a disputed border area nowhere near Kashmir.

Rann of Kutch episode

The Rann of Kutch is a desolate wasteland, situated in the south east extremity of Pakistan, covering an area of 22 000 square kilometres and separating the Sindh province from the Indian state of Gujarat. It is an almost uninhabited area which is virtually a desert during the dry seasons and transforms itself into marshland during the rainy seasons. It is considered to be both strategically and economically useless, although some 'jingoistic Indians' have periodically claimed the existence of oil and gas reserves.[63]

The Kutch dispute originated because of the undemarcated border in that region, which has been referred to by an eminent scholar as another example of the lack of preparation by the British for partition of the subcontinent.[64] Since the border was not delineated, the Indian Government after acquiring independence began to stress that the entire Rann belonged to India. The Pakistanis of course did not buy this idea, and instead highlighted the fact that the northern part of the territory (north of the 24th parallel) had always been under the administrative control of the Sindh Government.

Apart from various politically oriented moves and counter moves relatively little happened until January 1965, when the Indians began to obstruct the movements of the Pakistani border patrols. By the end of March the Indians had established new posts opposite their Pakistani counterparts and also moved an infantry brigade into the area. Patrolling activities were stepped up on both sides and the clashes gradually intensified. Finally, the Pakistani forces easily outmanoeuvred the Indian troops and in April decisively defeated them at

Biar Bet, where the Indians fled in disorder.[65] Following the debacle at Biar Bet the Indians decided not to deploy large-scale forces, primarily because of the approaching monsoon rains. Sporadic fighting continued until the Commonwealth Conference held in June 1965. The conflict was brought to a close thanks to the mediatory efforts of the British Prime Minister, Harold Wilson, who managed to persuade both President Ayub Khan and Prime Minister Shastri to agree to a ceasefire and to submit the dispute to international arbitration.[66] For the next three years the matter was argued before the International Tribunal. In February 1968 the tribunal announced its verdict, awarding some 900 square kilometres in the northern part of the disputed Rann to Pakistan and the rest of the disputed area to India.[67]

Some writers believe that the easy victory at Biar Bet emboldened the Pakistanis and injected a dose of overconfidence, and that as a result many people in Pakistan began to encourage the leadership to apply the Kutch prescription to Kashmir as well.[68] Indeed, it is not too farfetched to assume that the quick and easy walkover against the Indian troops in Kutch must have bolstered the morale of many in the Pakistani Army and generated ideas about future adventures in Kashmir. And for the Indians, to swallow defeat at the hands of the Chinese was one thing but to be outsmarted by the Pakistani forces was too much. Another eminent scholar aptly summed up the dangerous drift towards September 1965 thus: 'Pakistan's confidence and India's humiliation brought the two nations to the brink of war'.[69]

Lead-up to the war

While the official outbreak of the September war is considered to be when India violated the international border and attacked Lahore, the second largest city of Pakistan, on 6 September 1965, the renewed conflict in the disputed territory of Kashmir had begun well before

the Indian tanks moved towards Lahore. In fact the situation had been progressively deteriorating since the theft of the holy relic in December 1963, which sparked off communal riots and killings in East Pakistan and West Bengal.

In the face of India's continuing actions to erode the special status of Kashmir—actions which included brutal repression of Kashmiri activists—a guerrilla operation in Kashmir was approved by the Pakistani leadership in May but kept secret until it actually commenced. The operation, codenamed Gibraltar, was accompanied by another plan, Operation Grand Slam, which was concerned with the need to capture the town of Akhnur—deemed to be the jugular vein of Indian logistics.[70] The plan for Operation Gibraltar envisaged the infiltration of trained guerrillas disguised as freedom fighters into Kashmir with the objective of carrying out a sustained campaign of sabotage against military targets and also disruption of communications. Simultaneously, training and arming of sympathetic locals to initiate an insurgency was to be undertaken. The underlying idea was to engage the Indian forces by initiating a war of liberation that could effectively disrupt India's control over the state and politically put the Kashmir dispute on the front burner. As well, a protracted war of attrition could eventually result in securing much desired freedom for the Kashmiris.

Operation Gibraltar commenced on 24 July, but soon failed. Several things accounted for its collapse. First, the Kashmiri population inside Indian-occupied Kashmir was not at all prepared for starting a war of liberation. Second, it was a massive failure on the part of the Pakistani intelligence services. Contrary to the information the Pakistani Foreign Office and intelligence services supplied, not only were the people not ready for this type of action but the Indian forces were not ignorant of Pakistani designs. In fact, it seems that Indian Intelligence had a fair knowledge of the intended

operation, and the Indians took effective and ruthless measures to control the likely unrest in the area.[71] Third, the planners seemed to seriously underestimate the effectiveness of the Indian forces, who had considerably improved since their 1962 debacle.[72] Fourth, the Pakistani planners did not allow sufficient time for the training of guerrillas. They were only given six weeks' training which was totally insufficient. Then there were various logistic and tactical obstacles which proved insuperable. Finally, it was wrongly assumed that India would opt for a defensive posture and that its reaction would be confined to Kashmiri territory.

Given the urgency of the situation created by the collapse of Operation Gibraltar, Operation Grand Slam was launched on the night of 31 August from Bhimber with a view to reducing Indian pressures in the north by capturing Chamb and threatening Akhnur.[73] The Indians were well entrenched in the Chamb valley, but the Pakistanis moved with lightning speed and took Chamb. By 2 September the Pakistanis had captured further areas but then the high command decided to change the commander of Operation Grand Slam; this caused unnecessary delay in the advance towards Akhnur. The delay enabled the Indians to move up their infantry between Akhnur and Jurian and also secure the assistance of the Air Force. The Pakistani forces managed to continue their advance despite stiff resistance and eventually captured Jurian on 5 September, which, although it consumed more precious time, paved the way for the proposed assault on Akhnur.[74] But then on 6 September the Indians dramatically widened the war.

India attacks Pakistan

On that day, without any declaration of war or other warning, India invaded Pakistan and launched a three-pronged attack against Lahore. The following day it launched another attack against Sialkot.[75]

What possible reasons did India have for taking such drastic action? First, the pressures against Akhnur were multiplying and the quickest way to relieve them was to attack Pakistan at a vulnerable point: the city of Lahore suited admirably. Second, the attack on Lahore was in accord with PM Shastri's threat, following the debacle of the Rann of Kutch, 'to hit Pakistan at a place and time of [India's] own choosing'.[76] Third, it was part of a wider plan to capture Lahore and Sialkot in a blitzkrieg and then dictate peace terms under which these cities would be handed back in return for a final Kashmir settlement. Another important component of the plan was to cut the Grand Trunk Road in order to divide Pakistan in two. The capture of important cities and cutting of the GT Road would generate enormous pressure on the Pakistani decision makers.

India's plan reflected its superior military strength. When the war broke out, the Pakistan Army consisted of seven infantry divisions plus one armoured division and an armoured brigade, compared to India's 21 infantry and mountain divisions plus one armoured division and an independent armoured brigade.[77] But despite their initial advantage, the Indians were unable to gain ground as the Pakistanis fought fiercely and managed to halt the Indian advance towards Lahore. This was a great disappointment to the Indian Chief of Army, who had been so confident of taking Lahore the same day that he had already invited his officers to join him for drinks that evening at the Lahore Gymkhana.[78]

The war soon spread down the entire 2000-kilometre border from Kargil to south of Rajasthan. Notably, however, India did not extend the war to East Pakistan. Perhaps the existence there of the 20 per cent Hindu population acted as a restraint. On 7 September, in order to encircle the Indian troops marching on Lahore, the Pakistanis launched a counteroffensive in the Khem Karan/Kausar area and not only captured the town of Khem Karan a day later but also moved beyond it and

reached Valtoha.[79] Part of their objective appeared to be to take the war into Indian territory. While the area selected for the Pakistani thrust was strategically appropriate, failure to capitalise on the Indian weakness there reflected a lack of coordination and integrated planning. Moreover, Indian pressure in the Sialkot area increased and diverted part of the Pakistani effort.

The Indian forces started their push towards Chawinda in the Sialkot sector with almost corps strength on the night of 7–8 September, with the objective of gaining control of the road to Sialkot and eventually cutting the main line of communication (GT Road) between Lahore and Rawalpindi. Despite the deployment of large armoured units, the Indians were unable to make sufficient ground which enabled Pakistan to strengthen its defences and to take on the enemy where the Indian armour tried to pierce those defences. The Pakistani C-in-C asserted later that this strategy 'led to a head-on clash with the enemy and to one of the greatest and fiercest tank battles since World War II in which, sometimes, up to about 200 tanks were engaged'.[80] According to an Indian general, Chawinda was attacked twice on 14 September and again on the night of 18–19 September with a force far superior to the opposing Pakistani force, but the Indians failed to capture it and in the process suffered heavy casualties.[81] In other sectors like Sulemanki, Rajasthan and Kashmir limited encounters took place, followed by some form of stalemate, except in Rajasthan (and even there in relative terms). In Rajasthan it seemed that the main objective of the Indian offensive was to keep the Pakistani forces stationed in the area closely tied down. As far as East Pakistan was concerned, things largely remained quiet, though a couple of Indian divisions were tied down there.

During the seventeen-day war China accused the Indians of constant violations of its own border, and on 16 September it gave the Indians three days to withdraw from Chinese territory and also demolish the military

outposts the Indians had built there—or suffer the consequences.[82] While the Indians, the Americans and the British watched, worried and waited the Soviets then began to accuse the Chinese of aggressive intent. However, on 22 September China announced that the Indians had complied with its demands.[83] On the diplomatic front, no one really supported the Indians. The invasion of Pakistan was hardly supported by anyone. In fact it dissipated all the sympathy that India was able to muster following Pakistan's incursions in Kashmir. On the other hand, Pakistan was openly supported by many countries, though most of the support emanated from RCD countries. As far as the superpowers were concerned, Moscow and Washington took a similar stand to each other. Apart from being extremely anxious to prevent Chinese intervention in the Indo–Pak conflict, both were keen to secure a quick end to the war. Despite Pakistan's participation in western-sponsored alliances, America had remained somewhat indifferent 'when the frontier of her erstwhile principal ally in Asia was crossed by Indian armed forces'.[84] This was regarded as a major American letdown. And not only did America fail to help its alliance partner; it decided to impose an arms embargo under what it called an evenhanded policy.[85] Finally, although the UN Secretary General, U Thant, visited the area, it was mainly the joint efforts of the US and the Soviet Union that brought an end to the war. A ceasefire was achieved on 23 September 1965 in accordance with the Security Council resolution passed unanimously three days before.[86]

Indo–Pak war of 1971

The third and last war between India and Pakistan was primarily an outcome of the East Pakistan crisis and India's covert involvement initially and overt invasion later. The war started in East Pakistan and later spread to the western wing. The crisis was the product of a

combination of economic, political, linguistic and external factors causing an enormously high level of East Pakistani alienation from the federal government, but the crescendo was reached when power was *not* transferred to the East Pakistani winner of the 1970 general election (the Awami League), along with a subsequent federal clampdown in March 1971. Following the clampdown many Awami League leaders fled to India, where they were welcomed with open arms and extended all types of assistance to proclaim a government in exile. Consequently these leaders formed a Constituent Assembly and with the assistance of India began to prepare for the armed liberation of East Pakistan. Since many soldiers belonging to the East Pakistan Rifles had joined their leaders in India, the Indian intelligence agency RAW (Research and Analysis Wing) organised a group called Mukti Bahini, providing training camps along the borders of East Pakistan and supplying weapons to this force of East Pakistanis. Initially India concentrated on providing assistance for the effective functioning of the Bangladeshi government in exile from Calcutta; later it began to use the Mukti Bahini for scouting purposes as well as covert operations. Around 2000 guerrillas were trained in hit and run warfare by RAW every six weeks.[87] In the months of civil war that followed, the Pakistan Army's superior firepower was more or less neutralised by continuous Indian patronage of the Mukti Bahini. Supplies, and sanctuaries on Indian soil, were provided. The Pakistan Army was unable to chase the Mukti Bahini in its well-protected Indian sanctuaries; but nor was the Mukti Bahini strong enough to secure a decisive victory over the Pakistani forces. Aware of Pakistan's logistic nightmare, the Mukti Bahini opted for a prolonged struggle. India, for its part, would later opt for more decisive action.

During the summer of 1971 India signed a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with the Soviet Union, which included clauses relating to defence. It seemed

rather strange that India should invoke the treaty when it finally invaded East Pakistan.[88]

During the civil war period many East Pakistanis took refuge in India. India claimed that the number of refugees was in the millions and was generating unbearable pressure on its eastern provinces, where all the refugees were temporarily housed. This situation was one of the factors behind India's subsequent move, but there were others.

By October the Indians had taken the decision to invade East Pakistan and had begun planning strategies to minimise the risks involved.[89] Apart from the refugee crisis, the rationale for India's decision included its recently strengthened position thanks to the treaty with the Soviet Union. The treaty had more than mere symbolic value; it ensured India's protection by the Soviets inside the UN Security Council as well as against any outsider's military incursion. In other words, it meant that the Indians were very unlikely to face Chinese pressure this time, because if China decided to extend physical support to Pakistan it would have to do so in the face of the defence alliance implications of the treaty. Other political considerations added up to the same thing: India knew it was comfortably placed to bring the civil war to a conclusion and to dismember Pakistan.

Prior to the actual invasion the Indian PM, Indira Gandhi, embarked upon a diplomatic offensive and visited many important capitals, ostensibly with the objective of communicating to world leaders the enormous burden placed upon India by the presence of refugees from East Pakistan. But the real objective of this diplomatic onslaught was twofold: to stress that unless a settlement was quickly reached India would be forced to intervene militarily; and to assess how the great powers would react to such an eventuality. While Mrs Gandhi was on this tour her generals were finalising their invasion plans. Several matters were given special

attention. The first involved the peculiar nature of East Pakistan's terrain, which was studded with waterways. It was deemed imperative to have a strike force fully equipped with transport facilities suitable for deployment in the Ganges delta. Another important matter was the timing of the invasion. The Indian generals wanted to choose a time that would make it extremely difficult for the Chinese to come to the assistance of Pakistan in the event that China decided to extend physical help in East Pakistan. They also wanted to undertake the invasion after the monsoon season when the danger of flood was nonexistent, and if possible to avoid the destruction of crops. Thus the month of November was chosen. By late November it gets sufficiently cold to plug almost all the Himalayan passes, which were viewed as a likely Chinese route.

Two operational problems were also subjected to serious consideration. One was 'to deny the Pakistani forces the opportunity to group themselves in strong defensive positions protecting major population and production centres'.[90] The best way to attain this objective was to intensify the Mukti Bahini's efforts and to enlarge their area of activities, which could compel the Pakistanis to spread out. The second problem was the probability of a major strike from Pakistan's west wing towards Kashmir at the onset of India's invasion of the east wing.[91] Being fully conversant with Pakistan's often proclaimed strategy to the effect that the defence of East Pakistan lay in an offence from the west, it was not surprising that the Indian generals carefully looked into all possible danger points.

Having taken into consideration all the significant factors, India invaded East Pakistan on 21 November 1971. The invading army consisted of eight divisions whereas the defending Pakistani force had only one infantry division, one reconnaissance regiment equipped with 40 light tanks, and some infantry battalions (minus their heavy equipment) that had moved from west to

east Pakistan on an emergency basis, joining the already stationed skeleton force.[92] The first thirteen days of the war saw Indian attacks made with specific aims to draw out the Pakistani forces from their concentration points. Perhaps that's why most of the battles raged along the lengthy border between East Pakistan and India with a continuous but gradual increase in intensity and well-calculated escalation. It was not until 3 December that Pakistan launched an (ineffectual) retaliatory air strike on Indian air force bases, and it was at this point that the war spread briefly to the western sector as well, where the Pakistanis seem to have held their ground.[93]

Within two weeks the Indian Army encircled Dhaka and quickly conquered it. The Indian field commanders had been given two weeks to capture Dhaka as the Indians had anticipated that, once the war started, pressure would come from various quarters to end the fighting. So, wherever the advancing Indian Army met resistance, they bypassed it and continued racing towards Dhaka. The Pakistani forces in East Pakistan suffered reverses culminating in the surrender of a large number of soldiers on 16 December. India not only took many prisoners of war on the eastern front but also enabled the Awami League to establish a new country, Bangladesh. Predictably, the Indian forces were hailed as liberators by the local population.

The Pakistan Army generally enjoyed (and continues to enjoy) a good reputation and its soldiers have been considered to be highly trained, disciplined and motivated fighters. Yet the performance in 1971 was depressingly unimpressive. Among the factors that caused the Pakistan Army's defeat, the total alienation of the East Pakistanis must rate very high. It was very difficult to fight a war when the population that the Army was supposed to protect was against the protectors. A second factor that helped the Indians and consistently damaged Pakistan's interests was the role

of the Mukti Bahini, based in Indian Bengal, which acted as an extremely important source of strategic information and also caused communication disruptions wherever it was deemed necessary. Then there was the lack of adequate air cover. No modern war can be fought without effective air cover. The Indians not only destroyed the few Air Force planes that were stationed in East Pakistan but also badly damaged the airports. The Pakistan Army was totally exposed to incoming Indian aircraft. With no air cover the performance of the Pakistanis was understandably handicapped. A fourth reason for the Army's dismal performance was East Pakistan's terrain. It was unsuitable for heavy armour and Pakistan had not really developed the desired infrastructure for effective utilisation of waterways. Even if it had acquired this capability, without air cover it could not have proved effective. The Indians, on the other hand, carefully planned to neutralise the difficulties of terrain by the use of amphibian tanks, along with helicopters and paratroopers.

The list goes on. A fifth factor was what was commonly referred as the logistic nightmare of the Pakistan Army. At the time of the war it would have been extremely unrealistic of the commanders to expect any military aid from West Pakistan, as the Indian Navy not only controlled the sea route to East Pakistan but enjoyed total immunity in its movements. The only significant event that took place in the Bay of Bengal was the eventual arrival of the American aircraft carrier *Enterprise*, which in fact arrived too late. Despite being partners of Pakistan in the Cold War alliances, the Americans seemed to have decided not to be actively involved in the conflict, and opted only to demonstrate minor support by sending *Enterprise* to the Bay of Bengal. Its arrival was viewed by the Indians as a supportive gesture for Pakistan and they were annoyed about it. The Pakistanis, on the other hand, were expecting American help in preventing the dismemberment of

Pakistan. Another factor that influenced the performance of the Pakistan Army was the failure of the intelligence services. Neither the civilian nor the military agencies delivered dividends. A careful study of the 1971 war creates the impression that Pakistani Intelligence did not know much about Indian intentions of employing amphibious equipment or helicopters, or that General Arora, the Indian field commander, was required to complete the operation within twelve to fifteen days. Then there was Pakistan's heavy reliance on political considerations, which is not always a sound basis on which to wage a war. The Indians were carefully concentrating on military considerations revolving around quickly attaining the objective in mind. General Aurora's strategy seemed to be to create a situation in which the Pakistanis had no option but to surrender. Perhaps that's why he ordered his troops not to take on any major resistance on their way to Dhaka. Instead they were asked to take Dhaka first and, once Dhaka was taken, to run a mopping-up operation in reverse. Since the Pakistani forces were stretched out responding to innumerable probing attacks of the Indians, the advancing forces did not really face any major confrontation on their way to Dhaka.

Two remaining factors were in play. One was the lack of a comprehensive military strategy with a pronounced military doctrine. At the time, the common strategy for the defence of East Pakistan was heavy reliance on offence from the west.[94] Not only was this strategy faulty in many ways, but when the crunch came the offence from West Pakistan was hardly massive offensive action. In fact the failure to make substantial gains on the western side did not put the requisite pressure on the Indians. Almost all military planners of Pakistan were well familiar with the military weakness as far as the defence of East Pakistan was concerned. Faulty defence plans coupled with poor generalship made the task of the Indians much easier.[95]

And, just as the Pakistanis were outgeneralled, outmanoeuvred and outflanked from the front to the rear, they were outclassed in diplomacy as well. As mentioned above, Mrs Ghandhi toured the leading nations just before undertaking the invasion of East Pakistan and explained the intensity of refugee pressures on India and the complexity of the situation. She in fact mentally prepared them to expect an eventuality like a war. As far as the actual war was concerned, she worked a strategy on the lines of quickly achieving her objective and then confronting the world with a fait accompli. Pakistan's situation was extremely difficult largely because of its political blunders, which in turn made the job of the military commanders rather complex, even to fight a defensive war. And Pakistan's friends did not come to its assistance.

Skirmishes at Siachin

The 1980s saw periodic skirmishes on the Siachin glacier in northern Kashmir. In 1984 the Indians began probing operations and were later engaged in establishing permanent posts of a sort in the region, which inevitably led to clashes. Following the first Kashmir war a ceasefire had been arranged on 1 January 1949 in accordance with UN resolutions. However, the actual demarcation of the ceasefire line did not go beyond the edge of the Siachin glacier. It was assumed that the demarcation beyond this point would be made at a later stage. The status quo was not disturbed during the Indo–Pak wars of 1965 and 1971. Since the region happens to be physically situated in the north west corner of the disputed territory of Kashmir and is at a height of around 6000 metres, human survival is not an easy task and the logistics and cost of maintaining a fighting force in such an inhospitable region are formidable. After India's violation of the line of control and occupation of some high grounds on the Pakistani side, Pakistan lodged a

strong protest to India which eventually led to negotiations. The two sides reached an agreement which was announced on 17 June 1989, but this agreement was never implemented because the Indians got apprehensive of the likely national reaction in India. Further serious skirmishes took place in the region in the late 1990s.

OFFICER TRAINING

We noted earlier that following partition the Pakistan Army lacked adequately equipped training institutions, and that as one of the priorities the Pakistan Military Academy (PMA) was set up at Kakul in 1948 and entrusted with the task of training officers.

The PMA trains the men after their induction into the Army, which normally covers a period from two to three years. The new officers are trained in both military and academic subjects. The development of leadership qualities is also given close attention. The PMA now offers a degree to successful candidates. After serving a few years and acquiring the rank of major, selected officers are sent to the Staff College at Quetta which provides an almost year-long course in tactics, administration, staff duties, command functions through division level, at least one joint exercise with officers of the Air Force and Navy, several field exercises and a study tour.[96] The top of the training process is the National Defence College which runs two courses. One is the national defence course, in which most participants are of brigadier or equivalent rank from other services and sectors. The second course is the war course, in which most participants are of colonel or equivalent rank. Selection for either of these courses reflects positive attainments in the career of an officer. Indeed, the senior course prepares the officers for planning the higher levels of national strategy.

Apart from the PMA, and a wide variety of specialist training schools created since the early years,[97] a National University of Science and Technology has been established which caters primarily for the needs of the defence sector. Underlying its programs is a strong grounding in general Islamic teaching including the concept of Jihad. This is inevitable in a Muslim country: the concept of Jihad is an important pillar of Islam. According to the Koranic verses, 'Jihad is limited to fighting in defence', and Muslims are required to fight in the way of Allah but only against an enemy that has waged war on them.[98] (A broader interpretation of Jihad includes the fight against any ills of Islamic society such as poverty, illiteracy, etc.) Muslims are thus encouraged primarily to fight against an enemy only as a measure of self-defence. During the early days of Islam Muslims were persecuted and hounded in Mecca, but after their migration to Medina the enemies of Islam decided to annihilate them by invading Medina, which compelled the Muslims to take up arms and fight against the invaders. Participation in Jihad implies great honour in two senses: death in Jihad promises martyrdom; and if you remain alive you become a ghazi, a champion of Muslims, a dedicated fighter. Whether or not fighting against the enemy is obligatory for all Muslims is still debated among writers and jurists. But the majority tend to believe that it is obligatory and that Muslims should be ready and willing to participate whenever called upon to do so. Pakistan's soldiers and officers well comprehend the concept of Jihad, as Islamic ideas have become an integral part of training in the armed forces. Aware that it has to face a much larger and better-equipped Indian Army, Pakistan's Army relies heavily upon a 'great measure of moral superiority which encompasses a high degree of professional competence, in-depth study of modern concepts and doctrines of war, better leadership and inspired ideological orientations.'[99]

UN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

During the last half century Pakistan has been a great supporter of the UN and whenever the UN has asked for assistance in peacekeeping operations Pakistan has always responded positively. Among a number of countries where its Army has contributed in one form or another are Congo (the sometime Zaire), West Irian (now part of Indonesia), Kuwait, Somalia, Cambodia, Bosnia and Slovenia. In Congo, from 1960 to 1964, 'Pakistan provided logistic support during movements of troops to and from Congo and inland movements to the UN troops', which support was organised by the Pakistan Army supply corps.[100] While the movements involved sea, air, rail, river and road transport, the Pakistanis systematically made the transportation arrangements for troops and equipment in an atmosphere deemed to be extremely unfriendly. In West Irian, in 1962, Pakistan was entrusted with the 'responsibility of establishing the UN Executive Authority in maintaining law and order' until the region was handed over to the Indonesians.[101]

During the 1991 Gulf War, the entire Kuwaiti territory was turned into a battlefield and in consequence Kuwait was confronted with the massive problem of reclamation. Pakistan offered its services for reclamation of the devastated land and the task assigned was admirably performed by Pakistan Army engineers belonging to the Frontier Work Organization.[102] In 1992, Pakistan was asked to contribute soldiers to help maintain law and order and to facilitate the humanitarian assistance program in war-torn Somalia. With the tragic civil war there in full swing, armed bandits ravaged the country by looting, killing and terrorising the population. The Pakistani troops were assigned the task of 'securing the sea and airports, escorting food envoys and ensuring smooth distribution of relief supplies' and of recovering unauthorised arms with the objective of

further facilitating humanitarian efforts.[103] In pursuit of this task, Pakistan suffered considerable losses and many soldiers were killed in search operations. In addition, Pakistani officers of medical units, treated the locals. The Pakistani troops were the first to arrive and the last to leave. The role played by the troops in Somalia was well appreciated by all concerned. Pakistan's next peacekeeping involvement was in Cambodia. The soldiers were assigned the task of creating a secure environment in order to facilitate the election processes. The elections were held from 23 to 28 May 1993 without any major problem because of the work of the Pakistani forces, despite the fact that as the election date drew closer the intimidation and violence began to increase.

The UN then asked Pakistan to contribute troops to the UN protection force stationed in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Pakistanis immediately responded and around 3000 troops were despatched to Bosnia and Croatia in May 1994. Their assigned tasks included stabilisation of the situation by improving freedom of movement, maintaining existing routes, providing protection and support to various agencies and NGOs engaged in relief activities, and coordinating humanitarian assistance.[104] The job was admirably performed by the Pakistani troops, earning the appreciation and praise of many insiders as well as outsiders. Similar in some ways but a little more difficult was the task assigned to Pakistani troops in eastern Slovenia in the summer of 1996. Their task was threefold: to maintain a high-profile presence in the area of responsibility by carrying out extensive patrolling; to prevent opposing factions from infiltrating each other's areas; and to monitor the voluntary and safe return of refugees and displaced persons to their home of origin in cooperation with the UN High Commissioner for Refugees.[105] The troops finished the task within the given time, and Pakistani doctors treated many civilian patients.

Over the years it has become well established that the Pakistan Army is not merely an effective and efficient fighting force; as well, its contributions in various UN peacekeeping operations have earned it a good name. The Army's involvement in humanitarian assistance and in the reconstruction of war-ravaged territories has been appreciated both by those directly involved and by most members of the UN system.

5

Evolution of the Navy

PRESENT STRUCTURE AND STRENGTH

The strength of the Pakistan Navy is around 22 000 personnel, including the naval air arm and 1200 marines. There are 2000 paramilitary personnel of the Maritime Security Agency.[1] Naval tactical units are listed in Table 5.1. The Navy is headed by the Chief of Naval Staff, who is assisted by three Principal Staff Officers responsible for operations, personnel and materiel respectively. The Chief of Naval Staff exercises his command through four authorities: Commander Pakistan Fleet, COMPAK; Commander Karachi, COMKAR; Commander Logistics, COMLOG; and Commander North Navy, COMNORAV.[2] The most senior officer under the Chief is the Vice Chief of Naval Staff, who is primarily responsible for maritime operations and planning. A second deputy Chief of Staff deals with recruitment, administration and training, and the third is responsible for logistic support such as repairs and maintenance and technical evaluation of machinery and equipment.[3]

The Fleet Command is divided into operational squadrons: the 25th Destroyer Squadron, 10th Patrol Craft Squadron, 21st Minesweeping Squadron, Submarine Squadron and Naval Aviation Squadron. The Karachi Command looks after all shore bases including

Table 5.1 Navy: tactical units (summary)

Submarines	9
Principal Surface Combatants	10
Patrol and Coastal Combatants	10
Mine Countermeasures	2
Support and Miscellaneous	9
Naval Air Arm	
Combat Aircraft	7
Armed Helicopters	12
Anti Submarine	10
Helicopters	12+
Communication	3

Source: *The Military Balance 1998–99*, IISS, 1998

training establishments; and the Logistics Command is responsible for the Naval Dockyard, Weapon Support Group, Naval Store Depot and other fleet support organisations.[4]

The fleet's surface force includes three Gearing Class guided missile destroyers, eight frigates (six British Amazon and two Leander Class), two fleet tankers and three coastal and inshore tankers, three French Eridan Class minehunters, four patrol craft, and eight missile boats. Its subsurface force consists of nine submarines, including two French Agosta Class with Harpoon USGW, four French Daphne Class with Harpoon USGW, and three midget submarines. Three Agosta 90B submarines have been ordered and the first was to be ready by 2000. The naval air arm has seven combat aircraft (Bregeut Atlantic, P3C Orion and Fokker F-27) and fifteen helicopters (Sea King MK-45, Lynx Mk III and Alouette Mk III). In addition, the Navy has one survey ship, four offshore patrol vessels, four fast patrol boats and other craft.[5]

The Navy is engaged in a process of modernisation. While it has relatively sophisticated weapon systems like Exocet missiles, acoustic torpedoes and anti-submarine rockets, it has ordered new vessels, missile

systems, submarines and other defence equipment with a view to upgrading its capabilities.[6] Over the years elaborate logistics facilities have also been developed, including Pakistan's naval dockyard, initially planned in 1948 and subsequently extensively enlarged and modernised. Covering a vast area, it includes fourteen berths, a dry dock and two repair berths. There are more than 30 workshops equipped with the latest in simulators and test benches. The dockyard is capable of refitting the Navy's flagship, destroyers, smaller craft and submarines.

Like the other arms of Pakistan's armed forces, the Navy's requirements are heavily influenced by perceived Indian policies. The rapid enlargement and modernisation undergone by the Indian Navy, especially during the last two decades, makes a convincing case for increased allocation of resources to the PN, though matching the extensive surface and subsurface forces of the Indian Navy along with its impressive coastal defence capabilities may not be possible. The Indian Navy not only has two carriers with integral air strike and defence capacity but also has a submarine force, surveillance and anti-submarine aircraft, missile boats, shore defence craft, minesweepers and auxiliary craft. Its strength exceeds 55 000 personnel. An additional factor in the numbers game is the enormous cost involved in the purchase of a single vessel. In the face of all this, and to meet the emerging demands of its own Navy within limited resources, Pakistan has to strike a careful balance between quantity and quality.

Training

During the early phase of the Navy's development, almost all officers and some other personnel were sent abroad for training. With the passage of time, a large network of training facilities was established in Pakistan. Almost all basic and some advanced professional

training is now available there. Many friendly countries also make use of the training facilities in Pakistan.

Officers undergo training in phases. Initially all cadets spend a year and a half at the Pakistan Naval Academy and on passing out they are appointed as midshipmen, which entails a further six months of common training at sea. On qualifying at their final fleet examination they are commissioned as Acting Sub Lieutenants and sent to various branches of the Navy. After the allocation to branches, they continue their training at the Naval Engineering College (Jauhar and Karsazi) or at the Supply and Secretariat Schools. Once this phase is completed, they have sea training for one year. After completing this phase, each officer is entrusted with independent responsibilities. The training period for various branches varies: for operations it is four years; for technical branches four-and-a-half years; and for supply and secretariats four years. After serving for a few years, the officers are sent to staff courses at the Pakistan Navy College at Lahore or the Staff College at Quetta or the Air War College, Karachi or the Joint Staff College in Rawalpindi. Sometimes a few mid-career officers are sent to the Quaid-i-Azam University for Defence Studies courses. Selected senior officers regularly undergo the war course at the National Defence College in Islamabad. The most important and perhaps most coveted course is the defence studies course; the most senior captains and commodores attend it, unless they are sent abroad to suitable training institutions.

As far as the sailors are concerned, all recruits are given general boot camp training for 24 weeks at PNS *Himalaya*, followed by training at sea for another 24 weeks. A further 24 weeks are spent in schools for professional training. Communications, engine room and electrical personnel, however, join their professional schools directly and do sea time as part of the course. The total time for seaman training is 78 weeks and for technical sailor training is 126 weeks. All sailors

undergo professional courses before they are promoted to higher ranks. Sailors selected as apprentices join PNS *Karsaz* for a three-and-a-half year diploma level course in technical subjects and on successful completion are appointed as Petty Officers. The Pakistan Navy participates in international training exercises in both its home waters and abroad. These maritime exercises held jointly with friendly countries enable Pakistan to evaluate the operational readiness of its Navy. The PN also regularly undertakes training cruises to friendly countries on a reciprocal basis.

DEVELOPMENTS SINCE 1947

The division of the British Indian naval forces following partition was secured more or less in accordance with the recommendations of a Navy sub-committee working under the Armed Forces Reconstitution Committee.[7] While the division of seagoing assets did not cause any major problems and seems to have been amicably arranged, the question of equipment at the various dockyards did impede the division process, primarily because of India's refusal to part with any piece of machinery that happened to be on its soil. And almost all repair and docking facilities were at the ports of Bombay and Calcutta.

Because of the disparity in country size, it was decided to allocate two-thirds of the seagoing assets to India and Pakistan would receive the remaining one-third. Thus Pakistan, despite having inherited the large Ganges delta area in the east, was given much less than India. Indeed, not much attention was paid to the peculiar geographical nature of Pakistan. As the new state of Pakistan consisted of two wings separated by 1600 kilometres or more of Indian territory, in the event of a deteriorated relationship with India the only feasible link between the two wings would be via the sea. Of the 48 vessels of the Royal

Indian Navy, Pakistan was given sixteen.[8] In terms of manpower, Pakistan inherited roughly 200 officers and 3000 other ranks to man the ships and shore establishments.[9] In these respects, the PN seems to have done rather better than the Pakistan Army did. But this does not mean that it was not confronted with complex problems.

For a start, there was only one port in the west wing—Karachi, then a town of some 250 000 people. The second commercial port, at Chittagong, was over 1600 kilometres away from West Pakistan. While the need for more ports was acute, because of the lack of funds such projects were delayed. Now, of course, Karachi port has been developed extensively and many other ports have come into existence. In addition, Pakistan is developing Ormara as another naval base.

Like the Pakistan Army, the Pakistan Navy was confronted with the problem of a shortage of officers, particularly in the engineering branches. The problem was resolved by granting permanent commissions to noncommissioned men, by introducing short service commissions and by employing suitable officers from the British Navy and the Royal Australian Navy on a contract basis.[10] As soon as Pakistani officers acquired the requisite experience, they replaced the foreign officers.

At the time of partition there were very few naval stores in the shore establishments at Karachi. The lack of storage facilities meant that material had to be issued directly from its packing cases, at least during the early emergency period. Later the US military assistance organisation helped to set up a stores depot in the Karachi naval dockyard and an ammunition depot at Maripur. But there was still the problem of intransigence. 'Even after the stores had been checked and packed into cases, they would be intercepted at Bombay docks and frequently, on arrival in Karachi, packing cases which were supposed to contain valuable stores were found to contain nothing but useless rubbish.'[11] There was another serious lack—dry docking and repair

facilities. During the initial period most of the Pakistani ships had to go to the UK, Malta, Sri Lanka or Singapore for maintenance and repairs. Consequently, top priority was accorded to the construction of the naval dockyard at Karachi.[12]

Perhaps the most challenging problem facing the PN was the geographical division of the country. This confronted the Navy with a logistics nightmare, which became even more complex whenever there was a disruption of telegraphic communication between the two wings. The sea route between the west and the east exceeded 4000 kilometres. Such geographical division required the establishment of two fully equipped navies with the ability to protect vital sea routes. But the naval share given to Pakistan after partition was hopelessly inadequate for carrying out even coastal defence requirements. For Pakistan it became a more acute problem still because of the volatile nature of East Pakistan, and the Defence Ministry stressed the desirability of maintaining more than token forces of all three services there. For the Navy, being the smallest service, the problem was far more serious than was the case with the other services.

Finally, the question of training facilities also produced some headaches for the PN. Pakistan inherited two training schools for young recruits, a gunnery school and a radar school, which were luckily located at Karachi.[13] In time, the Navy expanded its training facilities for anti-submarine and torpedo personnel and created an establishment to provide training for the artificer and engine room branches of the service.[14]

Despite having inherited a skeleton navy and many complex problems, the PN's leaders started immediately on the task of buiilding a strong naval force. But progress was slow. At the time, it was assumed that the main threat to Pakistan's security would be land-orientated. This meant that Pakistan must concentrate on the development of a strong Army, and that the Air Force

would have a major role also. Consequently the Navy's share of the defence budget remained unimpressive for some time. (The former British Indian Navy had never been elevated to the level needed to meet the requirements of a vast country like British India, as most of the defence of the Indian Ocean was looked after by the main British Navy.) Adding to the difficulties was the sheer cost of developing a strong Navy—ships are extremely expensive commodities. Given the poor health of Pakistan's economy at the time, it was not realistic to think in terms of purchasing ships out of the nation's own coffers. A further factor which contributed towards the delayed development of the Navy was the notion that the defence of East Pakistan depended heavily upon land (and air) based offence from West Pakistan. Had some other strategy been adopted, accelerated development of the Navy would presumably have taken place, chiefly because an effective sea link between the two wings would be absolutely essential. But the Army Chief, Ayub Khan, who enjoyed considerable influence over many Pakistani politicians, did not fully comprehend the importance of safeguarding the sea lanes. Thus the ascendancy of the Army prevented the Navy from developing as it should have.

Building a navy is in any case a slow and difficult task. During the first five years of its independent existence the PN added three destroyers to its fleet and also acquired a tanker for use as a harbour oiler in the port of Karachi.[15] But real progress was registered only after the appointment of a Pakistani officer as Commander-in-Chief. Rear Admiral Choudri took over in February 1953 and held office until he resigned in early 1959 as a result of differences over the development of the PN. Throughout his tenure Choudri tried his best to build the Pakistan Navy despite the constraints he faced.

Pakistan had approached the Americans in 1947 for financial aid and 'asked for 81 million dollars per year for the next five years in order to build its forces in

congruence with the perceived threats and calculated minimum response', but the Americans refused to oblige the Pakistanis 'on the grounds of legal, supply and priority difficulties'.[16] Pakistan listed its requirements as four light cruisers, sixteen destroyers, four corvettes, twelve coastguard gunboats, three submarines and 120 000 tons of miscellaneous stores, along with ammunition, base equipment etc.[17] To the American decision makers, though, South Asia was not regarded as a priority area, there was no legal authority for granting US aid to Pakistan and, in any case, the American preference was to assist India.[18] The Pakistanis persisted in their efforts and kept on sending military missions but the American attitude didn't change until two major developments took place in 1950: the outbreak of the Korean War, which compelled the Americans to evolve an Asian policy; and the American visit of Pakistan's first Prime Minister, Liaquat Ali Khan, who was also Defence Minister. With the contacts between the two countries acquiring a more positive tone, the new US administration accelerated the process that led to Pakistan's participation in western-sponsored military alliances. During 1954–55 Pakistan not only signed a Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement with the US but also joined the South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) and the Baghdad Pact (later renamed Central Treaty Organization, or CENTO).

Following the signing of the Pakistan–US assistance agreement, the newly created Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) began to discuss naval requirements with the PN. The meetings eventually agreed upon the following probable roles of the Pakistan Navy:

- provide local defence of Karachi
- secure the Karachi–Persian Gulf sea lane
- secure the Karachi–Aden sea lane
- secure the Karachi–Chittagong sea lane
- provide local naval defence of East Pakistan ports and protect local sea lanes in that area[19]

With these roles in mind, MAAG sought a list of the requirements of the PN in order to submit it to the Chief of Naval Operations in Washington. The list included items for modernisation of the PN's existing ships and recommended the acquisition of many new ships. In addition, it recommended improvements in the defence of Karachi and much needed stores and equipment. While not all the requirements were obtained, there is no doubt that the naval expansion in real terms only began after Pakistan's participation in the western alliances. The PN eventually managed to acquire a light cruiser and five destroyers, including two modern battle class destroyers from Royal Navy Reserve Fleet, and these ships were refitted and modernised in the UK with MAAG support.[20]

The Pakistani naval authorities had been keen to acquire submarines right at the outset for training surface ships for anti-submarine work and as a deterrent on its long sea lanes from west to east Pakistan. But nobody supported them in their quest for submarines. The British and the Americans positively opposed it.[21] When Admiral Choudri became the Chief of Naval Staff he eventually managed to persuade the Swedish Government to sell submarines to the PN. But the deal did not materialise, as Choudri resigned over General Ayub Khan's making arbitrary decisions regarding naval affairs after seizing power and becoming head of state in 1958.[22]

Finally, in 1964, Pakistan acquired an ex-US Tench Class submarine, making it the second country after Indonesia among the Indian Ocean littoral nations to operate a submarine.[23] Also, during 1963 the Naval Chief had visited European countries including Holland, Germany and France with a view to negotiating the purchase of three submarines, and during his tour he managed to secure an agreement with the French Government to build three Daphne Class submarines for Pakistan.[24] Despite objections raised by the Finance Ministry, the deal went through and the submarines were constructed and inducted into the PN in due course.

The Pakistan Navy's first combat experience was during the 1965 Indo–Pak war. It also actively participated in the 1971 war. Following 1971 its acquisitions were somewhat modest. It acquired Chinese-built missile/torpedo attack craft, twelve Shanghai Class fast patrol boats, four Hainan Class attack craft and four Huchwan Class hydrofoil craft; followed by the acceptance of six ex-US Gearing Class vessels.[25]

The growth of the PN during the 1980s, though, was impressive. It almost doubled its surface fleet from nine combatant vessels to sixteen, and also acquired sophisticated long-range anti-ship missiles and enhanced its maritime reconnaissance capabilities.[26] Two things led to this unprecedented expansion. First, and perhaps more important, was the massive expansion of the Indian Navy, which most Indian Ocean littoral states had viewed with concern; Pakistan being particularly alarmed. Years before, unable to persuade western suppliers to sell submarines, India had turned to the Soviet Union. A close collaboration soon developed between the two countries, resulting in the signing of a Friendship and Cooperation Treaty in 1971. The relationship with the Soviets enabled India to acquire several Foxtrot Class submarines, along with destroyers, frigates, small suface combatants, amphibious warships and minesweepers.[27] In addition, transfers of technology enabled India to improvise and to modify equipment in accordance with specific requirements of the Indian Navy.

The second thing leading to the enlargement of Pakistan's Navy was the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the American response. Determined to bleed the Soviets in Afghanistan and to resist their expansionist designs, America not only encouraged and equipped the Afghan resistance groups but also strengthened Pakistan's military forces. The latter was justified on the grounds that Pakistan had become 'a frontline state' after the Soviets moved into Afghanistan. The US signed two

economic assistance and military sales packages with the Government of Pakistan. The first, signed in 1982, was worth US$3.2 billion, inclusive of US$1.55 billion specifically for military procurement. The second agreement was signed in 1987 for another six years and was worth US$4.2 billion, including US$1.74 for military purchases. Pakistan managed to acquire eight Brooke and Garcia Class frigates from the American Navy on a five year lease in 1988, followed by the transfer of PNS *Moawin* in April 1989 and the formation of a technical assistance team.[28] However, in October 1990 the US administration invoked a regulation known as the Pressler Amendment, and in consequence not only was further assistance cancelled but the US took back nine ships which had been given to Pakistan on lease.[29] Although the situation eased a little later on, the application of the Pressler Amendment caused the Pakistanis to diversify their procurement sources and to lay more emphasis on self-reliance.

During the 1990s the PN purchased six Tariq Class frigates from the UK for almost US$60 million and spent nearly the same amount on modernisation. Plans for three new Agosta 90B Class boats are intended to strengthen PN's submarine force. The first has been completely built in France, whereas the second one is to be assembled in Karachi from components made in Cherbourg and the third will be built entirely in Pakistan.[30] The naval air arm has also developed over the years; the introduction of Orions has strengthened the PN's strike capabilities. And the Marine Corps, which was established in 1990, has certainly added to the strength of Pakistan's coastal defences. Almost all new supply contracts now contain a clause relating to the transfer of technology, with a view to moving the PN from old technologies to new ones. The introduction of stealth technology, smart weapons and efficient sensors has radically transformed naval warfare, and almost all navies have to consider seriously the use of such systems.

Pakistan has a coastline of around 850 kilometres which stretches from the Iran border, just west of Gawadar Bay, to Sir Creek on the Indian border. For a long time Karachi was the only naval base but (since 1994) Ormara is being developed as another base and will greatly enhance the Navy's operational abilities. The development of Gawadar as a fishing harbour cum mini-port has also strengthened the Navy's options. Being located relatively close to the Strait of Hormuz at the mouth of the Persian Gulf, Gawadar has the longer term potential of evolving into a major international port, one that could serve both naval and commercial interests of Pakistan. Changing trading patterns and the needs of the landlocked countries of Central Asia are a factor here.

As with most navies, the tasks of the PN include coastal defence, protecting offshore resources including Pakistan's Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), maintaining the freedom of shipping lanes, acting in support of diplomacy, aiding the civil authorities, guarding the nation's territorial belt, and maintaining a strategic deterrence. In the case of the EEZ, which covers 625 000 square kilometres, the fishery resources alone are enormous. In the coastal areas fishing is the main economic activity, providing employment to many people, and is the main source of food. The mineral wealth including oil deposits is being continually explored in the EEZ. Apart from the EEZ, Pakistan relies on transportation by sea for more than 90 per cent of its trade. These economic activities alone justify the existence of an active Navy.

The order of chapters on the three armed services in this book is no accident. Just before the promulgation of the 1956 Constitution, the then Prime Minister decided that the military order of precedence would be Army, Navy and Air Force. In addition, the Navy was designated 'Pakistan Navy'; the prefix 'Royal' was dropped. The seniority that the Navy had enjoyed during British Indian times no longer applied.

ROLE IN NATIONAL DEFENCE

Indo–Pak war of 1965

Within hours of India's attack on Lahore on 6 September 1965, starting the second Indo–Pak war, the Pakistan Navy was ready in all respects and most of its ships were put to sea to take on the enemy. In the event, few Indian ships ventured out beyond their safety limits; many were in dock for repairs and refitting. The PN was assigned three major tasks: to protect the coastline and specifically the port of Karachi against enemy attack; to ensure the continued flow by sea of essential supplies to and from Pakistan; and to deny the enemy the use of its sea lanes for trading purposes.[31] To ensure the effective attainment of these objectives a three-tiered strategy was adopted: to send surface vessels to patrol the coast; to deploy Pakistan's sole submarine, *Ghazi*, to blockade the main Indian naval port, Bombay; and to attack the Indians' Dwarka radar station. At the time, Pakistan had one cruiser, one submarine and seven destroyers and frigates, whereas the Indian Navy was equipped with one aircraft carrier, two cruisers and nineteen destroyers and frigates.

Ghazi was deployed off the coast of Bombay with specific instructions to attack only heavy units that ventured out of the safe limits. Since the sinking of heavy ships was considered extremely important, *Ghazi* refrained from attacking other vessels even though it spotted some. The Indian aircraft carrier *Vikrant* and some other heavy ships were in Bombay but because of *Ghazi*'s presence just outside they remained bottled up. Postwar intelligence reports indicate that the Indian Navy was not informed of India's intention to attack Pakistan until 3 September (three days before the event), whereas Pakistan had already despatched its submarine to the target area on the 2nd and it was in position by the morning of the 5th.[32] It seems that the Indian naval commanders thought the time allowed was too little to

take the risk and that they decided not to put their units to sea.

With the Indian Navy kept off the ocean highways, Pakistan's sea lanes remained safe and uninterrupted, enabling the Pakistanis to replenish stockpiles in both east and west wings, and also to employ 'enticing tactics'. In order to entice an enemy out of a safe haven one undertakes an operation against some significant military installation, the loss of which may cause an upsurge in public opinion in the enemy country and result in pressure on its Navy to respond. So, in order to entice the Indian Navy out of is lair, the Pakistanis decided to attack the Dwarka radar installation. Besides the enticement aspect, the objectives were to lower Indian morale and perhaps to divert Indian aircraft away from the north, where most of the battles were fought.[33] Also, a successful raid on Dwarka would deprive enemy aircraft of information needed for attacks on Karachi. The raid was undertaken during the night of the 7th/8th September. A fast-moving Pakistani force silently reached the target area within the planned time and a little after midnight bombarded the Dwarka installation with all the firepower the invading vessels possessed. The attack lasted fifteen minutes, after which they moved away quickly without loss. It was a good start for the Pakistan Navy.

Indo–Pak war of 1971

With the outbreak of the 1965 war the US suspended all military and economic aid to Pakistan. This created major difficulties for Pakistan, which was getting more than 80 per cent of its weapons from the US.[34] A positive outcome of the embargo, however, was that Pakistan diversified its sources of arms procurement. In the case of the Navy, emphasis seems to have been placed on strengthening its underwater forces, even though most of its surface ships were aging.

Compared to the 1965 war, the situation for the Pakistani security managers was far more difficult in 1971. The 1971 war was primarily caused by the crisis in East Pakistan and the Indian invasion. In preparation for invading East Pakistan the Indians blocked access to the region via the sea. They transferred the aircraft carrier *Vikrant* to their Eastern Fleet and 'created a task force with two frigates, a destroyer, a submarine, a landing ships group and several patrol vessels and craft'.[35] India saw the 1971 war as 'a unique opportunity to avenge the humiliation that it had suffered at the hands of the Pakistan Navy in the 1965 war'.[36]

Beside India's naval preparedness, the Pakistan Navy was lumbered with old ships it was unable to replace and yet had to take on a much larger task than was the case in 1965. The only bright spot was that three Daphne Class submarines had been added to the fleet in the late 1960s.[37] Since the 1971 war started in East Pakistan and later spread to West Pakistan, the area the PN had to cater for was much larger than before. India now faced little opposition in the Bay of Bengal. Pakistan despatched its submarine *Ghazi* there, hoping for a repeat performance, but *Ghazi* had an accident and sank. It was not sunk by the Indian Navy. The submarine was engaged in laying mines off the coast of Vishakapatnam and, on picking up sonar transmissions or propeller noise, apparently opted for the safety of deeper water. Later it returned to the mined area to complete its assignment of bottling up the Indian Eastern Fleet in the port of Vishakapatnam and tragically collided with one of its own mines and exploded.[38]

As part of India's preparations for the war, four objectives had been agreed upon by naval strategy planners: the blockade of East Pakistan; attacks on shore targets of a military nature; disruption of Pakistan's trade and protection of Indian trade; and destruction of Pakistani maritime forces.[39] On the eastern front and with no opposition the carrier *Vikrant* launched a massive strike

against Chittagong harbour and managed to destroy a hangar, a control tower and an oil dump and to damage six merchant ships which the Indians referred to as 'armed merchant ships'. Since the small contingent of the Pakistan Air Force stationed in East Pakistan was destroyed by massive Indian air attacks during the initial 48 hours of the war, India's Eastern Fleet could operate freely. As the days passed, it not only bombarded shore installations at will but also maintained an effective blockade.

On the western front the Indians' naval exploits were not all that impressive, though they tried to project them as great achievements. Not long after the commencement of hostilities, the Indian Navy launched two attacks on Karachi—the first with three missile boats accompanied by two frigates on the night of 4 December, and the second on the 8th with two frigates and one missile boat. A Pakistani naval historian has said that the missile attack on the 4th, codenamed Trident, was planned well in advance and carefully rehearsed, and was based on the assumption, which turned out to be accurate, that most of the PN fleet would be on patrol away from Karachi.[40] When the success of these attacks was inflated in the Indian media, with claims of many ships being destroyed, the Pakistanis responded that only one major warship and a coastal minesweeper, along with a few merchant ships including a British merchant ship, had been destroyed.[41] Nonetheless, the Indian naval performance in the 1971 war was far more impressive than it had been in 1965. This was due at least in part to shortcomings in the PN. As noted, because of budgetary constraints almost all of Pakistan's surface ships were ageing and needed to be replaced or at least modernised. Moreover, the PN had neither an air strike capability nor anti-aircraft weapons.[42] In fact, air defence at the time was not the responsibility of the PN and those who were entrusted with it were deeply involved in their commitments to the Army. In any case, the limitations

of Pakistan's Air Force prevented their providing the requisite air cover to Karachi or providing an effective defence against the missile attacks on the harbour. Finally, the Navy was not assigned any role in the widely trumpeted strategy (or, as some have called it, cliché), 'The defence of East Pakistan lies in the West'.[43] But despite such impediments the PN did have its successes.

In many ways the 1971 Indo–Pak war highlighted the neglect of the Navy's requirements, and turned out to be a turning point in Pakistani naval consciousness.[44] Over the years successive governments began to seriously cater for naval needs, within the limited resources available. The PN acquired, besides new missile and torpedo boats from China, Sea King helicopters from Britain, Atlantic LRMR aircraft from France and, in 1982, the first of several Fokker F-27 aircraft, which eventually led to the formation of 27 Squadron.[45] Thus the aviation wing of the Navy gadually emerged as an integral part of Pakistan's naval force.

6

Evolution of the Air Force

PRESENT STRUCTURE AND STRENGTH

At the top of the Air Force hierarchy is the Chief of Air Staff (CAS), who is now invariably an Air Chief Marshal. The CAS exercises overall direction and control from Air Headquarters, which has five main divisions each headed by a Principal Staff Officer directly responsible to the CAS. The main branches are Operations, Engineers, Administration, Training and Personnel. At the field level the PAF consists of three Regional Air Commands (RACs). While each RAC enjoys functional control over its bases and units, operational control remains with Air Headquarters. In addition, the PAF has an Air Defence Command which monitors all air defence activities during peacetime. During a war, the Air Defence Command *controls* the air defence of the country. The bases house the operational and supporting units of the PAF and conduct training during peacetime under the functional control of the RAC. During a war, the bases are all controlled by the Command Operation Centre (COC). The current strength of the PAF is about 45 000.

The total number of combat aircraft is around 350, whereas the Indian Air Force has 1010. The gap is especially great in the case of high-tech aircraft—around 7 to 1. While the IAF has 232 high-tech planes, Pakistan

has only 32 F-16s. The PAF had planned to acquire 71 additional F-16s for its inventory, which would have comfortably seen it through the first decade of the twenty-first century, but was unable to get them because of the United States' Pressler Amendment.[1] The PAF introduced some F-7s and Mirage III and V planes for the interim period, but the search for modern weapons and aircraft continues for the time being in order to ensure that the balance in high-tech areas does not tilt even further in favour of Pakistan's adversary. During 1995 Air Headquarters recommended that the Government purchase Mirage 2000-5 planes to make the force more potent; although the Government had apparently earmarked US$3 billion for the PAF's high-tech aircraft program it was unable to secure the deal. For the long term the PAF has now opted for the Super-7, a multi-role aircraft being co-developed with the Chinese aircraft industry and with a Chinese airframe and western avionics and weapons. The PAF is expecting that S-7s will replace a large number of aircraft due for retirement between 2005 and 2015.[2] Current PAF aircraft numbers are shown in Table 6.1.

Table 6.1 Air Force: aircraft numbers

Combat Aircraft (F-16, Mirage 5, Mirage III EP, F-5, F-7)	410
Anti-Submarine	4 Atlantic + 3 P-3 Cosion
Helicopters (SAR)	6
Transport Aircraft	12 (C-130) + 1 (L-100) 2 (Boeing 707) + 3 (Boeing 737) 3 (Falcon) + 2 (F-27 200) 2 (Beach)
Helicopters	12 (SA 316 + 4 (SA 321) + 12 (SA 315 B Lama)
Training Aircraft	12 (CJ-68) + 30 (JJ-5) 40 (Mashing) + 6 (Mig) 10 (T-33) + 44 (T-37)

Source: *The Military Balance 1998–99*, IISS, 1998

Pakistan realises that the need for self-reliance in developing its weaponry is on the increase. The imposition of sanctions following the nuclear explosions of May 1998 has meant that dependence on its own technical and human resources will be a mainstay in future strategies. The PAF has been working to ascertain what technologies can be indigenously developed and what need to be imported, in order to make sure that all future deals suit the country's long-term ambitions in the weapons field.

Training

Given the challenges posed by its major adversary and the realisation that Pakistan can never match India in terms of numbers of personnel or aircraft, training has acquired a very high place on the priority list of the PAF. To offset India's numerical superiority, the emphasis has been on technical advances and very high standards of training. In the latter respect, the initial selection of candidates is extremely strict. Of about 1500 applicants for various branches of the PAF each year, only 300 or so are accepted. The basic rationale of the training is to develop the personality of each individual as an airman, a supervisor and a leader.

Among the officer training institutions the most important is at Risalpur. Pilots are trained at the Pakistan Air Force College at Risalpur which has, over the years, evolved into a key institution. The selected officers acquire a very high standard of efficiency in flying and also the requisite technical knowhow. But first they receive preliminary training at the PAF College at Sargodha—unlike many other air services, the PAF picks candidates at an early age. After having passed their intermediate examination, many candidates along with other outsiders go through a selection procedure which is conducted by the Inter Services Selection Board. The selected candidates then head for

Risalpur for five and a half years of rigorous professional training. For the pilot cadets the attrition rate is set very high. Up to 65 per cent fail to meet the strict standards for flying, but they can then choose other branches of the air force.[3] The college uses a Pakistani-built Mushaq single engine trainer for initial flying experience and then moves the successful cadets into jet trainers. The next step is basic flying training on T-37s—a program of 135 hours spread over 45 weeks. Here the cadet pilots learn how to cope with the demands of operational aircraft. After completing training at the college, the successful candidates are posted to Mianwali for advance tactical training on FT-5s in order to become fighter pilots. It is often the case that out of 100 candidates only fifteen to twenty survive the rigours of this training. After qualifying, most of them are posted to A-5 and F-6 squadrons; some are sent to more modern Mirages, but only a few exceptional pilots are sent for F-16 experience. After having served for a few years, some are selected for training at the Combat Command School at Sargodha, where they learn the finer techniques of air combat for five months. Those who do well are often retained for two years as instructors.

The College of Aeronautical Engineering was initially established at Korangi Creek in 1965 with the assistance of the Americans but in 1986 it was shifted to the PAF academy at Risalpur. Consisting of four major departments, Avionics Engineering, Aerospace Engineering, Industrial Engineering and Humanities and Science, the college keeps itself abreast of new technologies and regularly revises its curriculum. Having acquired a reputation of excellence, it trains engineers for national airlines as well as meeting PAF requirements.

A Transport Conversion Squadron trains pilots, navigators, flight engineers, loadmasters and scanners for work in different aircraft.

In 1993–94 a Basic Staff School was set up at Peshawar to hold three-month courses for officers at the level of flying officer and flight lieutenant. Courses covering areas like air force law, administration, management and English were deemed necessary for promotion purposes. In addition, a College of Staff Studies, established in the early 1970s, offers courses to flight lieutenants and squadron leaders. The college also conducts correspondence courses. For senior appointments such as air commodore and above, a war course is run at the PAF Air War College, which was established in 1958 but upgraded in 1987. The main objective of this college is to prepare selected officers for the assumption of key command and staff appointments. The college is affiliated with Karachi University, which awards a MSc degree after the successful completion of courses. Many officers of higher rank are also sent to the National Defence College at Islamabad for one year's comprehensive training.

As far as the other ranks are concerned, a system of regular training applies from the day a man joins the Air Force. He is put through formal and informal training until he attains the rank of chief warrant officer. For technicians and tradesmen, a chain of training institutions has been established. The men start with pre-trade training, which offers courses in English, physics, mathematics and Islamic and Pakistani studies, and then move to either the School of Aeronautics or the School of Electronics depending upon their assigned trade. The assignment is determined through tests of the men's clerical, mechanical and technical aptitude.

In the PAF emphasis is placed upon training through operational exercises. These help senior officers to evaluate the operational readiness of the service and also to evolve new concepts. Training in the PAF is not only accorded a very high priority; it is a continuing process for both officers and airmen, regardless of the role they play.

DEVELOPMENTS SINCE 1947

Like the other arms of Pakistan's armed forces, the Air Force inherited very little in terms of equipment or personnel. The allocation was made by the air force subcommittee of the Armed Forces Reconstitution Committee, which gave 20 per cent of the existing ten Royal Indian Air Force squadrons, along with their British equipment, to Pakistan.[4] Inheriting 220 officers, 2112 noncommissioned personnel and five bases,[5] the Air Force started functioning with sixteen Tempest II fighter bombers, two Dakotas, twelve T6G Harwards and seven Tiger Moths.[6] Most of the equipment was damaged or unserviceable, and Pakistan at the time had no maintenance facilities and only very limited spare parts. It has been said that a 'heap of junk' formed the nucleus of the Pakistan Air Force.[7] In addition, the departing Indian members of the Royal Indian Air Force seemed to have deliberately damaged the few aircraft that were stationed at Risalpur by boring holes in their wings and engines; even the undercarriages were damaged beyond repair.[8]

Small and ill equipped, the PAF embarked upon its independent career with more determination and devotion than essential equipment. At the Risalpur training establishment the cadets and instructors demonstrated zeal that bordered on fanaticism, allowing the school to hold its first passing out parade on 2 January 1948. On his visit in April the Governor-General, Quaid-l-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah, stressed that 'a country without a strong Air Force is at the mercy of any aggressor' and that therefore 'Pakistan must build up her Air Force as quickly as possible'.[9] Realising the shortage of both equipment and personnel, he assured them that efforts were under way to procure the necessary equipment.[10]

Among the initial tasks assigned to the PAF were the patrolling of the long border with India and that

of the north western frontier, and taking supplies to the northern areas. Lacking proper training, the PAF was expected to make air drops of supplies in a most treacherous terrain. Frequently the task was made further difficult because of the nonexistence of navigational and weather-reporting facilities. Another hazard faced by the PAF was that the Indian Air Force conducted regular operations, especially in the northern areas following the outbreak of the Kashmir war of 1948.

From 1947 to 1957 the Pakistan Air Force was commanded by British officers. The first Pakistani C-in-C, Air Marshal M. Asghar Khan, took over in July 1957 and led the development of the Air Force till July 1965.

Following the signing of the Pakistan–US Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement on 19 May 1954, American aircraft and related equipment were introduced to the PAF. Pakistan also joined the multilateral alliances SEATO and CENTO (initially the Baghdad Pact) in May 1954 and June 1955 respectively. As a result of these alliances, not only did Pakistan begin to receive American equipment but its training system was reorientated in accordance with American concepts. From 1954 onward the PAF started getting T-33 trainers as well as F-86 fighter bombers. In 1957 the induction of American F-86 Sabres was completed. Soon B-5 light bombers and F-104 Starfighters were also introduced to the PAF's inventory.

The Americanisation of the PAF was completed during the period of AVM Asghar Khan, who also established a Fighter Leaders School with a view to producing a class of warriors. In addition, sweeping changes in engineering and logistics were introduced. The early

1960s saw the arrival of a good deal of noncombat and support-role equipment, including six Lockheed C-130B Hercules aircraft. With the induction of US equipment, American experts came to give training in flying, engineering and related technical departments.

During the same decade Air HQ was strengthened and somewhat centralised with the establishment of direct links of various commanders with Air HQ. Almost all of the operational bases were located in West Pakistan and no operational unit was permanently based in East Pakistan. So the Pakistani C-in-C was able to quickly evolve the PAF as a well-knit fighting force. Regular exercises and manoeuvres were held in order to test its state of readiness. Joint exercises with other alliance partners of SEATO and CENTO enormously benefited the PAF.

The 1965 Indo–Pak war provided an opportunity for the PAF to test its skills and efficiency. Indeed, the war saw an extremely impressive performance from the PAF, although much smaller than the Indian Air Force. Not only was it able to provide adequate air cover to its ground forces; it was also hitting Indian airstrips effectively, along with engaging incoming IAF aircraft (see pages 86–9). One consequence of the 1965 war was the imposition of an embargo by the Americans which confronted the PAF with a dilemma regarding the procurement of aircraft. For obvious reasons the PAF was now forced to look for alternative sources. Consequently the Chinese F-6 entered the PAF's inventory in 1966. A limited number of Mirages were also added to the existing capabilities. Despite the new additions to Pakistan's air defence, the odds were heavily against the PAF during the 1971 Indo–Pak war, yet it came out of the conflict with honour and dignity and retaining its qualitative edge.

Following the 1971 war, which caused the dismemberment of Pakistan, the PAF initiated a program to revitalise itself. New operational bases were built, the obsolete T-33 aircraft were replaced by the Chinese fighter trainer FT-5 and rebuilding factories for Mirage and F-6 planes along with a factory for production of MIF-17 trainers were established. As well, 'the Air Defence System was modernised by inducting the latest

radars linked with computerised data processing and display equipment'.[11] The early 1980s saw the induction of Chinese A-5 ground attack aircraft and the F-5 Fighting Falcon.

The threat from Pakistan's western border grew to serious proportions when the Soviets invaded Afghanistan in December 1979. It was not Afghanistan itself that worried Pakistan in a military sense but the presence of Soviet combat troops and aircraft. During the crisis the PAF was called upon to prevent air intrusions on its western border in order to protect life and property. The Soviet aircraft were targeting Mujahideen places of refuge in Pakistan and in the process demonstrated a somewhat callous attitude towards Pakistanis inhabiting areas close to the Mujahideen's concentration points and the Afghan refugee camp. The PAF once again performed admirably and effectively sealed the border, shooting down many intruding Soviet aircraft. Oddly enough, this was the longest military campaign the PAF had to undertake, lasting until the middle of February 1989.

The end of the crisis and consequent withdrawal of the Soviets from Afghanistan enabled the Americans to block the future induction of F-16s into the PAF inventory. Having been denied the additional F-16s, Pakistan was compelled to evaluate other hi-tech aircraft on the market. As a result, Pakistan has a good mix of western and Chinese planes, but it needs to continue its quest for hi-tech aircraft. While the F-16s it does have enable the PAF to cope effectively with almost all offensive and defensive missions, the existence of the Chinese aircraft provides the capacity to absorb losses. The upgrading of aircraft and related weapons systems along with a very high degree of professionalism and dedication makes the PAF a formidable force. It indeed plays what its current Chief has called 'a pivotal role in the defence strategy and national security of Pakistan'.[12]

ROLE IN NATIONAL DEFENCE

Indo–Pak war of 1948

During the first Kashmir war—and also in the months that preceded it—the major task assigned to the air force was that of dropping supplies into the northern areas, Gilgit, Hunza and Skardu. By the end of 1947, the besieged and isolated soldiers and people in these areas were in desperate need of food and other essential supplies. The only reliable means of supply was by air, and consequently the PAF was called upon to do the job. In the beginning only two DC-3s could be spared for this assignment, with crews totally inexperienced in making supply-drops. In addition, the terrain over which the flights had to be made meant that the route was one of the most difficult in the world, being surrounded by snowclad mountains of 2000 to 7000 metres. The weather was unpredictable and the valleys were extremely narrow—so narrow that aircraft could not turn around in them. Weather reporting and navigational facilities were almost negligible. And when the war got under way, the risk of interception by IAF planes was very real. As a result of this, the PAF began to operate at night, which made the missions even more difficult. In all, the warlike situation lasted for just on a year and a half, and the PAF fully met its operational commitments despite being hopelessly ill-equipped. As time passed, it improved its strength in terms of aircraft, equipment and training personnel.

Rann of Kutch episode

By the beginning of 1965 the PAF had evolved into an impressive war machine. Hostilities in the Kutch area began when the Indians launched an attack against Pakistani territory on 8 April 1965 with three infantry brigades. For immediate support India had already alerted

its Jamnagar and Poona air bases. The Jamnagar base had at the time one recce squadron, one fighter bomber squadron, one Canberra squadron and a detachment of Gnat fighters, whereas Poona had one Canberra squadron, two Vampire squadrons and one maritime recce squadron.[13] 'Against this lineup, the PAF had two squadrons each of F-86s and B-57s and a detachment of F-104s, based at Mauripur'.[14]

Although air operations played an almost negligible part in 'Operation Desert Hawk', the codename for the Rann of Kutch conflict, the war was significant as it highlighted the need for coordinated efforts to provide air support to the Army. The specific commitment to the Army was thoroughly reviewed. This war was also significant in that the PAF Chief, Air Marshal Asghar Khan, after securing President Ayub's permission contacted his opposite number in the IAF, Arjun Singh, in a bid to keep both air forces out of this war.[15] Asghar Khan apparently conveyed to his counterpart that, if Indian aircraft attacked Pakistan Army units, the PAF would be obliged to retaliate anywhere and in any manner it deemed fit. While it was perhaps unrealistic to expect a positive response from the IAF Chief, the IAF more or less stayed away from the battle areas, which in turn proved to be somewhat advantageous for the Pakistan Army. It is suggested in some quarters that the PAF Chief not only took into account the proximity of IAF bases to the Rann area (compared to the distant positions of the PAF bases) but also recognised the exposed nature of the Pakistan Army units (whereas the Indians were defensively dug in). In any case, the situation influenced Asghar Khan to resort to this 'most unconventional strategem'.[16] The move elicited some criticism terming it a 'timid' and even 'cowardly' act, but in fact the nearest Pakistani air base at the time was Mauripur, which was three times as far away from the battle areas as the nearest Indian base.[17]

Indo–Pak war of 1965

While the air forces of both countries played an important role in the 1965 war, the PAF emerged as an extremely impressive force. It carried out repeated attacks on Indian air bases, provided regular air cover to its own Army and dealt with the incoming IAF fighters and bombers very effectively. The 1965 war saw the best of the PAF's war-fighting abilities. The force made history by shooting down thirteen IAF aircraft in one day. One of its pilots shot down five IAF Hunters in the space of a minute or two.[18]

Although the actual war between India and Pakistan started on 6 September when Indian forces launched a three-pronged attack against Pakistan's second largest city, Lahore, the hostilities had begun much earlier when Pakistan initiated Operation Gibraltar in the disputed territories of Indian-occupied Kashmir. Strangely, the Chief of the PAF was not consulted when plans for Gibraltar were being finalised. According to a biographer of President Ayub Khan, civilian officials (except the Foreign Secretary and the Defence Secretary) were not taken into confidence, and the Air Force was not brought into joint planning, as both groups were considered insufficiently security-minded.[19] Even Air Marshal Nur Khan, who succeeded the outgoing Air Chief, Asghar Khan, on 22 July and who called on the Army Chief the next day was not properly briefed about Operation Gibraltar. General Musa, the Army Chief, merely confirmed the existence of such an operation. It seems that Musa was confident that the operation would remain a localised affair and considered it basically the responsibility of the 12th Division—not requiring a major air action.[20] For obvious reasons the new Air Chief was somewhat perturbed over the casual attitude of his Army counterpart. To seek further details he went to General Akhtar Malik who was in charge of Gibraltar. Realising the significance and implications of the

operation, the new Air Chief felt that the Mujahid movement could not progress unless a proper and regular channel for the supply of food and ammunition was maintained. By the end of August the PAF was in a full state of readiness commensurate with the pace of developments in Kashmir. It is intriguing that while the PAF was increasing its combat posture almost daily the main decision makers were still under the illusion that the hostilities would remain localised. It was only after an ISI signal on 30 August, indicating the likelihood of an immediate Indian attack outside Kashmir, that President Ayub Khan held a full top-level meeting. The Air Chief went back totally convinced of the impending Indian attack. On 1 September he ordered the PAF to move to the highest state of alert.[21] To ensure full utilisation of civilian resources during the war, an Air Priorities Board was set up on 4 September and all civilian aircraft were placed at its disposal.

During the early phase of a related operation, Grand Slam, the PAF Chief had his combat aircraft flown throughout the day over the Sialkot area, sixteen kilometres from the border, to clearly communicate to the IAF that the PAF would deal swiftly with all interventions. In addition, the PAF agreed to provide close support to its Army in the Akhnur area. By 5 September the strategically important town of Jurian fell to advancing Pakistan troops, the PAF's close support playing a significant role.

On the 6th the Indians, unable to check the advancing Pakistani troops in the Chamb–Jurian sector, violated the international border and attacked Pakistan in the Lahore area. On the first day of the full war the PAF went into action against most of the advance Indian air bases, though at the time the existing ratio was heavily against Pakistan. The IAF retaliated but met little success as the PAF successfully repelled raids by Indian aircraft. The second day saw the IAF launch major attacks against Pakistani bases. Among the raids

perhaps the most important one was against Sargodha. In the early hours of the 7th India launched this attack with six Mystere fighter bombers. Although Sargodha was well defended with light ack-ack guns, it had only three fighters airborne when the Mysteres pulled up from their tree-top approach. But for some reason the IAF was unable to capitalise on the element of surprise and damage the base in any meaningful way. Within minutes the PAF was able to respond. In the two days the IAF lost 50 aircraft, compared to Pakistani losses of six planes.[22] These disastrous losses influenced the IAF decision makers to switch to night-time bombing of Pakistan bases. But throughout the entire conflict the IAF was only able to deliver an effective punch during the night of 13–14 September, against the Peshawar base which was at the time crowded with bombers, fighters and support aircraft. Even then, the IAF's Canberra dropped its bombs in a way that caused little damage. Had the Canberra been able to hit a parked bomber and exploded it, the entire base might have been badly damaged.

Not only the PAF's fighter squadrons made their name in the war; its bomber wing also earned a considerable reputation. Based mostly at Maripur base but also at Peshawar, the PAF bomber wing carried out regular night-time bombing operations against a number of Indian bases, damaging most of them. The nonstop nature of the PAF's airfield offensive was remarkable. While one strike force was landing after having completed its mission against a base, say Adampur, another strike force was taking off on its mission against another base, perhaps Pathankot. Of the 195 missions undertaken by the B-57s, 149 were considered effective.[23] While the main target of the bomber force was the airfields, at a later stage of the war targets like POL (petrol, oil, lubricants) storage, hangars and so on were also subjected to bombing. As the PAF bombing campaign was directed against military targets, pilots were under

strict orders that if they were unable to locate an assigned military target they were to bring their bombs back to base. Compared to the PAF's concentration on military targets, the IAF frequently bombed nonmilitary targets.

Another aspect of the PAF's night-time operations was the use of a C-130 for bombing purposes, since the C-130 crew had already demonstrated its prowess by dropping supplies under the most difficult conditions. The speed with which the idea was adopted and the necessary modifications introduced reflected the Pakistani pilots' and engineers' genius for improvisation. With eighteen 1000-pound bombs on board, the newly modified plane took off in the early hours of 12 September and returned after delivering its payload—which the Indians claimed had been delivered by a four-engined bomber of Chinese origin.[24] After this initial success the C-130 bomber was sent on many more missions in the later stages of the war.

Apart from American military assistance and the devoted efforts of the PAF's first Pakistani Chief, who virtually built the PAF into an effective war machine, many factors contributed to the PAF's successes during the 1965 war. First, the high selection standard, based purely on merit, produced excellent and devoted professionals. Second, intense training enabled pilots to specialise in all aspects of the main aircraft, the Sabre jet, and its weapons system. Third, the skill of engineers and maintenance personnel combined with a receptive leadership led to effective improvisation. Fourth, the PAF higher command's timely anticipation of the impending flare up and Air Chief Nur Khan's decision to order a 'red alert' on 1 September reflected an accurate reading of the situation. Fifth, the failure of the IAF to launch a major attack on 6 September and to maintain pressure on the PAF (despite having considerable superiority in numbers), along with the inaccuracy of the IAF's bombers, put the Indians well behind.[25]

Indo–Pak war of 1971

The year 1971 witnessed a rapid deterioration of the political situation in East Pakistan, which eventually resulted in the Indo–Pak war of 1971. Tension between the two countries had been mounting since March of that year when the Pakistani authorities decided to employ strongarm tactics to suppress the political agitations in the east. Many East Pakistanis left the country and took refuge in neighbouring Indian Bengal. During the last ten days of November the Indians launched a multi-pronged attack on East Pakistan. India had been carefully preparing for the war throughout the summer of 1971—which also saw the signing of the Indo–Soviet Friendship Treaty that enabled the Indians to secure massive shipments of arms from the Soviet Union. Once the war started, the Pakistanis retaliated on the western front by attacking IAF bases with a view to damaging the IAF's ability to operate against West Pakistan. On the western front the PAF with its 260 combat aircraft was pitted against India's 850 aircraft. As a consequence of this massive numerical difference the PAF was unable to gain the superiority it had enjoyed during the 1965 war, though it was still able to hold its own.[26] Almost every day, as the IAF launched attacks against targets in West Pakistan, the PAF effectively checked the onslaught.

In East Pakistan, the population had been alienated by the Pakistan Government's policies, and many local members of the East Pakistan Rifles had joined the Mukti Bahini force which was operating in close collaboration with the Indians, providing intelligence information and disrupting communication networks. In the air, India's 200 combat aircraft detailed to attack East Pakistan completely outnumbered Pakistan's one squadron with sixteen Sabres stationed at Dhaka. Following the outbreak of war the PAF squadron, on 4 December and against overwhelming odds, managed to shoot down

eleven IAF aircraft and lose only five of its own. The air battle was keenly watched by foreign correspondents who were at the time residing in the Hotel Intercontinental. Very soon, though, the IAF shifted to a strategy of bombing the Dhaka airfield intensively and as a result the airstrip became heavily cratered, which prevented further operation of the remaining Sabres and other PAF aircraft stationed at Dhaka. Towards the end of the war, the eleven surviving aircraft were destroyed by the Pakistanis to prevent them falling into the hands of the enemy.

The war lasted for just on two weeks, in which the Indians lost around 102 of their aircraft whereas the total Pakistani loss was 34 planes.[27] The PAF pilots fought with their customary courage and dedication. Indeed, given the massive differential between the two Air Forces, the PAF's performance was not at all unimpressive. The PAF has demonstrated over and over again that a high degree of effectiveness can result from intensive training. However, no Air Force is going to be fully effective unless it is equipped with the latest aircraft. With the rapid pace of technological advance it is imperative to have access to modern technologies, but these new sophisticated technologies are not cheap. Perhaps the best way to gain access to them in the long run is to strengthen one's own economy.

7

The armed forces and internal security

In functional terms the armed forces form a major part of a nation's security system. The national security system comprises all of the agencies concerned with identifying threats, evolving appropriate mechanisms to ward off the threats and implementing defensive policy. (Threats can range from an external adversary's aggressive intentions to internal turmoil.) The system is the custodian of national defence and the preserver of the country's territorial integrity. In many nations it is also seen as a defender of traditional values. Almost all nations are willing to allocate a large chunk of their own resources, however meagre they may be, to enable the armed forces to perform their primary functions. However, the multiplicity of roles undertaken by the armed forces in some countries makes the task of evaluating and justifying the defence budget, particularly when a country has limited resources, a very difficult one.

In Pakistan's case, one has to look at what the armed forces do and how they perform in both wartime and peacetime. Have they been successful, in times of war, in defending the territorial integrity of the country and upholding the dignity of the nation? Have they been able to cope with external threats adequately? These are

comparatively straightforward questions. Assessing the armed forces' performance in peacetime is a more difficult task. The activities are often more intangible. Involvement in unpopular causes and the resulting publicity may affect the military's image. Support extended by the armed forces to the strength or stability of the political system may be controversial. Rescuing the nation from any perceived drift towards anarchy is a task fraught with uncertainty; as is the handling of sensitive communal or religious divisions.

Over the years Pakistan's armed forces have been involved in various forms of nation-building activity. Despite its efforts to avoid involvement in unpopular causes under civilian regimes, the military has been called upon to assist the ruling regime many times since the birth of Pakistan. Almost all of Pakistan's successive constitutions have allowed such use of the armed forces; under the present Constitution, Article 245 specifically enables the Government in power to call upon the armed forces for assistance whenever it is deemed necessary.[1] At other times in Pakistan's history, instead of remaining a distant onlooker, the armed forces—more specifically the Army—have decided to take over the country and to establish a military-oligarchy type of rule (see Chapter 8).

States are often confronted by internal security situations which are the product of many factors. Perhaps the most important is some form of insurgency or guerrilla warfare. However, disruption of the normal functioning of Government institutions (or of trading and commercial activities), kidnapping and hostage taking, hijacking of transportation, extortion, riots, assassinations, terrorism, large-scale violent demonstrations and the like can all produce an internal security situation, either alone or in conjunction with other developments. Pakistani security crises involving internal threats, at times affecting territorial integrity, can be considered in five illustrative groups: Punjab in the

1950s, East Pakistan in the 1960s, Baluchistan in the 1970s, NWFP in the 1980s and Sindh in the 1990s. But before we turn to these, a word or two regarding the armed forces' role at the time of partition might be in order.

Just before partition of the subcontinent the British Indian Army became involved in the maintenance of law and order. A Boundary Force headed by General Rees was estabished on 1 August 1947 to check the rising communal bitterness and to facilitate the mass migrations. Rees was assisted by four brigadiers, Ayub Khan, Nazir Ahmed, Thimayya and Brar. (Thus Ayub had tasted involvement in civilian affairs before staging his coup in 1958.) While Rees tried his utmost to prevent communal violence, he was not successful, primarily because of the uncooperative attitude of some of the Indian political leaders.[2] The Indian press also played a rather negative part by denigrating and undermining the role of the Boundary Force. By the end of August it was decided to disband the Force, ending its very brief existence.

Immediately after partition, the Pakistanis were confronted with a problematic situation in the turbulent North West Frontier Province (NWFP). The independent-minded Pathans of the tribal areas had kept the British Indian Army busy throughout the period of British rule. It took some time to register the point with these Pathans that the British had departed and a new authority was ruling an independent Pakistan. One of the first jobs the newly established Air Force was assigned was to police the tribal areas in the NWFP. These operations provided 'an excellent basis for peacetime training, with just enough hazards from topography, weather and occasional potshots from the ground to provide an essential touch of realism' to the men of the Air Force.[3]

But the major internal security situations to come were handled by the Army.

PUNJAB IN THE 1950s

In March 1953 anti-Qadiani riots broke out in many cities of Punjab, creating an extremely difficult law and order problem. The Qadianis are also known as Ahmedis or Mirzais and the founder of their sect, a self-proclaimed prophet called Mirza Ghulam Ahmed, had deviated from one of the fundamental precepts of Islam and promoted his own interpretation of Islam from a place called Qadian.[4] Qadianis' view on the finality of Mohammad's (PBUH) prophethood was and still is viewed as blasphemous by almost all orthodox Muslims.[5] Qadianis' belief that Mirza was a successor to Holy Prophet Mohammad (PBUH) is viewed by Muslims as an infringement of one of Islam's cardinal principles, namely that Mohammad's (PBUH) prophethood was final and that he could have no successor as such.[6] So Mirza's claim angered many Muslims and clashes between Qadianis and politico-religious groups of *ulemas* frequently occurred in some form or another. The year 1958 saw the most violent confrontations.

The two religious parties Jamat-i-Islami and Ahrar put forward a demand at an all-parties Muslim convention in Karachi that the Qadianis be declared a minority. The demand to treat the Qadianis as non-Muslim and a minority was rejected by the Government and as a consequence severe riots broke out in Karachi. While the riots were quickly quelled there, the agitation moved to Lahore where it not only acquired increased intensity but soon engulfed almost all the major cities of the Punjab. Many accounts say that Ahrar's campaign of vicious and inflammatory speeches contributed enormously to the quick spread of the agitation. Some opine that the Ahrars were merely seeking to restore their public image which was badly tarnished by their outspoken opposition to Pakistan's independence.[7] Food shortages at the time and the Punjab Government's inability to take decisive steps worsened the situation.

When the riots acquired alarming proportions, the Government decided to impose martial law in Lahore. The Army was called in and martial law was declared on 6 March, with General Azam Khan as the Chief Martial Law Administrator. Azam Khan immediately divided Lahore into six sectors, with each sector having its own Martial Law Administrator. Machine guns and barbed wire barricades were quickly put up in the main streets of the city.

The sector commanders were given wide powers to restore a state of normality. The leaders of the movement took refuge in the Wazir Khan Mosque and the shrine of Data Ganj Buksh, creating a rather complex situation for the Army in seeking their surrender.[8] Since the major issue involved was a religious issue, it was not an easy task to resolve amicably. However, the Army restored the desired level of normality within a week. It also launched a Clean Lahore campaign to give an improved look to the city—to improve the health and sanitation conditions and to widen the streets and pavements. In addition, steps were taken to inculcate a civic sense among the general public, who responded positively. In fact, this turned out to be the beginning of the people's recognition of the Army's ability to efficiently run civilian affairs, and could well have helped prepare the ground for the military takeover in 1958, in which Ayub Khan became President. Martial law was withdrawn on 14 May 1953. The short spell of governing and administering civilian affairs not only gave the Army valuable experience in civic duties but also 'created an impression in the minds of the public that the Army could restore peace and effective government when all other devices had failed'.[9]

EAST PAKISTAN IN THE 1960s

Following the 1965 Indo–Pak war the situation in East Pakistan rapidly deteriorated. While many factors

contributed to the eventual total alienation of the East Pakistanis, the neglect of East Pakistan's defence during the war was a catalyst. In 1969 President Ayub Khan stepped down and was replaced by General Yahya Khan, who once again imposed martial law. Yahya Khan announced general elections for October 1970 with a view to subduing increasing dissidence in both wings of Pakistan. The elections were held in December 1970 and produced an unexpected result for the rulers, with the Awami League (a party based in East Pakistan) gaining a substantial majority there. For obvious reasons the Awami League leadership began to demand a transfer of power, a demand delayed by President Yahya Khan who wanted a consensus constitution for the country before the transfer. Unable to secure a workable compromise and disappointed over the intransigent attitude of leaders of the major parties, the President postponed the convening of the new Assembly indefinitely, which infuriated the supporters of the Awami League. The East Pakistanis began to see the delay in transfer of power as yet another attempt by the West Pakistani leadership to deny them what they regarded as their legitimate right after having won the elections. To demonstrate their displeasure the East Pakistani and (more specifically) the Awami League leadership called a general strike. Yahya made an effort to secure a solution to the crisis but was not successful.

In March 1971 he appointed General Tikka Khan as Governor and Martial Law Administrator and issued orders for a military clampdown on the agitation. Cognisant of the sympathies of the East Pakistan regiments and East Pakistan Rifles, the new Governor sought to disarm them and to gain complete control of the ports and airports. With the Army's clampdown, many leaders of the Awami League fled to India. In April they formed a Bangladeshi government in exile and with overt and substantial Indian help began to prepare for the armed liberation of East Pakistan. The Mukti Bahini (the East

Pakistani guerrilla force), with the active involvement of India's intelligence agency RAW, established many training camps along the border with East Pakistan.[10] India's active participation in the overall proceedings was not only a great source of encouragement for the Mukti Bahini and the Bangladeshi government in exile but also a security nightmare for the Pakistan Army.

Thus civil war began in East Pakistan. It proved to be a murderous affair, with many people killed on both sides, and huge numbers of refugees. It grew in intensity until December, when India (with the backing of its treaty with the Soviet Union) invaded East Pakistan. India then proceeded blatantly to help in the transformation of the region into an independent Bangladesh.

BALUCHISTAN IN THE 1970s

There had long been tribal unrest in Baluchistan, the Pakistani province lying to the south of Afghanistan, but matters came to a head in the early 1970s.

For years the National Awami Party (NAP) had promoted the right to self-rule.[11] In 1972–73 a serious conflict erupted between the Baluchi leaders and the central government when the provincial government began to replace non-Baluchi members of the provincial civil service with its own nominees and to substitute a local militia under its own command for the federally organised and directed Pakistan Rangers.[12] On 10 February 1973 federal forces raided the Iraqi embassy and discovered a large cache of arms allegedly intended to be used by the insurgents. A few days later President Bhutto dismissed the NAP government and proclaimed President's Rule in the province. In an attempt to justify the dismissal, Bhutto said in the National Assembly that the arms were meant to be used in Pakistan and were not meant for a third country as some had claimed.[13] However, some observers have emphasised

that the weapons were not destined for use in Pakistani Baluchistan but were supposed to reach Iranian Baluchistan, where Iraq was openly supporting Baluchi guerrilla activities in retaliation against the Shah of Iran's support for Kurdish rebels.[14]

A few weeks after the ousting of the NAP government, Baluchi guerrillas began to attack the Army. Bhutto retaliated by strengthening the existing garrisons in Baluchistan and by arresting the key NAP leaders. Soon the struggle acquired the status of a full-fledged insurgency.

In October 1974 the Government of Pakistan issued a White Paper in which it was said that the main causes of the insurgency were social and not political, and that the Baluchi Sardars were determined to resist reforms that could erode their absolute authority.[15] The White Paper promised to 'abolish [a] tax, consisting of between one-third and one-sixth of the crop, paid to the Sardar by his vassals, and to introduce a programme of immediate agricultural and industrial development' and also said that 'elements in Baluchistan and the NWFP that were at odds with the Government clearly drew their support from outside forces which seek to make these provinces secede from Pakistan'.[16] In short, the Government of Pakistan was more or less accusing the Afghan Government of causing and sustaining rebellion in Baluchistan. In this connection Bhutto sent a note to the Secretary General of the UN in October 1974 claiming that the Afghan Government was 'systematically organising sabotage and terrorism throughout Pakistan'.[17]

While political efforts to work out a compromise were going on, the insurgency war itself gained momentum, especially during 1974. The guerrillas met with some success in terms of disruption of a few major road links, but the use of the Air Force and particularly helicopters enabled the Pakistani forces to herd the guerrillas into shrinking sanctuaries. The helicopters helped the Army to flush out the fighters who were

effectively employing mountain hideouts. From then on the guerrillas were largely outclassed by the superior discipline and weaponry of the armed forces. Confronted with steady reverses, many of the insurgents moved into Afghanistan. The Afghan regime of Sardar Daud allowed them to set up encampments close to the Afghan–Pakistani border. Officially these guerrilla camps were described as refugee camps in order to forestall objections from Islamabad, but in practice the leaders of the fighting bands inside Baluchistan would visit the camps regularly to get supplies and to attend strategy sessions.[18]

In early 1975 the death of several Pakistani leaders in a bomb explosion caused the Bhutto regime to ban the NAP, arrest many of its leaders and put some of them on trial. It was not until the advent of the Zia regime, following the ousting of Bhutto in July 1977, that an uneasy truce was reached between the Baluchi leaders and the new Government. Finally, convinced of the futility of continuing the confrontation, moderate Baluchi leaders were able to influence their more hawkish colleagues and to develop a working relationship with Islamabad. By 1978 the new Government had released a large number of Baluchi prisoners and had declared a general amnesty for the guerrillas, including those who had gone to Afghanistan.

NWFP IN THE 1980s

Following partition, the main problem in the NWFP was of a political nature and revolved around the movement for 'Pakhtoonistan', in which the Pushto-speaking Pathans would be united in an independent or, as some assert, autonomous entity. The NAP leaders of the NWFP actively supported the movement and the rulers of Afghanistan also extended a helping hand. Afghanistan's active involvement in the issue prevented the

development of friendly relations with Pakistan. At times, relations deteriorated to the point where border closure became inevitable. However, the years 1976–78 saw a significant rapprochement between the two neighbours, with Daud (the Afghan President) visiting Pakistan twice and Pakistani leaders paying return visits. The outcome of these visits was that Kabul dropped its insistence on Pakhtoon self-determination, hostile propaganda ceased, and an active search for resolution of the Pakhtoonistan issue was soon well under way. But the Marxist takeover in Afghanistan in April 1978 reversed the trend.

More importantly, it gave birth to a general resistance movement. Large-scale clashes between Afghan forces and the resistance groups led to a massive refugee exodus into Pakistan. Within a couple of years the exodus reached the mammoth proportion of three to four million people, completely overwhelming the hardpressed Pakistani authorities and creating many complex economic, social, political and strategic problems. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, together with the huge refugee exodus, dramatically complicated the security situation on Pakistan's western border.

Afghanistan, on its own, was never viewed as a serious problem, as Pakistan's military strength was regarded as more than sufficient to cope with threats emanating from Afghanistan. It was the Soviet backed and protected Afghanistan that adversely affected Pakistan's strategic scenario. The dangers were many. First, the Soviet invasion generated fears among many Pakistanis that their country would be the next target of the Soviets' adventurism. Second, because of the presence of the refugees on Pakistani soil and the continuing resistance movement inside Afghanistan, it could not be overlooked that Pakistan might be drawn into the Afghan cauldron. Third, because of the Soviet Union's deep involvement in Afghanistan and its close friendly relations with India, the emergence of a dangerous

Moscow–Kabul–Delhi axis could not be brushed aside. Fourth, Soviet support of dissident elements inside Pakistan, especially in Baluchistan and the NWFP, was real; the Soviets did exploit the internal security situation in Pakistan. The Kabul regime managed to penetrate the great reservoir of the resistance movement, namely the refugee camps, and also many Afghan saboteurs were sent into Pakistan to introduce terrorism and create a gulf between the locals and the refugees. Acts of terrorism were varied and many, with the NWFP particularly at the receiving end. Agents of the Afghan intelligence service had been extremely active in fomenting riots in refugee villages and generating tensions between the locals and the refugees. The Afghan intelligence (commonly known as Khad) was also able to create internal feuds among the various resistance groups based in the NWFP. And many bomb blasts were suffered by the people of the NWFP throughout the Afghanistan crisis.

There were additional problems. Soviet aircraft and helicopter gunships frequently violated Pakistan's airspace. Despite Pakistan's repeated protests and warnings, these violations—and others on the ground—never stopped. Unable to check the Mujahideen's infiltration into Afghanistan, the Soviets made a number of cross-border air attacks on Pakistan. An upset balance of numbers in the Kurram Agency district caused by the incoming refugees led to a major sectarian clash. Drug addiction and drug trafficking, relatively unknown in Pakistan until the Afghan crisis, appeared on a large scale. All this entailed active armed forces vigilance and involvement in the sensitive areas.

SINDH IN THE 1990s

Two types of internal security situation often surface. In one, the major interference comes more or less

directly from an external adversary. The second type is primarily the creation of internal activists but is prone to exploitation by an interested outsider. Sindh falls into the latter category, and the turmoil there began in fact before the 1990s. However, it became much more pronounced during the past decade.

By May 1992 Sindh was experiencing complex situations of lawlessness in its various parts but more specifically in the major urban centres. In these centres, especially Karachi and Hyderabad, the problem was more complex because of ethnic issues inflamed by the Mojahir Quami Movement (MQM). The MQM began to employ street violence in 1989–90 with the objective of influencing national level politics. The momentum of street politics intensified during the days of MQM's partnership in provincial government and resulted in excessive militant actions which did not even spare army personnel.[19]

In the rural areas of Sindh, the main problem was dacoits. The use of radio, cellular telephones, modern weapons, etc. now facilitated the work of these violent armed bandits. Kidnapping for ransom and raiding villages were regular occurrences. The provincial law and order authorities with their limited budgets were unable to cope with the situation.

Unable to control the general lawlessness, the provincial government sought the Army's help in mid-1992. In doing so, it decided to rely on Article 147 of the Constitution, which says: 'the Government of a Province may, with the consent of the Federal Government, entrust, either conditionally or unconditionally, to the Federal Government, or to its officers, functions in relation to any matter to which the executive authority of the Province extends'.[20]

The Army was asked to tackle four major aspects of law and order: murders, kidnappings, dacoities, and thefts including car snatching. The Army soon managed to check and reverse the rising tide of crime. It also

moved against the MQM activists indulging in law-breaking activities. In June it announced that it had captured maps of 'Jinnahpur' or 'Urdu Desh', which was to be 'carved out of the Sindh, [and include] Karachi, Hyderabad and coastal areas, as an independent country by the MQM'.[21] In the rural areas, the Army was particularly effective and soon rendered more than 1000 dacoits ineffective; over 200 were killed and about 900 were arrested.[22] The Army also gave a list of 72 influential offenders to the Chief Minister of Sindh, hoping that early action against them would accelerate the process. In addition, the crime reduction process needed to be accompanied by a package of economic, political and social reforms. But the reforms were not introduced, nor were the persons whose names appeared on the list subjected to any form of legal process. The failure of the provincial government to initiate action created doubt in the minds of many Army officials regarding the objectives of the government. Consequently, the Army decided to withdraw from the assignment.

Following the Army's replacement by civilian armed forces in December 1994 the MQM once again intensified its activities, but with a revised strategy which included increased pressure on the civil administration, frequent sniper and rocket attacks on police stations, and engaging Army units, Rangers and police in street encounters with the help of its well-trained, armed activists, ranging in number from 1500 to 4000.[23] However, the Government of the day, by coordinating the efforts of security and intelligence agencies, managed to contain the nefarious activities of the MQM by the second quarter of 1996.

The year 1998 saw the involvement of the Army again, in a somewhat indirect fashion. The provincial government had been removed from office and the province of Sindh placed under Governor's Rule. The Governor happened to be an Army general and, in order to assist him, the federal Government instituted

military courts in Sindh via a presidential ordinance. A little later, though, these courts were abolished by order of the Supreme Court.

It was noted at the beginning of this section that Sindh is a case in which internal troubles are exploited by an interested outsider. One final contributor to the messy situation in Sindh is the active involvement of India and specifically its intelligence agency RAW. Certainly, the main factors that produced the complex situation arose from domestic sources, but India has consistently capitalised on it and helped from time to time to sustain the crisis. In fact, being locked in a conflictual relationship, both India and Pakistan fairly regularly exploit each other's internal tensions through propaganda and other means. For obvious reasons, a crisis makes an attractive target for such activities. It is frequently asserted that whenever the situation begins to improve in Sindh, RAW steps in in one way or another and injects doses of destabilisation.

8

The armed forces and politics

Four times the armed forces (more specifically the Army) have taken over Pakistan and directly governed it. The three generals Ayub Khan (1958–69), Yahya Khan (1969–71) and Zia-ul-Haq (1977–88) have led the country, and the fourth, General Pervez Musharraf, took over in 1999. Besides these cases of direct intervention, on other occasions the military has exerted its influence to attain desired objectives. An eminent scholar wrote that 'there are armies that guard their nation's borders, there are those concerned with protecting their own position in society, and there are those that defend a cause or an idea,' but the Pakistan Army does all three.[1] Many episodes in the nation's history can be adduced in support of this view, but in this chapter we focus on the regimes of Ayub, Yahya and Zia. Four things seem to have facilitated the process of military takeover in Pakistan. First, the superiority of military discipline and organisational skill, together with the willingness to play an active role in the developmental tasks of Pakistani society. Second, the weakness of political institutions and the almost continuous wrangling among various groups of politicians seeking to gain power. Third, the inability of civilian regimes to keep firm control over both the civilian and the military bureaucracies; the two were, compared to other national institutions, somewhat overdeveloped entities. Fourth, the overwhelming illiteracy of the general public, which precluded constructive evolution

of public opinion and allowed the public to fall easy prey to organised divisive manoeuvres.

AYUB KHAN, 1958–69

On 7 October 1958 the military staged a coup d'état under the overall guidance of President Iskandar Mirza, removing the incumbent civilian government and imposing martial law. General Ayub Khan was appointed Chief Martial Law Administrator. Soon after assuming this power, Ayub declared that the 'main object of the military rule was to return the country to sanity'.[2] Within three weeks, President Mirza was eased out by Ayub, who assumed the presidency on the grounds that Mirza's continuation in office would perpetuate the intrigues and that nothing constructive would be done—a view shared by Ayub's loyal generals.[3]

Having acquired full control of the country and realised the popularity of the Army as compared to that of the previous civilian rule, Ayub Khan immediately moved to deal with the politicians. Presenting himself as a soldier of integrity and honesty, he began to propagate the view that parliamentary democracy was not all that suitable for Pakistan. To discredit the existing political elite, he quickly issued an Elective Bodies Disqualification Order with a view to banning the participation of many politicians in public life. A choice was given to the politicians: either withdraw from political activities for six years or be tried for their misdeeds. With the exception of a very few political leaders who opted for trials, most accepted political exile for six years. Thus, as far as the internal situation was concerned, Ayub soon became all-powerful. Even on the external front he did not face much difficulty. A former chief of the Air Force wrote: 'Knowing Iskander Mirza's and Ayub Khan's strong leanings towards the United States and Great Britain, it is my belief that the coup of

7 October was carried out with the knowledge of, if not encouragement from, the Governments of these two countries.'[4]

Ayub's regime started off with many advantages. First, the general public was fed up with the political instability of civilian governments and the bickering of politicians. Second, the military was viewed as an untried commodity and people had high hopes that the armed forces could secure speedy solutions to their problems.[5] Besides, the military enjoyed an excellent image at the time of the coup. Third, Ayub enjoyed a stable and strong position in the Army. Fourth, the incumbent US administration was favourably inclined towards Ayub's regime and Ayub himself had many good contacts in the administration. As the coup coincided with America's deep involvement in checking perceived Soviet and Chinese expansionism in Asia, it does not seem farfetched to think that the Americans might have preferred Ayub Khan to his predecessors.

Having consolidated his position, but acutely conscious of people's expectations and the absence of his regime's legitimacy, Ayub quickly turned to the introduction of reforms, with the threefold objective of eradicating corruption, nepotism, blackmarketing and smuggling; ensuring economic development, industrialisation and improvement in the standard of living; and providing a viable political framework for the future. He established many commissions and committees on land reform, educational reform, administrative reorganisation, food and agriculture, the question of a federal capital, maritime affairs, etc.[6] In addition, special machinery was set up to weed out corrupt officials. The tax collection net was tightened around businessmen and others who evaded tax. Smugglers and those indulging in blackmarketing were rounded up. Such measures made the regime popular for some time. Ayub also shifted the capital from Karachi to a specially selected site near Rawalpindi—Islamabad.

Ayub did not trust politicians as he believed that they had brought the country to the brink of bankruptcy. Convinced that the people generally were too 'uneducated, divided, impoverished and unsophisticated' to allow satisfactory functioning of democratic institutions, he preferred a somewhat centralised authoritarian system.[7] His choice was a system in which the bureaucrats played an important role, as he regarded them as educated and experienced administrators. Ayub viewed the Pakistanis as a 'mixture of races, riddled with parochialism and linguistic differences' which impeded the process of evolving a united and disciplined team at the top; and therefore he believed in a strong central government which was not dependent upon the whims of the legislature.[8] He was of the opinion that Pakistan should have a presidential system somewhat similar to the system in France.

One of his first acts was to announce that he would consult the best brains available and ascertain the wishes of the people and then give the country a good, suitable constitution. Still conscious of his regime's lack of legitimacy, he began discussions with his cabinet colleagues and eventually adopted a constitutional plan at a governors' conference held at Karachi in May 1959. A month later a detailed plan of action to create a 'Basic Democracy System' was approved at another governors' conference.[9] At yet another meeting in early August, the implementation mechanism for Ayub's constitutional plan was decided. The plan envisaged 8000 electoral units, each of which would elect ten members, and together the members would form an electoral college for the election of the president and the central and provincial assemblies. Each unit would represent a population of 1000 to 1200.

In due course, Ayub appointed a constitution commission with Justice Shahabuddin as its head. After holding many meetings in several cities, the commission submitted its report to the President who gave it to

a cabinet subcommittee to examine and to finalise the draft constitution. The draft, which was described by Ayub as a blend of democracy and discipline, was announced on 1 March 1962.[10] While Ayub said in his autobiography that the constitution was well received generally, many of the previously disqualified politicians were unhappy. And an observer who had served as Ayub's information secretary, and had been known to be fairly close to the President, later commented that the public reaction was 'instantaneous and unanimous' and that the constitution was seen as 'an elaborate design to perpetuate one-man rule in the country'.[11] The same observer added that 'Ayub saw the country behaving like a wild horse that had been captured but not yet tamed' and that taming the wild horse became Ayub's principal concern and consequently the whole machinery of the Government was mobilised to suppress political dissent. The most prominent feature of the new constitution was the status and extensive executive and legislative powers of the president. Even the Minister of Defence was removed from civilian control and placed directly under the president.[12]

In January 1960 the election of 'basic democrats' was held and in February they voted in a referendum. The question that confronted the 80 000 basic democrats was: 'Do you have confidence in the President, Field Marshal Ayub Khan?' As was anticipated, something like 96 per cent responded in the affirmative. Consequently Ayub was sworn in as the first elected President. Although the election of basic democrats had been held without the participation of political parties, Ayub soon realised that no political system could function properly without such participation. However, he was not keen to lift the ban and allow the resurrection of the defunct political parties without first introducing adequate safety measures. So he called a convention of political activists to reshape the Muslim League, and the old party under the new name 'Convention Muslim League'

quickly emerged. Despite Ayub's many popular reforms he was unable to secure his much sought after legitimacy and popular support for his controlled democracy. The opposition joined hands and formed a combined front known as the COP (Combined Opposition Parties).

The next major development in Ayub's search for legitimacy was the holding of the next presidential election which, according to the Constitution, was to be held at least twenty days before expiry of the incumbent's term of office. (Before this election, the new election of basic democrats had to be held.) The COP had managed to convince Miss Fatima Jinnah to stand for election against Ayub Khan. Miss Jinnah, the sister of Quaid-I-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the founding father of Pakistan, was commonly known as the Madre-Milat (the Mother of the Nation) and enjoyed tremendous respect among Pakistanis. Given Ayub Khan's tight control and heavy reliance upon the bureaucracy and the armed forces, Miss Jinnah was seen as 'the only hope of changing an unjust and oppressive system'.[13] With her popularity and record of devoted service, it was difficult for the supporters of Ayub Khan to attack her decision to lead the opposition. Ayub's supporters persuaded him to play the religious card and secure a *fatwa* (a religious decree) to the effect that a woman could not become the head of state of a Muslim nation; in consequence a *fatwa* was obtained from some *ulemas*.[14] However, the opposition 'organised an even larger set of ulemas to produce an equally authoritative *fatwa* in support of Miss Jinnah', and 'discovered from the writings of various Muslim jurists that a woman could become the ruler under exceptional circumstances'.[15] In fact the use of the religious card more or less worked against the interests of Ayub, as it was very difficult at the time to deny that the circumstances were exceptional. During the election campaign Miss Jinnah attracted huge crowds, particularly in East Pakistan where most Bengalis had already started airing their

grievances regarding what they called constant neglect.

The election for the formation of the electoral college was over by 19 November 1964, with both sides claiming victory. 'The Muslim League declared that 80 per cent of the elected members were Ayub supporters and the COP claimed that 90 per cent of the members were pledged to vote for Miss Jinnah'.[16] The presidential election took place on 2 January 1965 and of the 80 000 BDs 49 951 voted for Ayub and 28 691 for Miss Jinnah.[17] Although Ayub won the election, it was an open secret that the Government machinery had been used to secure votes from members of the electoral college. And so Ayub's controlled democracy was still unable to secure popular support and the search for legitimacy continued.

From 1966 on there was a gradual deterioration in Ayub's hold over the country. The reasons included economic stagnation and worsening conditions for industrial labour, growing political and military disenchantment with the Ayub regime, alleged corruption and amassing of huge fortunes by Ayub's family, his deteriorating health and his rapidly increasing unpopularity with the East Pakistanis.[18] The political movement against the Ayub regime gained momentum when Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto left Ayub in 1966 and later launched the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP), posing an effective challenge to Ayub. Bhutto managed to attract many followers to his way of thinking and was among the very few bold individuals who openly extended sympathy to the student movement against Ayub. In addition, many senior military officials joined the movement against the regime, vociferously criticising the restrictions on political activity and the press, and condemning corruption and nepotism.[19] Another development was the formation of the Democratic Action Committee (DAC), consisting of several opposition parties, with the specific objective of establishing 'full and complete democracy'.[20] Two important political parties, the PPP and the National Awami Party (Bashani Group) did not join

the DAC but continued to oppose the Ayub system.

Early in 1969 there was an alarming deterioration in law and order and Ayub handed over power to Yahya Khan, who immediately abrogated the 1962 Constitution, banned all political activities, dissolved national and provincial assemblies, dismissed central and provincial cabinets and declared martial law throughout the country.[21]

Ayub demonstrated to the military as well as the nation the ease with which the military could take over the country and even scrap the sacred Constitution. Admittedly the bickering of the politicians had created a special situation in which the public was disenchanted with civilian rule and did not feel strongly about the coup. Another important legacy of the Ayub era was the strengthening of the civil and military bureaucracies and the bonds between them. Ayub did not trust politicians but relied heavily on the bureaucrats. Even after introducing the system of 'basic democracy' he placed all elected officials at the various levels of governance under the chairmanship of appointed officials.

YAHYA KHAN, 1969–71

Ayub's period in office was followed by the brief but significant spell of another authoritarian regime, that of Yahya Khan. Lacking in national vision and the ability for hard work, Yahya also became heavily dependent upon the civil and military bureaucracies. Following his assumption of power Yahya stressed in unequivocal terms that he had no political ambitions. Conscious of excessive criticism of Ayub's regime, he quickly introduced many reform measures to promote social justice and egalitarianism and to prevent too much concentration of wealth in the hands of a few families. The launching of the fourth Five Year Plan (1970–75) also

reflected his desire for wider distribution of developmental benefits. To remove another element of annoyance, especially among the East Pakistanis, he disbanded the so-called 'One Unit' scheme and reverted to the original system of provinces. Yahya's Government also decided not only to restore full political activity but to accept the longstanding Bengali demand that elections be held on the basis of adult franchise.

Although Yahya is often credited with holding the nation's first fair election, his inability to transfer power to elected representatives eventually resulted in the separation of East Pakistan and emergence of Bangladesh. Inheriting a much worse situation than Ayub did, Yahya, soon after assuming power, announced general elections for October 1970 on the basis of adult franchise with a view to subduing the dissidence in both wings of Pakistan. A little later he issued a Legal Framework Order (LFO) which envisaged an interim structure of authority and constitutional boundaries within which parties could contest elections.[22] The LFO also provided for the President to set the date for the new National Assembly to meet. In the end, the election was delayed until 7 December 1970, primarily because of floods and a disastrous cyclone, which struck East Pakistan causing enormous loss of life and inestimable damage to property.

The elections for the National Assembly, consisting of 300 members, produced somewhat unexpected results. Of 162 seats allocated to East Pakistan the Awami League won 160, but it did not win a single seat in West Pakistan; whereas the PPP won 81 seats out of the 138 allotted to West Pakistan and did not win a single seat in East Pakistan.[23] The results clearly reflected the intensity of polarisation between the West and East Pakistanis. Logically, the Awami League emerged as the single largest party. After the election Yahya announced that the National Assembly would meet in East Pakistan on 3 March 1971 to frame a new

constitution. The main Bengali leader, Sheikh Mujeeb, had put forward six points as a basis for the new constitution but this was unacceptable to almost all of the West Pakistan politicians. Bhutto, the leader of the PPP, which had secured a majority in West Pakistan, said that his party would not attend the forthcoming session. Yahya, who had already described Mujeeb as the next Prime Minister, tried his best to work out a formula between the main party leaders but was unsuccessful and he decided to postpone the session. This was seen by the East Pakistanis as yet another attempt of the Pakistani leadership to delay the transfer of power and to deny them what they deemed legitimately theirs following the election victory. To protest against the postponement, Mujeeb called a general strike. On 6 March Yahya announced that the National Assembly would meet on 25 March but simultaneously stressed the need 'to preserve the absolute integrity of Pakistan'.[24] On the 7th Mujeeb put forward a demand for 'immediate withdrawal of martial law, immediate recall of all military personnel to their barracks, an inquiry into Army shootings during the general strike and consequent loss of life, and an immediate transfer of power to the elected representatives of the people'.[25]

The situation in East Pakistan continued to deteriorate and by mid-March the 'provincial courts ceased to function, telecommunication links with West Pakistan were severed, banks closed their doors, law enforcement no longer mattered, and foreign personnel were ordered out of the country by their governments'.[26] A last ditch effort was made by Yahya when he flew to Dhaka on 15 March and met not only Mujeeb and Bhutto but also the leaders of other political parties in order to find a solution to the crisis. These talks also fell victim to the ongoing deadlock over the envisaged constitution. Bhutto continued to stress his inability to support any arrangement that would permit Mujeeb alone to determine the process of constitution making, whereas

Mujeeb continued to assert his rights as usually accorded to a majority party leader. Unable to secure a settlement, a disappointed Yahya left for Islamabad on 25 March, leaving orders for an Army clampdown. As noted in Chapter 7, this action was the trigger for civil war in East Pakistan, which was followed by India's invasion and the setting up of independent Bangladesh.

The dismemberment of Pakistan led to Yahya's downfall. A few days after the surrender, the CGS of the Pakistan Army went round the key Army formations in order to assess the feelings of senior officers and found a great amount of resentment against Yahya Khan. The CGS and the Chief of Air Staff then asked him to step down from the presidency. Yahya agreed, but insisted on retaining the post of C-in-C of the Army.[27] Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto was invited to head the new Government of the defeated Pakistan and on 20 December 1971 was sworn in as the new President as well as the Chief Martial Law Administrator. Bhutto's party had won 81 seats in the National Assembly and with the departure of East Pakistan he had become the de facto leader of the Assembly. Bhutto assumed power at a very difficult time and was immediately confronted with the task of pulling the nation out of its demoralised state. Yahya's period in Pakistan's history is often referred to as the most turbulent, and some observers have gone to the extent of calling it an ignominious one.[28]

ZIA-UL-HAQ, 1977–88

General Zia-ul-Haq staged a coup on 5 July 1977 and remained in power until he died in a plane crash. Zia surprised almost everyone when he deposed the popular political leader Z.A. Bhutto. Like his predecessor Ayub Khan, Zia initially attempted to consolidate his position by promoting the idea of accountability. A little later, sensing the directionless pursuits of masses of

Pakistanis, he began to promote a process of Islamisation. A shrewd politician, Zia pushed the process only to the extent needed to secure the support of the mullahs and the rural populace. During the later stages of his rule, particularly from 1985 onwards, he also introduced a rudimentary form of democracy—although he maintained martial law longer than his predecessors did.

A number of reasons account for Zia's political longevity. To begin with, he did not abrogate the Constitution but opted to suspend parts of it. Projecting himself as a reluctant ruler, he announced that his action of taking over was of temporary nature and that elections would be held within ninety days. He stressed that his sole aim was to organise free and fair elections, which would be held in October 1977, and promised that power would be transferred to the elected representatives. He also gave a solemn pledge that he would not deviate from this schedule.[29] Such assurances went down well; the President was allowed to function under the Constitution, though a high-powered military council was created to assist him.

Zia had also learned several lessons from preceding civilian and military regimes. The first was that a politician (as distinct from the President) who had unchecked powers could create havoc, and therefore it was imperative to have constitutional guarantees against unchecked powers. Hence one finds the advent of the Eighth Amendment of November 1985, which strengthened the role of the President and subsequently became the legal basis for Zia's dismissal of national and provincial assemblies in May 1988, and later for the dismissal of both Benazir Bhutto's and of Nawaz Sharif's government.[30] Zia also believed that politicians could be controlled if elections were held on a non-party basis. The second lesson he learned was that power must be shared with the people, as they long for some form of participation. Perhaps that's why he held partyless local

body elections in 1979 and appointed a partyless national assembly, Majlis-i-Shura, in 1981. Third, he recognised the strength and values of the middle classes. Many of his subsequent acts followed the logic of appeasement of the middle classes. Participation, accountability and Islamisation all had great attraction for these people. By emphasising Islamisation as one of the main objectives of his government, Zia was able not only to allay the fears of many Pakistanis but also to neutralise the Islamic fundamentalists.[31] Besides, Zia also knew that many officers in the Pakistan Army were drawn from middle class, orthodox and religious families. Finally, he learned never to abandon one's own base. He retained control of the Army: even when he became President he retained the post of COAS.

Another factor that helped to prolong Zia's rule was that, by relying heavily on a team of technocrats, he was able to give the country a sustained economic growth rate. As well, relations with donor organisations were improved. And during the period from 1975 to 1985, Pakistan received a total of $25 billion in remittances from Pakistani workers in the Middle East.[32] The Afghanistan crisis, which made Pakistan a 'frontline state' in terms of American perceptions, likewise helped Zia greatly. The American response allowed the Zia regime to secure not only economic assistance but also much needed weaponry for the modernisation of Pakistan's armed forces. Arms and ammunition worth millions also came from countries like China, Saudi Arabia and Egypt. Other factors too, not least luck, sided with Zia and helped to keep him in power for eleven years. But there was ruthlessness as well.

Following his release from protective custody early in the piece, Zia's predecessor, Z.A. Bhutto, made a tour of Lahore, Multan and Karachi, where huge crowds turned out to welcome him. This sent danger signals to Zia and the generals. Reacting to the signals, the generals decided to postpone the promised elections and to

conduct a probe into misdeeds of the Bhutto government. It does seem rather strange that it was during this period that the generals '[became] aware of Bhutto's misdeeds and his machiavellian style of rule'.[33] As Chief of Army Staff, Zia claimed he had not been familiar with Bhutto's excesses and only came to know about them after he assumed power.[34] He began to stress that the previous government must be held accountable for the excesses it had committed. The process of accountability was generally endorsed by the National Assembly, some of its stalwarts saying that accountability was 'a prerequisite for free and fair elections'.[35] All former members of provincial and national assemblies were asked to submit lists of their assets for 1970 and 1977—to show any substantial changes. Several tribunals were set up to inquire into misuse of power by members of previous assemblies as well as cabinets. Subsequently hundreds of politicians were barred from participation in elections and holding public office for seven years.

The Zia government made Bhutto its main target. He was charged with having conspired in the murder of a member of the Assembly and was subsequently convicted by the Lahore High Court. After his appeal against the conviction was turned down by the Supreme Court, he was hanged at Rawalpindi on 4 April 1979.[36] It is of interest that of the seven judges of the Supreme Court all four Punjabi judges voted to uphold the judgment of the Lahore High Court, whereas the three judges from other provinces voted to strike it down.[37] Just before the hanging, all appeals to commute the death sentence, from domestic sources and from abroad were turned down by Zia.

Just before the Supreme Court gave its verdict Zia announced a new date for elections, 17 November 1979. While the political parties were preparing for the elections Zia issued many martial law regulations with the objective of attaining complete control over political

activity. He banned the existing political parties and introduced an amendment to the *Political Parties Act 1962*. The amendment required the registration of all political parties with the Election Commission, publication of formal manifestos, holding of annual elections for party office bearers, and submission of party accounts and lists of office bearers and ordinary members to the Election Commission.[38] In addition, Zia introduced an electoral system of proportional representation in place of the existing system of simple majority, single member constituencies, and opted for separate electorates for Muslims and non-Muslims. Many political parties opposed these changes and some even decided not to register with the Election Commission. Despite the non-cooperative attitude of the parties, the military authorities went ahead with the local body elections. On discovering that most members elected to the local bodies belonged to political parties that had refused to register with the Election Commission, the military government once again decided not to hold national elections, ostensibly because of the law and order situation but in fact because of the election of many PPP candidates or sympathisers to the local bodies. This had created a fear among the military authorities that if the national and provincial elections scheduled for November were held, supporters of the PPP (which Bhutto had led) would be elected in large numbers.[39]

In March 1981 Zia issued a Provisional Constitutional Order (PCO) which, among other things, sought to discipline the judiciary, ordering the judges to take a new oath to abide by the order. The PCO specifically excluded military courts and cases brought before them, and invalidated all court judgments against earlier orders of the regime.[40] Many judges refused to take the new oath.

Zia had by now embarked on the process of Islamisation, seeing its potential as a political resource. But

having frequently chided politicians for employing Islam for exploitative purposes, he felt obliged to translate the Islamic idiom into concrete measures.[41] He opted to establish *sharia* as the basis of all laws, which meant that all laws passed by the assemblies would have to be in conformity with *sharia* and that any law repugnant to *sharia* must either be declared null and void or be revised in order to bring it into line with Quranic injunctions. Zia established *sharia* courts in all provinces and created a Sharia Appeal Bench at the Supreme Court. Islamic punishments were imposed in 1979 for crimes such as drinking alcoholic beverages, gambling, theft, prostitution, fornication, adultery and bearing false witness. Such crimes could be punished by flogging, amputation or stoning to death, in accordance with Islamic law.[42] Zia also ordered that steps be taken to provide what he called Islamic banking facilities. He introduced the collection of Zakat (alms giving) at the rate of 2 per cent of an individual's wealth, to be distributed among the needy by boards he specifically established, and introduced Ushr, a form of agriculture tax.[43] The introduction of Zakat evoked strong reactions, especially among the Shia community who formed about 20 per cent of the total population, and for them it was withdrawn.

On 19 December 1984 a national referendum was held to ask the people whether or not they approved the process of Islamisation.[44] It had been made clear that affirmation by simple majority would be seen as a mandate for Zia to remain in office for another five years. Zia is said to have received a 98 per cent affirmative vote.[45] Having secured his position, he held partyless elections in February 1985 and soon afterwards issued a Revival of the 1973 Constitution Order.[46] Zia selected Mohammad Khan Junejo as Prime Minister, who promised that martial law would be lifted by the end of 1985. It *was* lifted, but at a price which Zia extracted from the elected representatives. The price

was the passage of the Eighth Amendment, which regularised all steps taken under martial law and also gave vast powers to the President. He could virtually dissolve assemblies and dismiss even the Prime Minister at will. In May 1988 Zia invoked these very powers to dismiss Junejo. He was also entrusted with the power to appoint the Prime Minister, the armed forces chiefs, judges of the Supreme Court and High Courts, governors and many other top officials. Following his dismissal of the Junejo government, Zia once again promised to hold elections within 90 days and declared that they would be held on a non-party basis. But before the new elections could be held, Zia was killed along with senior military officers and the American ambassador in an unexplained air crash near Bahawalpur.

PERVEZ MUSHARRAF 1999–

On 12 October 1999 Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif announced that he had retired the incumbent Army Chief, General Musharraf, and appointed General Ziauddin to replace him. At the time of the announcement Musharraf was returning to Karachi on a commercial flight from Colombo. Almost immediately after his elevation to the post of COAS, Ziauddin tried to make telephone contact with the Corps commanders but was not able to reach them.[47] Within minutes of Nawaz Sharif's announcement, the commanders loyal to Musharraf swiftly moved their troops, took over strategic locations without firing a single shot and placed Nawaz Sharif and his key associates under house arrest. The military leadership seems to have known that the PM was planning to remove Musharraf and had unanimously decided to counter such a move with swift action. According to a report, the Corps commanders and Joint Chiefs of Staff had in fact prepared a contingency plan in the third week of September.[48] The

commanders' extreme action in mobilising their troops was taken during the time when Musharraf was engaged in trying to secure landing permission from the Karachi control tower which, initially refusing it, had then advised the pilot to land at Nawabshah airport, some distance away. Being low on fuel, the pilot refused to go on and sought landing permission again. At this stage Musharraf took charge of the situation and eventually secured the permission.

A few hours later, General Musharraf announced in a televised speech that Nawaz Sharif had been deposed on charges of interfering in the affairs of the armed forces, politicising the Army, destabilising it and trying to create dissension within its ranks.[49] Later he issued Provisional Constitutional Order No. 1 of 1999. Under PCO 1 the Constitution was held in abeyance, the elected assemblies and the powers of their presiding officers were suspended, the Prime Minister, federal ministers and provincial functionaries ceased to hold office, and General Musharraf proclaimed himself as Chief Executive.

The dismissal of Nawaz Sharif was enthusiastically welcomed in almost all quarters of Pakistani society. Many leaders and analysts hailed the advent of another military regime. Some people expressed regret, but even they placed the blame on Nawaz Sharif's policies in general and his quest to acquire more and more powers in particular.[50] His government was regarded as extremely corrupt, dictatorial, inept and inefficient, one that had allowed a rapidly deteriorating law and order situation to emerge as well as continually increasing prices of goods. People found it hard to dispute Musharraf when he said that what had been rolled back was not democracy but a sham.

The international community saw the development rather differently, viewing the advent of another military regime with concern and apprehension. Later a more realistic assessment of the situation emerged and

the new setup in Islamabad began to gain wider recognition.[51] Compared to the Commonwealth, the US and Japan demonstrated a better understanding of the circumstances that produced the military takeover. The Commonwealth, however, decided to suspend Pakistan from membership and called for the restoration of civilian democratic rule without delay.[52] The European Union also called for a quick return to democracy, but took note of the military rulers' commitment to economic and political reform and the administration's pledge to respect human rights.[53]

Explaining his agenda at a press conference, General Musharraf refused to give a timeframe for the restoration of democracy. His expressed agenda included revival of the economy; effective, impartial and across-the-board accountability to stamp out corruption; good governance; electoral reforms to introduce genuine democracy; and strengthening of the federation. To attain his objectives Musharraf set up a National Security Council consisting of seven members plus himself as chairman. The Council is to act more like an advisory body, with the actual administration of the country remaining in the hands of a small cabinet. He also established a National Accountability Bureau.

Musharraf stressed that martial law had not been imposed and that the Army was to remain away from the civilian system. He further emphasised that 'nobody would be allowed to exploit Islam for political gain', implying that many leaders had been doing that in the past. He also undertook to maintain freedom of the press, to encourage the rule of merit and to initiate the devolution of power from centre to provinces. Speaking about foreign policy, the General stated that there would be hardly any significant change and that Islamabad would go along with all its commitments to the international community. Regarding relations with India, he adopted a positive approach and stressed that Pakistan wanted to resolve all disputes including the Kashmir dispute, which

must be addressed 'first of all or at least simultaneously'. He also announced a unilateral pullout of Pakistani troops from the border with India—a confidence-building measure which, at the time of writing, the Indians have neither responded to nor reciprocated.[54]

A month after the military takeover, the leading members of the Pakistan Muslim League filed a constitutional petition in the Supreme Court of Pakistan, alleging that the military take over was unjustified and questioning the legal basis for the declaration of an emergency by the army chief. The petition stressed that there was no provision to govern the country through a National Security Council, or for the involvement of the armed forces in the affairs of governance. The Chief Justice handed down the ruling justifying the coup on the grounds of necessity, but stressed that General Musharraf had three years from the date of the takeover to hold elections. The court ruled that the coup was justified because of the corruption, misrule and bad shape of economy at the time.

Since the Supreme Court's ruling General Musharraf has repeatedly stated that the elections would be held within the time frame given by country's highest court. He initiated comprehensive reform programs covering almost all sections of Pakistani society. Special attention was paid to the revival of the economy. With these reforms he managed to arrest the economy's downward slide and transform it into an upward thrust. The revival of an economy often requires quite some time before it reaches a healthy profile, but Pakistan's economy is improving steadily. Not only within the two-and-a-half years of General Musharraf's rule has inflation been considerably controlled, but the foreign exchange reserve has exceeded five billion dollars. In addition, agriculture, industry, energy and information technology have attracted special attention. A comprehensive privatisation ordinance was also issued to initiate the process. However, even with economic

reforms, investment levels continue to remain somewhat unimpressive.

Following the tragic events of 11 September 2001 and the consequent formation of the international coalition against terrorism in which Pakistan also became a partner, circumstances began to improve for Pakistan. Not only were all types of sanctions gradually lifted, but the international financial institutions began to view Pakistan more favourably. Cognisant of Pakistan's difficulties as a result of its participation in the international coalition against terrorism and the US-led war against Afghanistan, along with its radically altered Afghan policy, the donor community adopted a comprehensive approach to help Pakistan's economy to grow again.

Apart from reviving the health of Pakistan's economy, General Musharraf focused his efforts on improving the governance and reducing corruption within Pakistani society. In this connection he established the National Accountability Bureau (NAB) and the National Reconstruction Bureau (NRB). The NAB was entrusted with the tasks of recovering loans from defaulters and punishing corrupt officials. Huge amounts have now been recovered from bank loan defaulters, and money has also been recovered from many corrupt officials. Cases against officials are continuously being dealt with by the NAB.

The NRB was entrusted with the tasks of political restructuring and the devolution of powers. A modified local bodies system was revitalised and its elections were completed by August 2001. During the past year the system has been working admirably. The promised devolution of powers has become a reality, and the elected representatives have been administering their respective areas quite effectively. General Musharraf has also provided a road map for the elections of the provincial and central assemblies. The elections are scheduled for October 2002. The Election Commission has the

task of delimiting the constituencies, primarily because of the increased population and consequent increased number of seats in both the central and provincial assemblies. Special seats have also been reserved for women and technocrats.

On 12 January 2002 General Musharraf took another decisive step, banning five important extremist groups in an attempt to eliminate the militant culture that had developed over the years—especially since the start of a Jihad against the Soviet Union in 1979. Recognising the dangerous implication of this militant culture, Musharraf was keen to bring it under control, and in 2001 took many measures to cleanse it from society. His efforts to de-weaponise Pakistan did not meet much success. However, his administration was not discouraged by the slow progress, and continued their efforts to pursue this objective. By arresting most of the extremists and maintaining tight control, along with continuous monitoring, the General was able to make some commendable strides in this direction. However, in this pursuit the General also invoked the anger of many religious groups. Some of the banned groups went underground but continued working against the government.

Another area where the General is attempting to make a visible dent is poverty. Poverty alleviation programs have been launched, and not only are donor agencies contributing but even the government is making concerted efforts to make the poverty alleviation program a success. In general, the military regime has been able to rebuild a level of trust between the people and the government, eradicatie some corruption (especially at the macro level), establish a process of accountability and improve the image of government institutions.

In terms of foreign relations, Pakistan's relations with almost all countries have considerably improved. However, little improvement has been registered as far as its relations with India. The Kashmir disputes continue to haunt the normalisation process. While both

India and Pakistan became partners in the international coalition against terrorism, they were unable to resolve their own disputes: Musharraf went to India in May 2001 with the resolve to remove all impediments to India–Pakistan normalisation, but was unable to realise this objective because of the attitude of the hardliners within the ruling party of India.

THE MILITARY AND GOVERNANCE

Over the decades following partition the military acquired the status of most important member of the ruling troika in Pakistan. It played a very important role in the Pakistani polity and no significant decision was taken, in domestic or security affairs, without the military's input. In normal times it shared power with the civilian rulers without having to bear responsibility. Part of its strength came from the persistent demonstration of political immaturity on the part of civilian politicians. Lack of consensus among the politicians as to how to keep the military out of politics, coupled with feuding politicians' periodic efforts to enlist the support of the military in dislodging adversaries, proved at times to be a great encouragement to military leaders contemplating a takeover.[55] The politicians' inability to project democracy as the preferred political system only helped in this. In situations of political strife and turmoil, along with a rapid deterioration of law and order, the military leadership at the time had no difficulty in finding support among the civilians. The massive support extended to the recent military takeover once again revealed the brittle nature of political institutions in Pakistan. For its part, the bureaucracy has generally found itself more comfortably placed under a military regime than under civilian rule, with a strengthening of the bureaucrats' hand and the evolution of a strong bond with the military bureaucracy.

Military regimes have demonstrated the ease with which they can abrogate or suspend, or hold in abeyance certain portions of, the Constitution. In general, constitutions have become something of a plaything of those in power and 'have hardly been constraining devices in the use of arbitrary power; military regimes have mostly coped with the problem of legitimacy through the higher courts or by using extralegal sources of legitimacy.[56]

9

Defence production and procurement

DEFENCE PRODUCTION

The development of a defence industry in Pakistan can be divided into two broad phases. The first started with independence and ended in 1971 when East Pakistan separated and became Bangladesh. The second phase covers the period from 1972 to the present day. During the first phase relatively little was achieved because of the economic and geopolitical circumstances of those years, as outlined in earlier chapters. In the second phase almost all governments have accorded high priority to defence production. Considerable progress was made with the help of China and France, though many other countries were also approached. The Chinese contribution to the building up of Pakistan's defence industries, which surpasses the other contributions by an impressive margin, gained momentum during the regimes of Z.A. Bhutto and Zia (i.e. the period 1971 to 1988).

In 1972, in order to attract investment from various sources, to secure transfers of technology and to sustain an industrial base for defence production, the Bhutto government established a Defence Production Division with four major objectives:

- to achieve maximum self-reliance in the production of defence materiel
- to accelerate the pace of technological development
- to maximise industrial potential in the production and procurement of defence stores
- to attain economies of scale through optimum production and procurement

Over the years, Pakistani Governments have sought to bring the private sector into defence production, hoping eventually to reverse an imbalance in which 90 per cent of defence industries are state-owned and very little is in the hands of the private sector.[1] While governments have given many incentives to motivate the private sector to take over a major chunk of the defence industries, it is recognised that this is a long-term goal.

Today the defence production workforce exceeds 50 000, including more than 26 000 scientists, engineers and technical experts. The system has the capacity of producing materiel worth US$400 million per year.[2] Of the defence-related industrial units, the following are regarded as the most important.

Pakistan Ordnance Factories Complex (POF)

This is perhaps the most important establishment engaged in defence production. It started in the early 1950s with the help of the British and followed British techniques, but later switched to American, German and Chinese weapon systems. It has now become a major establishment consisting of many factories and employing over 30 000 people. Although most of its units are based at Wah it also has factories at Havelian, Sanjwal and Gadwal. The main activities of this complex revolve around the production of weapons such as the G-3 rifle, MG-1A3 machine gun, MP-5A2 submachine gun and 12.75mm anti-aircraft gun; various

types of ammunition for small arms; artillery, aircraft, anti-aircraft and anti-tank guns; mortars, missiles, bombs and different types of explosives and propellants. In addition, it caters for the armed forces clothing requirements. The Pakistan Ordnance Factories Complex (POF), after meeting domestic needs, exports its surplus production to friendly countries.

Heavy Industries Taxila (HIT)

Originally known as the Heavy Rebuild Factory, the HIT started functioning in 1971 to rebuild T-59 tanks and engines with the assistance of the Chinese. The HIT employs over 7 000 workers in a 30–70 Army–civilian ratio. Over the years it has graduated into a vast complex which covers the manufacturing of armoured vehicles including T-69 II MP and T-85 tanks, APCs (armoured personnel carriers), ARVs (armoured recovery vehicles) and self-propelled guns. It also encompasses heavy rebuild factories for both T-series and M-series tanks. To meet future requirements the HIT is currently working, in collaboration with the Chinese, on production of the main battle tank MBT 2000, named the Al-Khalid. This tank was apparently chosen in preference to the technologically superior American M1A1 because of political restraints on US arms sales, the higher cost of the American tank and the longstanding relationship between the armed forces and defence industries of China and Pakistan.[3] Since the Al-Khalid has already undergone many tests, it is expected that it will be introduced into service not later than 2001.

Pakistan Aeronautical Complex (PAC)

Situated at Kamra, some 50 kilometres north of Islamabad, the PAC consists of four major factories: F-6 Rebuild Factory, Aircraft Manufacturing Factory, Mirage

Rebuild Factory, and Kamra Avionics and Radar Factory. The major operations undertaken at this complex involve maintenance, overhaul and modernisation work on PAF aircraft. The largest factory is the F-6 Rebuild Factory, which started in 1980 and currently has a workforce of more than 2000 employees. As the PAF bought other versions of Chinese aircraft, the factory expanded to include overhaul facilities. After Pakistan's purchase of F-7P aircraft, a variant of the Mig-21, the rebuild facilities were further expanded. The factory also repairs and overhauls components and accessories like landing gears, pumps, instruments, valves and actuators, airborne communication and navigation equipment and aircraft guns.[4]

The second most important factory at the PAC is the Mirage Rebuild Factory (MRF), which became operational in 1978. Since 1987 it has upgraded engines from F100-200 to F100-220E. Despite the US embargo and consequent difficulties in procuring requisite material, the MRF has been successfully providing support to F-16 weapon systems.

The third major component of the PAC is the Aircraft Manufacturing Factory (AMF), which started in 1981. The AMF is the only division of the PAC which actually produces aircraft. Pakistan began assembling the light trainer Saab-Scania MF1-17 under licence in 1975. Efforts to upgrade the aircraft have attracted the attention of many other countries. The AMF is engaged in the manufacture of a basic trainer-cum-surveillance aircraft known as the Mushaq, and manufactures low speed target drone systems for use in anti-aircraft gunnery training.[5] In addition, the AMF has an industrial partnership with China National Aircraft Manufacturing Company for production of a new generation jet trainer known as Karakoram 8 or K-8 and has in fact produced some of the planes, which are already flying with the PAF.[6] The Air Force is planning to replace its aging T-37 aircraft with the K-8.

The fourth main pillar of the PAC is the Kamra Avionics and Radar Factory (KARF), which was established in 1989 to rebuild air defence radars and supporting generators. Over the years KARF has been continuously expanding and diversifying its activities. It has ventured into other areas like ground and airbone electronic equipment production, and has undertaken many collaborative projects with foreign firms.[7]

Other establishments

The Defence Science and Technology Organisation was created in 1953 to carry out applied research and evaluation of defence weapon systems. It has undertaken many analytical studies. The Military Vehicle Research and Development Establishment was created in 1972 with a focus on vehicles and engineering equipment for the three services. Another organisation, which came into existence in 1974, is the Armament Research and Development Establishment. The Margalla Electronic Establishment was formed in 1985 with the objective of assembling and rebuilding radar units and electronic equipment. The Institute of Optronics was created in 1987 to assemble night vision devices and image intensification systems.

DEFENCE PROCUREMENT

The US arms embargo in the mid-1960s turned out to be a blessing in disguise for Pakistan. Disillusioned with the alliance partnership and the policies of the Americans, the Pakistanis were compelled to explore alternative sources for the acquisition of advanced, sophisticated weapons. This led Pakistan to closer contacts with the Chinese and the French. Soon both China and France made substantial inroads into the Pakistani market for the sale of their arms, but China secured a

much larger share than the French did. Several reasons account for this being the case despite the fact that French weapons were considered to be qualitatively superior and that Pakistan was in search of quality weaponry. To begin with, China had not only demonstrated open support for Pakistan in the 1965 war but had signed three major pacts with Pakistan in 1963 covering areas such as trade, civil aviation and borders. Besides, the public in Pakistan after the 1965 war was extremely supportive of closer ties with China. In fact China had supplied some war material including T-59 tanks and Mig-19 fighter planes, although they arrived after the war was over.[8] Second, Chinese credit was available on easy repayment terms. Third, Chinese weapons were much cheaper than western ones. Fourth, China was viewed not only as a counterpoise to India but as a much more reliable partner than the West, especially the US.

Since the 1960s, China has fairly regularly provided Pakistan with substantial economic and military aid, as well as diplomatic and political support whenever required. Although the weapons supplied by the Chinese were not qualitatively on a par with western weaponry, they were supplied in large quantities and eventually became a major component of Pakistan's arsenal. By the early 1980s China had provided Pakistan with roughly 75 per cent of its tanks and about 65 per cent of its aircraft. It had also greatly assisted Pakistan in the development of defence industries.[9]

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 compelled the Americans to review their South Asia policy, particularly towards Pakistan, and they decided to resume the supply of arms to Pakistan in order to strengthen it militarily.[10]

The US and Pakistan signed the first economic assistance and military sales agreement in 1981. The package of US$3.2 billion (1981–87) had two components: economic assistance amounting to US$1.6 billion, and the

military sales which consisted wholly of credits repayable over nine years, after a period of grace of three years, and at an interest rate of 10–14 per cent. Pakistan used the opportunity to acquire 40 F-16 fighters in accordance with its policy of securing qualitatively superior weapons; for the purchase of the F-16s it paid the requisite amount separately. Pakistan also began to extend limited-transit stopover facilities to US P-3 reconnaissance aircraft, and a dialogue was started on whether or not Pakistan should be given an airborne early warning system.[11]

A second package (1987–93) consisting of economic assistance and military sales worth US$4.2 billion was approved by the US Congress in December 1987. But the package did not complete its term because of American suspicions that Pakistan was treading the forbidden path to nuclearisation; the entire aid program to Pakistan was suspended. The US also refused to deliver even that military equipment for which the Pakistani Government had already made payments. Perhaps the most interesting controversy revolved around the non-delivery of F-16 fighters, a controversy that has only recently been resolved. For years the US was neither willing to deliver the F-16s for which money had been paid nor willing to return the money. However, most of it has now been refunded.

In Pakistan the Defence Production Division has the additional task of procuring defence equipment and stores for all three services. There is a Directorate-General of Defence Purchases (DGDP) assisted by three service directorates and Defence Attaches are posted in the US, the UK, France, China and Germany. Almost all kinds of defence procurement are covered by the DGDP. Most of the local purchases are handled by the service directorates, but major defence equipment acquired from the international market is the direct responsibility of the DGDP.

10

Nuclear and missile developments

NUCLEAR DEVELOPMENTS

Following Pakistan's nuclear testing in 1998 the Prime Minister declared: 'Today we have settled scores with India. We have paid them back.'[1] An eminent strategic analyst added: 'If we [were] to regain our national pride, we had to test. The issue had been brought to a boiling point by India. Now we have [redressed] the strategic imbalance that India had created.'[2] While Pakistan's nuclear policy appears to be reactive in its visible dimension, Indian nuclear pursuits are goal orientated. India aspires to become a nuclear power in order to become more than a regional power. While the Pakistani approach is regional and nonproliferationist in essence, India's is global and proliferationist. For years both India and Pakistan followed a strategy of ambiguity and the world community was beginning to be reconciled with the situation of known capabilities. But the Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests of May 1998 were seen not only as a major defining development of the post–Cold War era but as an event that has weakened the nonproliferation regime, humiliated America's vast intelligence-gathering machine, intensified geopolitical rivalry in Asia and increased the risk of destabilising copycat effects from the Middle East to the Northern Pacific.[3] The

immediate reaction of the world community was one of condemnation and the initiation of a punitive drive against the two states, including the imposition of sanctions. However, a much more positive approach would lie in extending help to them in establishing nuclear stability, providing technical expertise regarding safety, security and command issues, encouraging them to abide by the NPT terms without being a formal signatory, and helping them to resolve the ongoing Kashmir dispute.[4]

Compared to India, Pakistan was a relatively slow and somewhat reluctant starter in the field of nuclear development. Although the Atomic Energy Council came into existence in 1956 and had decided to acquire a research reactor by 1959, various bureaucratic impediments meant that the reactor was not set up until 1963 (at the Pakistan Institute of Science and Technology, or PINSTECH) and became functional only in 1965.[5] A CANDU-type power reactor was established at Karachi and formally inaugurated in 1972. The major boost to nuclear development in Pakistan came in May 1974 when India exploded a nuclear device, asserting that it was a peaceful nuclear explosion (PNE). Apart from the Canadians, whose reactor was instrumental in producing the nuclear device, not many nations attempted to discourage the Indian nuclear effort. On the contrary, the French not only congratulated the Indians but offered help to build a fast breeder reactor.[6] The Americans readily accepted India's explanation that the 1974 event was a PNE despite the fact that they themselves had concluded, after running a series of tests, that there was an insignificant difference between explosions of a peaceful and a military nature.[7] The quick American acceptance was given primarily in the hope that it would make it easier for the Indians to stop there and not embark upon a path leading to nuclear weapons.[8] At the time, the Americans did not overreact, mainly because they thought that the explosion did not necessarily make India a nuclear state and that in order to become

one India would need to acquire and perfect a delivery system. Today India has not only acquired heavy bombers and perfected many missiles but has also made efforts towards the acquisition of a nuclear submarine.

Pakistan's response to the Indian explosion was a mixture of frustration and aspiration. It was frustrated by the impressive scientific advancement demonstrated by the alleged PNE, but the then Prime Minister, Z.A. Bhutto, quickly expressed a determination to match the Indian accomplishment. As a matter of fact, Bhutto had already correctly perceived the Indians' intentions and wrote in 1969 that India would detonate a nuclear device in order to match China's accomplishments in the nuclear field.[9] Convinced of India's intentions to acquire nuclear weapons, Bhutto subsequently convened a meeting of Pakistani scientists and allegedly asked them to work towards nuclear weapon capability. The 1974 Indian explosion accelerated the effort.[10]

Pakistan's uranium-enrichment program started in 1976 at what are now known as the Khan Research Laboratories. By the beginning of the 1980s Pakistan had made tremendous strides in this field and had acquired uranium-enrichment knowhow and related sensitive technology despite the advent of the US Glenn–Symington Amendment, which implied the termination of assistance to any state that imported uranium-enrichment equipment, acquired technology after 1977 and refused to subject it to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspection. The work on nuclear development in general and more specifically on uranium-enrichment processes had the full blessing of successive governments in Pakistan. Compared to Z.A. Bhutto's policies, the regime of Zia ul Haq proved astute in pursuing a less provocative policy. 'Zia deliberately fostered ambiguity, took calculated risks, and skilfully exploited the international environment and the loopholes in the US nonproliferation policy.'[11] Zia believed that Bhutto's policy of open and repeated

assertions that Pakistan was engaged in developing nuclear weapon capability was not appropriate.

For a very long time both India and Pakistan opted for a policy of ambiguity. Ambiguity reflects adherence to a 'delayed option' presumably based on acute realisation of the costs involved and the likely international pressures that would be generated by openly contemplated weaponisation. As in the case of India, Pakistan's nuclear program was the product of many factors, including insecurity resulting from neighbouring conventional military capability, national energy requirements, prestige value and domestic compulsions. For Pakistan the experienced unreliability of its western friends and allies also meant that a cautious drift towards self-reliance was somewhat inevitable. The policy of ambiguity bought time, enabling both India and Pakistan to continue strengthening their scientific base and to keep their nuclear options open. In doing this, the two countries were conveying to the rest of the world that they did not really intend to transform their capabilities into actual weaponisation, but that the dictates of national security and the pressures generated by their peculiar environment could cause a change in the existing posture. The frequent employment of the phrase 'nuclear option' in official statements signified 'not only freedom of action in the narrow nuclear strategic realm but also the wider principle of state sovereignty in international relations'.[12] For Pakistan, in many ways, the strategy of ambiguity proved useful in the wake of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in December 1979. First, it allowed Pakistan to keep its options open. Second, it kept Pakistan's major adversary somewhat uncertain. Third, it highlighted the fact that the threshold states seriously objected to selective possession of nuclear weapons. Fourth, the strategy of ambiguity provided a face-saving means of climbing down from overpublicised, committed positions. Finally, the ambiguity also paid dividends in domestic politics.

Despite having terminated economic and military aid to Pakistan in 1977 and 1979, in view of Pakistan's efforts to acquire the forbidden technology, the Americans decided to suspend the application of the Glenn–Symington Amendment to Pakistan for strategic reasons following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Although the Americans described Pakistan as a front-line state that needed help, the real reason was to bleed the Soviets in Afghanistan as they had done to the Americans during the Vietnam War. Simultaneously, the American administration was confronted with the dilemma of how to keep an effective check on Pakistan's drive towards the acquisition of nuclear technology and how to pacify its domestic critics. The duality of American policy eventually resulted in the passage of the Pressler Amendment, which provided that American aid and military sales could be cut off unless the US President certified each year that Pakistan did not possess nuclear weapons. Presidential certification stopped in 1990 when President Bush decided to withhold it.

By the mid-1980s both India and Pakistan seemed to have acquired nuclear capability but it was not publicly acknowledged until a few years later. A leading Pakistani scientist deeply involved in the acquisition of nuclear technology had given a public statement in 1987 revealing that Pakistan had perfected the uranium-enrichment process and was in a position to make an atomic device whenever the decision makers in Pakistan took the necessary decision.[13] Such a statement not only indicated the level of accomplishment in the nuclear field but also the degree of official determination. From then until 1998 both India and Pakistan apparently continued work in the nuclear field while generally and officially refraining from acknowledging any intention to move into weaponisation. However, the existence of nuclear weapons did echo periodically in the 1990s.

On 11 and 13 May 1998 India conducted a series of nuclear tests and Pakistan followed suit on the 28th. Compared to the Indians' calculated decision to explode the nuclear devices, Pakistan's test gave the impression, once again, of being a reactive move. While the Indian Prime Minister, A.B. Vajpayee, had said back in 1964 that 'the answer to an atom bomb is an atom bomb, nothing else' and had subsequently made weaponisation one of the major strands of his government's election policies, Pakistan's politicians rarely discussed publicly the nuclear test issue.[14] Even after the Indian tests, the Pakistanis seemed to be engaged in seeking a way out of the dilemma confronting them. Several factors helped the Pakistani decision makers to decide in favour of testing. First, the Indian explosions radically altered the existing security environment and created a sense of urgency to remedy the situation, especially as Pakistan's conventional capabilities had been progressively dwindling relative to India's. Second, world reaction over the Indian tests—apart from Japan and to some extent the US—was muted. At the same time, cognisant of the fact that Pakistan would react, the international community did not even try to offer incentives to Pakistan to refrain. Further, the Indian nuclear tests increased the pressure from domestic sources on Pakistan's decision makers. Various groups organised demonstrations in their attempt to influence the government to explode the bomb in response. But perhaps the most important factor was the newly evolved tough Indian policy on Kashmir. Indeed, India's Interior Minister issued a threatening statement reflecting calculated aggression.[15] The Indian leaders seemed to have misjudged the intensity of Pakistan's feelings regarding the Kashmir situation. And so, for all these reasons, Pakistan gave a fitting response to the Indian tests—after which it was subjected to intense pressure by the international community!

This seemed doubly unfair as Pakistan had raised many proposals over the years to prevent the nuclearisation of South Asia and to introduce an arms control regime there. None of the proposals were accepted by India.

Soon after the nuclear tests, the Pakistanis announced a unilateral moratorium on testing and invited India to join in an agreement outlawing all future tests.[16] Again India did not agree. As mentioned above, India has its own agenda which includes acquiring the status of a big power, with possibly a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. In addition, India argues, with some justification, that the existing nuclear states should provide a timetable for eventual total nuclear disarmament. One is simply amazed at the hypocrisy of those who, still controlling 30 000 nuclear weapons, condemn the existence of a few in the hands of India and Pakistan.[17] Yet, in western eyes, since the two countries have fought three wars already, the danger of another war is real and the next war could be a nuclear war. While one can understand the main thrust of such an argument, it needs to be remembered that the Indo–Pak wars took place during the first 25 years of the countries' independent existence, whereas the next 25 years and more saw no real war. Second, it can be argued that the acquisition of nuclear weapons capability may introduce a new set of incentives for cooperation.

The world community's initial punitive drive has now been replaced by a more constructive approach. US officials have entered into a dialogue with Indian and Pakistani officials in order to encourage both India and Pakistan to abide by the spirit of the NPT, without necessarily becoming a formal signatory to it. Another positive way of minimising the dangers of a nuclear arms race or even a nuclear exchange is to concentrate efforts to remove the main source of tension between India and Pakistan—the ongoing Kashmir dispute—and to extend cooperation to both countries on nuclear safety, security, command and control issues.

Infrastructure

Pakistan's nuclear infrastructure includes three R & D establishments—Khan Research Laboratories at Kahuta, Chaghi Hills and the Pakistan Ordinance Factory at Wah; two power reactors—KANUPP at Karachi and Chashma I under construction at Chashma; three research reactors—Pakistan Atomic Research Reactors I & II in the Islamabad/Rawalpindi area and a research/plutonium-production reactor at Khushab; four uranium-enrichment establishments—Khan Research Laboratories at Kahuta and facilities at Sihala, Wah and Golra (Golra's operational status is unknown); three reprocessing facilities (plutonium extraction)—Chasma, New Labs and PINSTECH in Islamabad; six uranium-processing facilities—Baghalchar, Qabul Khel, Lahore, Chashma/Kundian and two at Dera Ghazi Khan (one for uranium mining and milling and the other for uranium conversion); and two heavy water production units—Multan and Karachi. (Further details are given in Jones and McDonough, 1998.)

MISSILE DEVELOPMENTS

A missile is an untutored weapon powered by a rocket during its initial launch stage usually with a fixed ballistic trajectory. However, the Cruise missile has variable aerodynamic flight characteristics and is a guided missile. The last 20 years have witnessed the rapid arming of nations with missiles that can deliver conventional, nuclear, biological and chemical warheads. Many reasons account for missile proliferation. First, technologies employed in the development of missiles are relatively easily available. Second, missile technologies are 'dual use' technologies. This implies that a missile technology has legitimate non-military applications. Under the cover of civilian use, it is not

too far-fetched to assume, its military use can also be perfected. Third, missiles are viewed by almost all military analysts as extremely effective weapons in penetrating even the most sophisticated air defences. Fourth, a missile is a carrier of all types of warhead. Fifth, the cost of manufacturing, acquiring, operating and maintaining missiles is far less than that of manned aircraft. Sixth, not too many restrictions are imposed on the supply of missile technologies. Admittedly many alarmed suppliers created the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) in 1987 to restrict the proliferation of missiles and related technologies, but the MTCR controls only those missiles which are capable of carrying a payload of 500 kilograms or more for a distance of 300 kilometres or more. Seventh, the element of national pride also contributes to the acquisition of missile technologies. 'The ability to master the complexities of guidance technology, rocket fuels and metallurgy reflects a state's technological sophistication and competence and is therefore clearly attractive to many developing countries.[18] Finally, missiles are known to have enhanced many countries' deterrence capabilities. The degree of deterrence of course depends upon the deployment of a sufficient number of missiles—the number must be ascertained in relation to the size and military capabilities of the target country or countries.

Almost all of the abovementioned factors contributed to India's decision to acquire missile technology. As well, India has a large and well-developed chemical industry nurturing almost all the material deemed necessary for chemical weapons, and recently it declared large stockpiles. Pakistan's missile program, by comparison, is both limited and reactive in nature.

Pakistan, though a latecomer in this field, quickly developed the requisite technology and has now test fired a series of ballistic missiles. Its short range ballistic missiles are known as Hatf I and Hatf II and have a range

of 80 km and 300 km respectively. Both can deliver a payload of 500 kg.[19] Pakistan has also test fired Hatf III which can deliver a payload of 500 kg with a range of 800 km.[20] The Hatf series of missiles have been developed at Khan Research Laboratories and are known to be equipped with a locally built sophisticated guidance system.

In the first week of April 1998 Pakistan successfully test fired the latest version of the Hatf series, known as the Ghauri but also called Haft V. The Ghauri missile can carry a payload of 700 kg and has a range of 1500 km.[21] Equipped with guidance technology, the Ghauri's range can cover most Indian sites of strategic importance including the naval development areas. Although described as an appropriate response to the vast Indian missile program, and named after King Shahabuddin Ghauri who established the first Muslim dynastic rule in India, the Prime Minister of Pakistan has stressed that it was the product of the growing need for stronger national defence rather than a matter of past glory.[22]

It seems that both India and Pakistan developed their intermediate range missiles from the same model—the Soviet Scud missile which was a crude affair with a very high circular error probability. Both Indian and Pakistani scientists improvised on the model so much that the Indian Agni and the Ghauri appear to be very different weapons. So far neither has been deployed. On 11 April 1999 India tested Agni II.[23] Pakistan responded by testing advance versions of its Ghauri and Shaheen missiles.

Reports from Indian and western sources allege that China has given Pakistan M-11 missiles, which have a range of about 290–300 km. In June 1996 the *Washington Times* reported, quoting US intelligence sources, that Pakistan had secured the missiles from China and had deployed them against India. American sources also suggested that China had delivered to Pakistan parts of missiles along with 30 ready-to-launch M-11s which are

stored in canisters at the Sargodha Air Force base.[24] In the summer of 1996 'a US National Intelligence Estimate concluded that Pakistan had roughly three dozen M-11 missiles'.[25] However, the Chinese did not accept the western allegations, nor did the Pakistanis acknowledge them.[26] During his American visit that year the Chinese Defence Minister, Chi Haotian, curtly dismissed American concerns about Chinese sales of missiles and nuclear technology to Iran and Pakistan, and insisted that China strictly complied with the MTCR, which governs the export of missile technology, and that Chinese exports of equipment, arms and technology were made under safeguards.[27]

A MATTER OF CONCERN

The main motivation for nuclear and missile development in Pakistan is the continuing fear of Indian domination. Unable to secure a protective umbrella from others, Pakistan was more or less forced to tread the forbidden path. Since the international community was unable to restrain India in its nuclear and missile development and made no concerted effort to resolve the Kashmir dispute, the Pakistanis were left with few options. Consequently most Pakistani pressure groups, some reluctantly, others with enthusiasm, began to support the acquisition of nuclear capability. Among the nuclear hawks perhaps the top military leadership has been the most dominating. According to an eminent scholar, 'it was the military high command that was responsible for the decision to test and that continues to strongly support the retention and expansion of Pakistan's nuclear weapon capability'.[28] But most religious parties also extend strong support to the acquisition of nuclear weapons.

Compared to India's vast network of nuclear and missile development establishments and its future

program, Pakistan's own acquisitions are meagre. But unless tension is reduced between India and Pakistan and the roots of conflict are subjected to a concerted effort by the international community, the quest to acquire minimum deterrence capability will continue to influence Pakistani decision makers. Since minimum deterrence is difficult to define accurately, it can be assumed that the two countries will continue improving their latest technological acquisitions unless the major source of tension is effectively removed. And given the close geographic proximity of the antagonists, launch-to-target times would be extremely limited. Thus it is imperative for both of them to refrain from equipping their missiles with nuclear warheads and from deploying them close to the borders. They must adhere to the global trend towards restraint.

11

Concluding remarks

DEFENCE POLICY AND STRATEGY

The evolutionary process of defence preparedness entails policy development to meet anticipated defence needs on a long-term basis, coupled with strategies to meet threats that emerge periodically. Ordinarily, defence objectives are worked out by the political authorities and passed on to the high military officials in the form of defence policy. The military officials implement the policy through military strategy. Thus defence policy is primarily a political concern, whereas strategy is a military affair.

Feeling threatened right at the outset, Pakistani leaders accorded top priority to the defence sector. To offset the Indian threat, they were almost continuously engaged in securing requisite resources and weapons. Building a military force that could effectively ward off the Indian threat was not an easy task, but by displaying considerable prudence and diplomatic skill the leaders were able eventually to create an impressive military machine. Given the nature of the Indian threat, and the long border with India, the Pakistani decision makers accorded preference to development of the Army. While the physical separation of East Pakistan was given some consideration when Pakistan's strategic doctrine was in its early stages, the lack of a strong Navy and the

inability to quickly acquire expensive ships was another factor in determining the early defence mix. At the time, too, defence planners thought that the most threatened and vulnerable area was the plains of Punjab.

The strategic doctrine that evolved entailed an offensively orientated approach to defence. First, the defence planners regarded East Pakistan as undefendable. The argument was that if the Indians made up their mind to invade East Pakistan, the Pakistani forces there would not stand a chance as they were grossly inadequate in number. The best way to relieve pressure on East Pakistan if India invaded it, it was thought, was to launch a major attack from West Pakistan aimed at threatening the Indian capital. Thus the notion that the defence of East Pakistan lay in offence from West Pakistan was born.[1] And it meant that force posture and equipment would be developed (in part) in accordance with the relevant geographical terrain facing West Pakistan. The terrain included desert, plains and mountainous areas. But the Army was equipped at this stage to conduct operations only in the plains of Punjab.[2]

Secondly, there was a belief that an Indo–Pak war would be of short duration as neither side was in a position to wage a protracted war. It seems that the common belief at the time was that a quick hot war could raise the stakes to an unacceptable level for the adversary. But for this one needed quality equipment which, at the time, was only available from the US. The quest for quality equipment, along with seeking western support for its case on Kashmir, led Pakistan to join the western-sponsored defence alliances of the Cold War.

A closer scrutiny of the defence doctrine suggests that it was not as well thought out as it might have been. It failed to provide adequate protection for East Pakistan, being loaded in effect in West Pakistan's favour. The peculiar geographical situation in which West and East Pakistan were separated by more than 1600 kilometres of hostile Indian territory deserved a

basic strategy that could satisfy both wings. Had some other strategy been adopted, an accelerated development of the Navy would have taken place, partly because Pakistan was divided into two far flung units and the maintenance of an effective link between them would have been essential, and partly because the Navy was perhaps the only arm about which the East Pakistanis were enthusiastic.[3] But as the adopted strategy gave a crucial role to the Army and most of the soldiers were recruited from Punjab, the impression that preference was accorded to West Pakistan was inevitable. It must be said, though, that the pressures following partition made it extremely difficult for Pakistan to formulate a carefully calculated defence policy. The Pakistani decision makers were engaged on quickly securing a survival path that could take the country out of the turbulent post-independence phase. In any case, the defence policy changed little in its fundamentals for a good many years.

Following the 1971 war and dismemberment of the nation, Pakistan's external security environment gradually began to improve. Pakistan was now reduced in size and population but not significantly in military strength, and it was geographically more compact. The strategic doctrine began to undergo change and the entire higher structure of defence was reorganised. It was realised after the East Pakistan debacle that the process of defence decision making was seriously flawed. Until 1971 defence planning had remained entirely within the domain of the military leaders. The defeat of the Army and surrender of over 90 000 soldiers in East Pakistan had demoralised the armed forces considerably. The new situation allowed the civilian rulers to reorganise the armed forces and to reduce their political role. A White Paper on Defence Organisation was issued, which increased civilian control over major defence decisions and also established the Defence Committee of the Cabinet, Defence Council and Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee. These bodies were responsible for

improving coordination between the armed forces of Pakistan. In the new system the Defence Committee of the Cabinet became the most powerful body regarding defence affairs.

SERVICES TO THE COMMUNITY

Apart from dealing with internal and external security, the armed forces are called on to assist civilian authorities in such activities as logistics work, flood relief and development assignments. In particular, the work of the armed forces during and after flooding of various areas of Pakistan is well appreciated by the people, especially those in isolated or stranded communities. At times the work includes the strengthening of protective barriers against the likely overflow of excess waters. Road building and construction of bridges are another vital form of assistance to the community. In many parts of Pakistan with difficult terrain, troops have produced essential transport and communication networks. The Karakoram Highway is one instance; others are the Gilgit–Skardu and Chakdara–Chitral roads, along with many smaller roads in Azad Kashmir and Baluchistan. These came from the Army, which has also helped to build major dams.[4]

Education is another area of assistance. The Pakistan Army has developed an education system which besides meeting its own requirements caters for civilians. The armed forces have also periodically assisted the Election Commission to conduct free and fair elections, and gave support to the Population and Housing Census Office in the 1998 census. Another recent involvement of the military is in the affairs of the Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA). For a very long time WAPDA had tried its best to prevent power theft and to recover legitimate dues from consumers but had failed. At the end of 1998 the federal Government handed

WAPDA over to the Army to rectify the situation, and promulgated three special ordinances to help it do so.[5]

In peacetime as well as in time of war the armed forces have long served the nation of Pakistan. We may expect them to continue to.

Despite insufficient resources, Pakistan's leaders have tried to accommodate the needs of the armed forces while maintaining a certain level of economic development. Since they were incorporated, under the most adverse of conditions, the armed forces have advanced to a stage where they are currently viewed as strong, disciplined and dedicated, although their lack of sophisticated weaponry is keenly felt. The armed forces have performed many functions over the years, from defending the frontiers of the state carrying out assignments from both civilian and military governments.

Since the death of President Zia, the armed forces in general, and the army in particular, have been performing their constitutional roles. The elected civilian regimes have been gradually consolidating their hold over the armed forces while deliberately promoting democratic changes. Almost all army Chiefs of Staff have contributed to the ongoing process of strengthening elected governments. The instances of military intervention in civilian affairs have inevitably been caused by the internal instability of crisis in the civil system. Apart from the rise to power of General Yahya Khan, all of Pakistan's military regimes are the direct result of politicians failing their own systems.

During the 1990s there were numerous opportunities for the armed forces to stage another takeover, but the military leadership refrained from making any such move until the coup in October of 1999. Even then, at no stage did the military contemplate taking over government, electing instead to fulfil its constitutional role in helping the government to contain the rapidly escalating lawlessness in Karachi and supervising election

processes. This use of the military as a police force demonstrated not only the ineffectuality of the civilian law and order agencies but also the gravity of the situation. The performances of the armed forces in these situations have been impressive. In most cases they have fulfilled their assigned mandate while earning the praise of both the civilian regime and the general public. The internal discipline and organisation of the armed forces allow them to reach disaster areas more quickly than other relief agencies, and their prompt and effective action in the flood seasons, in restoring paralysed communication systems and quick construction of roads and bridges, brings immediate praise from the people they are helping.

Despite labouring under resource constraints, all three forces have steadily grown and kept pace with modern developments, particularly in the areas of science and technology. The lack of quality weaponry is an ongoing concern for both civilian and military decision makers, but internal discipline and training procedures attract well-deserved praise. The slow development of the indigenous defence industry has contributed to the problems of weapons supply, but by the late 1990s, Pakistan's defence industry has developed to the stage where not only is it meeting part of the local demand but it is now exporting goods to various countries.

The armed forces of Pakistan have made significant contributions to the peace-keeping operations of the United Nations. The army has effectively completed missions including peace enforcement, conducting and supervising elections and defending human rights. Pakistan has taken part in peace-keeping operations in West Irian (New Guinea), Somalia, Cambodia, Bubiyan Island, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Haiti. In addition, Pakistani forces have been involved in the UN Yemen Observation Mission, the UN Transition Assistance Group in Namibia and the UN Iraq–Kuwait Observation Mission.

One of the major problems in the development of Pakistan's armed forces has been a lack of coordination in command and control. The late Z.A. Bhutto realised the need for a unified higher command and, to this end, instigated a restructure of the defence organisation. The outcome of this restructure was the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee (JCSC). The JCSC was created to be a link between the political and military organs of the state, as well as the supreme planning and coordinating body of the military. However, it must be stressed here that it has never been able to function as it was intended to. Each of the three services continued to conduct operations in accordance with its own perceptions and planning. In none of the three wars Pakistan fought with India was a joint plan or integrated approach evolved. An analyst has summed up Pakistan's conduct of war in the following words: 'For want of proper command and control the Kashmir war could not be won; for want of joint planning and conduct, the '65 war ended in defeat, and for want of both, proper command and control and joint planning and conduct, the 1971 war was lost'.[6] This assertion might not be accurate in all respects, but criticism of the lack of coordination and joint planning seems to be well-founded. The JCSC as it stands can only effectively perform such functions as it is allowed to. Pakistan's development of nuclear weapons capabilities makes it all the more essential that an efficient, unified command structure is developed for the armed forces. It would be beneficial for the armed forces to undergo periodic defence reviews, in order to capitalise on their strengths and eradicate their weaknesses.

Notes

See Bibliography for full reference details.

CHAPTER 1

1 Cheema 1984, pp. 136–7.
2 Martin 1948, p. 11.
3 Fukuyama 1982, pp. 183–93.

CHAPTER 2

1 Spear 1970, pp. 225–6.
2 Aziz 1979, pp. 108–16.
3 Shehab 1989, pp. 80–8.
4 Many leaders and writers condemned this decision. For a detailed analysis of some of the opinions see Seervai 1990, pp. 19–25.
5 Ali 1985, pp. 29–31.
6 Spear 1970, p. 229.
7 Ali 1985, p. 38.
8 Blinkenberg 1972, p. 53.
9 Brines 1968, p. 43. Also see Choudhury 1968, p. 53; Ali 1985, p. 205.
10 Choudhury 1968, pp. 52–7.
11 Birdwood 1953, pp. 235–6.

12 For a detailed discussion and analysis of new material see Roberts 1994.
13 Stephens 1963, p. 176. Also see Ali 1985, pp. 173–8; Choudhury 1968, p. 56.
14 Mosley 1961, p. 248. Also see Ali 1985, p. 177.
15 Ali 1985, p. 177.
16 Das Gupta 1960, p. 46.
17 Burke 1975, pp. 13–14.
18 Cheema 1990, pp. 76–7.
19 Khera 1968, pp. 24–7. Also see Khan 1963, pp. 26–7.
20 Khan 1963, p. 27.
21 Cheema 1990, pp. 31–2.
22 ibid.
23 Ali 1985, pp. 130–2.
24 Choudhury 1968, pp. 41–2.
25 Cheema 1990, p. 76.
26 Stephens 1963, p. 21.
27 Many writers share the view that no effective measures were taken to avert the planned massacre: e.g. Azad 1959, p. 190; Choudhury 1968, p. 45; Stephens 1963, pp. 207–8; Ali 1958, pp. 255–9.
28 Choudhury 1968, p. 45.
29 ibid. pp. 155–69.
30 Quoted in Cheema 1990, p. 33. Also see the original article, Lilienthal 1951.
31 Choudhury 1968, pp. 164–6. For a detailed study see also Michel 1967.
32 The number of states varies from one source to another; some sources put the number at 600 while the others quote 562. While it is not easy to ascertain the exact number, I am using the figure quoted by many writers. See Cheema 1990, p. 34. Also see Ali 1985, p. 222; Choudhury 1968, p. 65.
33 Korbel 1966, pp. 44–9. Also see Cheema 1990, p. 34.
34 For detailed analysis see Korbel 1966, pp. 73–96. Also see Lamb 1992, pp. 121–45; Hasan 1966, pp. 55–106; Brecher 1953, pp. 18–40; Cheema 1990, pp. 34–45; Ali 1985, pp. 276–315; Choudhury 1968, pp. 90–140.
35 See Gupta 1966, pp. 174–202. Also see Choudhury 1968, pp. 90–140.
36 Siddiqui 1960, pp. 44–7.
37 ibid.
38 Cheema 1991, pp. 282–92. Also see Tahir-Kheli 1984, p. 232.
39 For a detailed analysis of Kautilyan foreign policy see Kautilya

1992, pp. 542–50. Also see Rose 1988, pp. 368–91; Thomas 1986, pp. 14–19; Cheema 1991, p. 288.
40 For a detailed discussion see Khan 1967, pp. 114–85.
41 Cheema 1983, pp. 107–11.
42 For a detailed analysis see Horelick 1974, pp. 192–200.
43 Singer 1958, pp. 90–105.
44 For details see *The Military Balance*, IISS, 1998–99, pp. 153–6, 159–60. Also see *Human Development Report 1997*, pp. 188–9.
45 ibid.

CHAPTER 3

1 Khan, F.M. 1973, pp. 106–7.
2 Cohen 1984, pp. 122–33. Also see Cheema, Z.I. 1998, pp. 10–12.
3 Khan, F.M. 1973, pp. 106–7, 261–4.
4 See 'The White Paper on National Defence', *Defence Journal*, vol. II, nos 7–8, 1976, pp. 16–22.
5 ibid.
6 ibid. Also see Rizvi 1986, pp. 294–302.
7 ibid.
8 ibid. Also see Cheema, Z.I. 1998, pp. 11–12.
9 Jalal 1995, pp. 108, 111, 196.
10 Rizvi 1998, pp. 100–1.
11 ibid.
12 Haq 1997, p. 30.
13 Cheema 1987. Also see Cheema 1995–96, pp. 19–42; Cheema 1995, pp. 41–64; Cheema 1997, pp. 136–45.

CHAPTER 4

1 Nyrop et al. 1975, pp. 387–90.
2 Amin et al. 1988, pp. 44–5.
3 *The Military Balance 1997–98*, IISS, pp. 159–61.
4 Nyrop et al. 1975, pp. 387–8.
5 *The Military Balance 1998–99*, IISS, pp. 160–1. Also see *Military Technology*, vol. xxiii, no. 1, 1999, pp. 282–5.
6 ibid.
7 Khan 1963, pp. 21–2.
8 ibid. p. 24.

9 Cheema 1990, pp. 19–20.
10 Khan 1963, p. 29. Also see Cohen 1984, p. 17; Siddiqi 1964, p. 74.
11 On the Navy see Siddiqi 1964, p. 74; also Keesings Contemporary Archives, 12–19 July, 1947. On the Air Force see Cheema 1990, pp. 77–8; also Rizvi 1986, p. 26.
12 Khan 1963, p. 25.
13 Das 1969, p. 162.
14 Rizvi 1986, p. 33.
15 Khan 1963, p. 45.
16 Amin et al. 1988, p. 41.
17 ibid.
18 Khan 1963, p. 47.
19 Khan 1967, p. 18.
20 Cohen 1984, p. 7.
21 Cheema 1990, p. 80.
22 ibid. pp. 80–5.
23 Khan 1963, p. 50.
24 Cheema 1990, pp. 80–5.
25 ibid. Also see *Five Years of Pakistan*, 1952, p. 213.
26 ibid.
27 Khan 1963, p. 25.
28 Siddiqi 1964, p. 78.
29 Cheema 1990, p. 83.
30 Khan 1963, p. 140.
31 ibid.
32 ibid. p. 141.
33 ibid. p. 142.
34 ibid. pp. 144–5.
35 Khan 1967, p. 40.
36 Cheema 1990, pp. 116–17.
37 ibid. pp. 118–19.
38 ibid.
39 ibid. p. 120.
40 ibid. p. 121. Also see Burke 1973, pp. 155–8.
41 Dulles 1954, p. 108.
42 Cheema 1990, p. 127.
43 Bamzai 1966, pp. 126–7.
44 Johnston 1966, p. 316.
45 Details of the military operations are given in many books. See for example Khan 1970; Khan 1963; Bamzai 1966.
46 For details see Siddiqui in *Defence Journal* (1985).

47 Khan 1970, p. 143.
48 Khan 1963, p. 105.
49 Khan 1963, p. 103.
50 Ganguly 1986, p. 18.
51 Korbel 1966, pp. 112–17, 357–62.
52 Khan 1963, p. 117.
53 Blinkenberg 1972, p. 111.
54 *The Sunday Times*, 12 September 1965.
55 Khan 1963, p. 117.
56 'Heer' is a famous Punjabi folk song describing the tragic love affair of Heer and Ranjah, and is always sung in a low, haunting key. See Khan 1963, pp. 120–1.
57 For a detailed analysis of various moves undertaken by India, not only to wriggle out of its commitments to the international community regarding the plebiscite but also gradually to integrate the state into the Indian Union, see Cheema 1994, pp. 97–108.
58 Dupree 1965, p. 9.
59 Burke 1973, pp. 226–30.
60 ibid. p. 319.
61 Ayub Khan 1967, pp. 127–8.
62 Burke 1973, pp. 322–3.
63 Ziring 1978, pp. 140–57. Also see Ganguly 1986, p. 83.
64 Lamb 1966, p. 116.
65 For details of various encounters see Ahmad 1973, pp. 42–97. Also see Dupree 1965, p. 15.
66 For a detailed analysis see 'Staff Study', *Pakistan Horizon*, vol. xix, no. 1, 1966, pp. 53–67.
67 Khan, F. 1968, pp. 121–33. Also see Munshi 1970, pp. 37–50.
68 See Stoessinger 1982, pp. 115–39. Also see *Nawa-i-Waqt*, 9 May 1965; *The Pakistan Times*, 11 July 1965; Dupree 1965, p. 17; Matinuddin 1996; Ganguly 1986, pp. 87–8.
69 Stoessinger 1982, p. 126.
70 Gauhar 1994, pp. 318–19, p. 322.
71 Gauhar 1994, pp. 325–6.
72 Lamb 1992, pp. 259–60.
73 Musa 1983, p. 39.
74 ibid. pp. 41–2.
75 *The New York Times*, 7 and 8 September 1965. Also see Lamb 1992, pp. 262–63.
76 Choudhury 1968, p. 295.
77 ibid. pp. 295–6. Also see Amin et al. 1988, p. 46; *Defence Journal*, vol. II, no. 9, 1976, pp. 16–17.

78 Amin et al., p. 46.
79 Kamal Matinuddin, 'Battle of Khem Karan', *The News*, 6 September 1995.
80 Musa 1983, pp. 63–70.
81 Kaul 1979, pp. 25–44.
82 Dupree 1965, pp. 19–20.
83 ibid.
84 Choudhury 1968, pp. 298–9.
85 Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, 'A question of credibility', *The Muslim*, 2, 3 and 4 December 1982.
86 Choudhury 1968, p. 299.
87 For details see Gunaratna 1993, pp. 23–5.
88 Arif 1995, p. 30.
89 Maniruzzaman 1980, pp. 124–32. Also see Wilcox 1973, pp. 36–8.
90 Wilcox 1973, pp. 37–8.
91 ibid.
92 Arif 1995, p. 32.
93 Bokhari and Thornton 1988, pp. 4–5.
94 Matinuddin 1994, pp. 336–7.
95 Khan, F.M. 1973, pp. 159–73. Also see Wilcox 1973, pp. 49–50; Arif 1995, pp. 32–3; Riza 1990, pp. 133–63, 211–13.
96 Nyrop et al. 1975, pp. 386–90.
97 ibid.
98 For a detailed analysis see 'Jihad in Islam', by Prof. Rafi Ullah Shehab, in *The Muslim*, 6 September 1989.
99 For an interesting discussion see 'Motivation: the ultimate weapon', by Dr S.M. Rahman in *The Dawn*, 6 September 1984. For a comprehensive discussion regarding Islamic influences on the Army see Cohen 1984, pp. 32–51, 86–104.
100 For details see *50 Years of Peacekeeping* (1998), p. 5.
101 ibid.
102 ibid. p. 21.
103 ibid. p. 7.
104 ibid. pp. 23–5.
105 ibid. pp. 27–31.

CHAPTER 5

1 For details see *The Military Balance 1997–8*, pp. 159–60.
2 For further details see Amin et al. 1988, pp. 114–24.

3 ibid.
4 ibid.
5 For details see *Sentinels of the Sea: The Pakistan Navy (1947–1997)*, 1997, pp. 107–8. Also see *The Military Balance 1997–98*, pp. 159–60.
6 Amin et al. 1988, pp.114–24.
7 For further details see *Story of the Pakistan Navy 1947–1972*, 1991, p. 49.
8 ibid. p. 55.
9 ibid. p. 63.
10 Choudri in *Sentinels of the Sea*, 1997, pp. 16–17.
11 *Story of the Pakistan Navy*, 1991, pp. 72–3.
12 ibid. pp. 12–13.
13 ibid.
14 *Five Years of Pakistan*, 1952, p. 211.
15 ibid. p. 210.
16 Cheema 1990, p. 114.
17 ibid.
18 ibid. p. 115.
19 *Story of the Pakistan Navy*, 1991, pp. 181–2.
20 ibid. p. 184.
21 ibid. p. 185.
22 ibid. Also see Choudri 1997, p. 18.
23 Tormans 1997, pp. 77–91.
24 *Story of the Pakistan Navy*, 1991, pp. 209–10.
25 Tormans 1997, p. 79.
26 ibid.
27 For details see Khana 1989, pp. 120–2.
28 Tormans 1997, pp. 79–80.
29 For details see interview with the Naval Chief, Admiral Mansurul Haq, in *The News*, 6 September 1995.
30 Tormans 1997, pp. 83–4.
31 See H.H. Ahmad 1997, pp. 23–9.
32 *Story of the Pakistan Navy*, 1991, pp. 217–18.
33 ibid.
34 See 'A question of credibility' by Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema in *The Muslim*, 2–4 December 1982.
35 See Rahim 1997, pp. 41–9.
36 ibid.
37 *Story of the Pakistan Navy*, 1991, p. 331.
38 For details see 'The Ghazi that defied the Indian navy' by Ghani Eirabie in *The Pakistan Times*, 3 October 1995. Also see *The Muslim*, same date.

39 Kaul 1973, pp. 174–95.
40 *Story of the Pakistan Navy*, 1991, pp. 346–7.
41 Rahim 1997, p. 45. Also see Kaul 1973, p. 190.
42 Kaul 1973, p. 192.
43 Rahim 1997, p. 48.
44 Tellis 1987, p. 52.
45 *Sentinels of the Sea*, 1997, pp. 148–50.

CHAPTER 6

1 See interview with Air Chief Marshal Pervaiz Mehdi Qureshi in *Defence Journal*, February 1998, pp. 1–7.
2 ibid.
3 ibid.
4 See Fricker 1979, pp. 21–34.
5 ibid.
6 For details see '50 Years of the Pakistan Air Force' by Wing Commander Saqib Shafi in *The Frontier Post*, 7 September 1997.
7 See Jafri 1966, pp. 419–35.
8 ibid.
9 See Shafi, op. cit. Also see 'Air Force that the Quaid willed' by Wing Commander S.M.A. Iqbal in *The Muslim*, 11 September 1984.
10 See 'Quaid-e-Azam & Pakistan Air Force' by Group Captain Sultan M. Hali in *The Frontier Post*, 7 September 1997.
11 Shafi, '50 Years of the Pakistan Air Force', 7 September 1997.
12 See interview with Air Chief Marshal Pervaiz Mehdi Qureshi in *Defence Journal*, February 1998, pp. 1–7.
13 *The Story of the Pakistan Air Force*, 1988, p. 329.
14 ibid.
15 ibid. pp. 330–1. Also see Fricker 1979, pp. 35–42.
16 ibid. (*The Story of the Pakistan Air Force*).
17 ibid.
18 ibid. pp. 379–86. Also see Fricker 1979, pp. 11–20.
19 See Gauhar 1994, pp. 322, 338–9.
20 *The Story of the Pakistan Air Force*, 1988, p. 335.
21 ibid. p. 342.
22 ibid. p. 385.
23 Fricker 1979, p. 155.

24 ibid. p. 165.
25 *The Story of the Pakistan Air Force*, 1988, pp. 434–5.
26 See 'Indo–Pak air wars, past and future' by Air Marshal Ayaz Khan in *The News*, 22 February 1991.
27 Amin et al. 1988, p. 166. Also see 'The air war in 1971 revisited' by Group Captain S.M. Hali in *Defence Journal*, February 1998, pp. 31–2.

CHAPTER 7

1 Butt 1998, pp. 162–3.
2 In early August 1947, Mountbatten was urged by Jinnah and Liaquat to put Master Tara Singh (a militant Sikh leader) and his close colleagues under arrest. This was strongly opposed by Vallabhai Patel (the strongman of Congress leadership who later became the Deputy Prime Minister). See Connell 1959, p. 904.
3 See Fricker 1979, pp. 22–3.
4 Jalal 1991, pp. 151–2.
5 ibid. A group of Mirza Ghulam Ahmed's followers based in Lahore did not subscribe to the claims of his prophethood and were and still are known as the Lahori group.
6 James 1993, pp. 13–16.
7 ibid. Also see Jalal 1991, pp. 151–2.
8 Khan, F.M. 1963, pp. 183–91.
9 Rizvi 1986, pp. 60–1.
10 Gunaratna 1993, pp. 23–5.
11 James 1993, pp. 194–7.
12 ibid.
13 Raza 1997, pp. 266–72.
14 ibid. Also see Harrison 1981, pp. 33–40; Waseem 1989, pp. 336–40.
15 James 1993, p. 196.
16 ibid.
17 ibid.
18 Harrison 1981, p. 39.
19 Waseem 1998, pp. 73–92.
20 Butt 1998, pp. 88, 162–3.
21 Waseem 1998, p. 88.
22 Sehgal 1993.
23 Waseem 1998, p. 89.

CHAPTER 8

1 Cohen 1984, pp. 105–33.
2 Wilcox 1965, pp. 142–63.
3 Khan, M. Ayub 1967, pp. 70–76. Also see Khan, F.M. 1963, pp. 192–205.
4 Khan, M.A. 1983, p. 10.
5 ibid. p. 11.
6 For details of the commissions and committees see Rizvi 1986, pp. 78–83.
7 Baxter et al. 1993, pp. 212–15.
8 Gauhar 1994, pp. 157–93.
9 ibid.
10 ibid.
11 ibid. Also see Khan, M. Ayub 1967, pp. 186–226.
12 Samad 1994, pp. 189–201.
13 Gauhar 1994, p. 277.
14 ibid. pp. 278–9.
15 ibid.
16 ibid.
17 ibid. pp. 284–8.
18 ibid. pp. 407–72. Also see Burki 1991, pp. 52–6; Baxter et al. 1993, pp. 214–15; Waseem 1989, pp. 230–8.
19 Rizvi 1986, pp. 152–61.
20 ibid. The parties that joined the DAC were the Awami League (Sheikh Mujibe-ur-Rehman Group), National Awami Party, Jamiat ul Ulma-i-Islam, National Democratic Front, Awami League (Nawabzada Nasrullah Group), Muslim League and Jamat-i-Islami.
21 ibid.
22 The LFO contained five main points: (1) the country should be a federation; (2) the Constitution must provide for Islamic ideology, democracy, civil rights and the independence of the judiciary; (3) the provinces should have maximum autonomy; (4) the people of all parts of the country should be full participants in all national activities; (5) within a specified period, economic and all other disparities between the provinces and between different areas in a province were to be removed by adoption of statutory and other measures. See Wilcox 1973, pp. 13–25.
23 Khan, M.A. 1983, pp. 22–3. Also see Rizvi 1986, pp. 174–8; Burki 1991, pp. 56–61.
24 Wilcox 1973, pp. 22–5.

25 Arif 1995, p. 25.
26 Ziring 1992, pp. 65–9.
27 Khan, M.A. 1983, pp. 45–6.
28 ibid. Also see Rizvi 1986, pp. 192–3.
29 For the text of Zia's speech on 5 July 1977 see Rizvi 1986, pp. 226 and 289–93.
30 LaPorte 1993, pp. 171–87.
31 See Burki's chapter, 'Zia's eleven years', in Burki and Baxter 1991, pp. 11–24.
32 ibid.
33 Rizvi 1986, p. 230.
34 See Baxter's chapter, 'Restructuring the Pakistan political system', in Burki and Baxter 1991, pp. 27–47. Also see Burki's article, 'Pakistan under Zia, 1977–1988', in *Asian Survey*, vol. 38, October 1988, pp. 1087–8.
35 Baxter, ibid.
36 ibid.
37 ibid.
38 Rizvi 1986, p. 231.
39 Baxter 1991, pp. 32–3.
40 Burki 1991, pp. 68–85.
41 Waseem 1989, pp. 392–405.
42 Baxter 1991, pp. 35–9.
43 ibid.
44 Burki 1991, p. 75.
45 Baxter et al. 1993, pp. 218–19.
46 Rizvi 1986, pp. 245–53.
47 *The Gulf News*, 15 October 1999.
48 *The News*, 13 October 1999.
49 ibid.
50 For details on Sharif's powers see 'Return of the generals' by Aziz Siddiqui in *Frontline*, vol. 16, no. 23, 6–19 November 1999.
51 See 'Change was necessitated: German Envoy' in *The Dawn*, 11 November 1999. Also see 'Change of tone in the US' by Hassan Ali Shahbaz in *The News*, 22 October 1999.
52 *The Hindu*, 13 November 1999.
53 *The Dawn*, 16 November 1999.
54 For details of the press conference see *The News*, 2 November 1999.
55 Rizvi 1998, pp. 96–113.
56 See 'The Pakistan experience' by Lawrence Ziring in *The News*, 17 November 1999.

CHAPTER 9

1 Sayigh 1997, pp. 161–94.
2 Jamil ul Haq 1998, pp. 21–3.
3 Talat Masood, 'Al-Khalid tank: the challenges that lie ahead' in *The News*, 29 July 1991.
4 For further details see Ahmed Ishtiaq, 1997, pp. 3–5.
5 See *The Nation*, 7 September 1996.
6 Ahmed, Ishtiaq, 1997, p. 8.
7 ibid. pp. 9–10.
8 China supported Pakistan in the Rann of Kutch clash as well as in the 1965 Indo–Pak war. See Cheema 1997, pp. 148–60. Also see Burke 1973, pp. 318–57.
9 Ispahani 1990, pp. 60–1.
10 Cohen 1983, pp. 1–26.
11 Rizvi 1993, p. 101. Also see 'The US–Pakistan strategic relationship' by L. Lifschultz in *The Muslim*, 30 October 1986.

CHAPTER 10

1 Quoted in Ahmed 1998, p. 407.
2 Quoted in *India Today International*, 8 June 1998, p. 12.
3 Heisbourg 1998–99, pp. 77–92.
4 For a detailed analysis of contributions see Heisbourg, ibid.
5 Salik 1996, pp. 87–102.
6 Weissman and Krosney 1981, pp. 132–5.
7 ibid.
8 ibid.
9 See Z.I. Cheema 1996, pp. 103–30.
10 ibid.
11 ibid.
12 *Preventing Nuclear Proliferation in South Asia*, 1995.
13 See Cheema 1984, pp. 54–72.
14 Heisbourg 1998–99, p. 78.
15 *The News*, 19 May 1998.
16 *The Dawn*, 12 June 1998.
17 Haq in *The News*, 25 July 1998.
18 Navias 1990, pp. 10–11.
19 *The News*, 9 January 1992.
20 *The Nation*, 4 July 1997.
21 *The News*, 7 April 1998; *The Nation*, 7 April 1998.

22 *The News*, ibid.
23 *The News*, 12 April 1999.
24 See *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 27 June 1996.
25 See Jones and McDonough 1998, pp. 131–46.
26 *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 27 June 1996.
27 *The News*, 12 December 1996.
28 Ahmed 1998, pp. 407–11.

CHAPTER 11

1 Cheema 1990, pp. 174–5.
2 ibid.
3 ibid. pp. 180–8.
4 For example, in the construction of Wali Tangi Dam in the Zarghun Hills the army played the key role. For details see Moore 1969, pp. 447–56.
5 *The Nation*, 23–24 December 1998.
6 Quoted in Sassheen, September and October 1991, pp. 6–15, 42–7.

Appendix: Service chiefs since 1947

ARMY CHIEFS

General Sir Frank Messervy 14.8.47–10.2.48
General Sir Douglas David Gracy 11.2.48–16.1.51
General Muhammad Ayub Khan 17.1.51–26.10.58
(later Field Marshal)
General Muhammad Musa 27.10.58–17.9.66
General Agha Muhammad Yahya Khan 18.9.66–20.12.71
Lieutenant General Gul Hassan Khan 20.12.71–3.3.72
General Tikka Khan 3.3.72–1.3.76
General Muhammad Zia ul Haq 1.3.76–17.8.88
General Mirza Aslam Beg 17.8.88–16.8.91
General Asif Nawaz 16.8.91–8.1.93
General Abdul Waheed 12.1.93–12.1.96
General Jehangir Karamat 12.1.96–7.10.98
General Pervez Musharraf 8.10.98–

Originally C-in-C, the designation became Chief of Army Staff (COAS) on 20 December 1971.

NAVAL CHIEFS

Rear Admiral James Wilfred Jefford 15.8.47–30.1.53
Vice Admiral Haji Mohammad Siddiq Choudri
31.1.53–28.2.59

Vice Admiral Afzal Rahman Khan 1.3.59–20.10.66
Vice Admiral Syed Mohammad Ahsan 20.10.66–31.8.69
Vice Admiral Muzaffar Hassan 1.9.69–22.12.71
Vice Admiral Hasan Hafeez Ahmed 3.3.72–9.3.75
Admiral Mohammad Sharif 23.3.75–21.3.79
Admiral Karamat Rahman Niazi 22.3.79–22.3.83
Admiral Tariq Kamal Khan 23.3.83–9.4.86
Admiral Iftikhar Ahmed Sirohey 10.4.86–9.11.88
Admiral Yastur-ul-Haq Malik 10.11.88–8.11.91
Admiral Saeed Mohammad Khan 9.11.91–9.11.94
Admiral Mansural Haque 10.11.94–1.5.97
Admiral Fasih Bokhari 2.5.97–2.10.99
Admiral Abdul Aziz Mirza 2.10.99–

AIR CHIEFS

Air Vice Marshal A.L.A. Perry 14.8.47–17.2.49
Air Vice Marshal R.L.R. Aicherley 18.2.49–6.5.51
Air Vice Marshal L.W. Cannon 7.5.51–19.6.55
Air Vice Marshal A.W.B. McDonald 20.6.55–22.7.57
Air Vice Marshal M. Asghar Khan 23.7.57–30.11.58
Air Marshal M. Asghar Khan 1.12.58–31.8.69
Air Marshal Malik Noor Khan 23.7.55–31.8.69
Air Marshal A. Rahim Khan 1.9.69–2.3.72
Air Marshal Zafar Ahmed Chaudhry 3.3.72–14.4.74
Air Marshal Zulfiqar Ali Khan 15.4.74–31.12.75
Air Chief Marshal Zulfiqar Ali Khan 1.1.76–21.7.78
Air Chief Marshal M. Anwar Shamim 22.7.78–5.3.85
Air Chief Marshal Jamal Ahmed Khan 6.3.85–8.3.88
Air Chief Marshal Hakimullah 9.3.88–13.8.88
Air Chief Marshal Hakimullah 14.8.88–8.3.91
Air Chief Marshal F.F. Khan 9.3.91–8.11.94
Air Chief Marshal M. Abbas Khattak 9.11.94–7.11.97
Air Chief Marshal P.Q. Mehdi 8.11.97–21.11.2000
Air Chief Marshal Mushaf Ali Mir 22.11.2000

Bibliography

References cited in the text are listed below under either Books, Journal Articles or Newspapers.

BOOKS

Ahmad, Borhanuddin, *The Generals of Pakistan and Bangladesh*, Academic Publishers, Dhaka, 1993.

Ahmad, Commander H.H., '1965 war: exploits of the Pakistan Navy', in *Sentinels of the Sea: The Pakistan Navy (1947–1997)*, compiled by Public Relations Directorate, Naval Headquarters, PN Book Club, Islamabad, 1997.

Ahmad, Major Saeed, *Indo–Pak Clash in Rann of Kutch (1965)*, Army Education Press, Rawalpindi, 1973.

Ahmed, Ishtiaq, *Pakistan Aeronautical Complex*, Hawk Communication & Advertising Consultants, Islamabad, 1997.

Ali, Chaudhri Muhammad, *The Emergence of Pakistan*, Research Society of Pakistan, University of the Punjab, Lahore, 1985.

Amin, Mohammed, Quraishy, Masood, Willets, Duncan, and Tetly, Brian, *Defenders of Pakistan*, Camerapix Publishers International, Nairobi, 1988.

Arif, General Khalid Mahmud, *Working With Zia*, Oxford University Press, Karachi, 1995.

Azad, Abul Kalam, *India Wins Freedom*, Oriental Longman, Calcutta, 1959.

Aziz, M.A., *A History of Pakistan (Past and Present)*, Sang-e-Meel Publications, Lahore, 1979.

Bahadur, Lal, *Struggle for Pakistan*, Oriental University Press, London, 1988.

Bahargava, G.S., *South Asian Security After Afghanistan*, Lexington Books, Toronto, 1983.

Bamzai, Prithvi Nath Kaul, *Kashmir and Power Politics: From Lake Success to Tashkent*, Metropolitan Book Co., Delhi, 1966.

Baxter, Craig, 'Restructuring the Pakistan political system' in *Pakistan Under the Military* by Shahid Javed Burki and Craig Baxter, Westview Press, Boulder, 1991.

Birdwood, Lord, *A Continent Decides*, Robert Hale, London, 1953.

Blikenberg, Lars, *India–Pakistan: The History of Unresolved Conflicts*, Dansk Undenrigspolitik Institute, Copenhagen, 1972.

Bokhari, Imtiaz H. and Thornton, Thomas Perry, *The 1972 Simla Agreement: An Asymmetrical Negotiation*, The Johns Hopkins University Press, Washington D.C., 1988.

Bose, Sumantra, *The Kashmir Challenge*, Sage, New Delhi, 1997.

Brecher, Michael, *The Struggle for Kashmir*, Oxford University Press, New York, 1953.

Brezinski, Zbigniew, *Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Adviser 1977–81*, Farrar-Straus-Giroux, New York, 1983.

Bull, Headley, 'The new environment: sea power and political influence' in *Sea Power and Influence; Old Issues and New Challenges* edited by Jonathan Alford, The International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, 1980.

Burke, S.M., *Pakistan's Foreign Policy: An Historical Analysis*, Oxford University Press, Karachi, 1975.

Burki, Shahid Javed, *Pakistan: The Continuing Search for Nationhood*, Westview Press, Boulder, 1991.

——'Zia's eleven years' in *Pakistan Under the Military* by Shahid Javed Burki and Craig Baxter, Westview Press, Boulder, 1991.

Butt, M. Rafique (compiler), *The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan 1973*, Mansoor Book House, Lahore, 1998.

Campbell-Johnson, Alan, *Mission with Mountbatten*, Robert Hale, London, 1953.

Campbell, D.D., *Pakistan: Emerging Democracy*, N.J. Van Nostrand, Princeton, 1963.

Chaudhuri, K.C., *History of Ancient India*, Central, Calcutta, 1982.
Cheema, Pervaiz Iqbal, *Pakistan's Defence Policy, 1947–58*, Macmillan, London, 1990.
——'Pakistan's threat perceptions' in *Pakistan–United States Relations* edited by Rais Ahmed Khan, Area Study Centre, Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad, 1983.
——'Pakistani perspectives on international security' in *Asian Perspectives on International Security* edited by Donald Gough McMillen, Macmillan, London, 1984.
——'Growing defence expenditure and its implications for economic development in South Asia' in *Regional Security in South Asia* edited by Sridhar K. Khatri, Centre for Nepal and Asian Studies, Katmandu, 1987.
——'India's Kashmir policy' in *Perspectives on Kashmir*, edited by K.F. Yusuf, Pakistan Forum, Islamabad, 1994.
——'Arms procurement in Pakistan: balancing the needs for quality, self-reliance and diversity of supply' in *Military Capacity and the Risk of War: China, India, Pakistan and Iran* edited by Eric Arnett Sipri, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1997.
——'Economic trends, national security and defence spending in Pakistan' in *Regional Economic Trends and South Asian Security* edited by Iftekharuzzaman, Regional Centre for Strategic Studies, Colombo, 1997.
Cheema, Zafar Iqbal, 'Pakistan's nuclear policies: attitudes and posture' in *Nuclear Non-Proliferation in India and Pakistan* edited by P.R. Chari, Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, Iftekharuzzaman, Regional Centre for Strategic Studies, Manohar, 1996.
Choudhury, G.W., *Pakistan's Relations with India 1947–1966*, Pall Mall Press, London, 1968.
Choudri, Vice Admiral H.M.S., 'Some recollections of early years of Pakistan Navy 1947–1959' in *Sentinels of the Sea: The Pakistan Navy (1947–1997)*, compiled by Public Relations Directorate, Naval Headquarters, PN Book Club, Islamabad, 1997.
Cohen, Stephen P., *The Pakistan Army*, Himalayan Books, New Delhi, 1984.
Connell, John, *Auchinleck*, Cassell, 1959.
Das, S.T., *Indian military—its history and development*, Sagar Publications, New Delhi, 1969.
Das Gupta, J.B., *Indo–Pakistani Relations*, Djambatan, Amsterdam, 1960.

Defence Implications of a Partition of India into Hindustan and Pakistan, East and West Publishing Company, Karachi, 1976.
Feldman, Herbert, *Revolution in Pakistan*, Oxford University Press, London, 1967.
50 Years of Peacekeeping, Inter Services Public Relations, Rawalpindi, 1998.
Five Years of Pakistan, August 1947 to August 1952, Pakistan Publications, Karachi, 1952.
Fricker, John, *Battle for Pakistan: The Air War of 1965*, Ian Allen Ltd, Shepperton, 1979.
Fukuyama, Francis, 'Pakistan since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan' in *US Strategic Interests in South West Asia* edited by Shirin Tahir-Kheli, Praeger, New York, 1982.
Ganguly, Sumit, *The Origins of War in South Asia*, Westview Press, Boulder, 1986.
Gauhar, Altaf, *Ayub Khan: Pakistan's First Military Ruler*, Sang-e-Meel Publications, Lahore, 1994.
Gunaratna, Rohan, *Indian Intervention in Sri Lanka*, South Asian Network on Conflict Resolution, Colombo, 1993.
Gupta, Sisisr, *Kashmir*, Asia Publishing House, Bombay, 1966.
Haq, Mahbub ul, *Human Development in South Asia 1997*, Oxford University Press, Karachi, 1997.
Harrison, Selig S., *In Afghanistan's Shadow: Baluch Nationalism and Soviet Temptation*, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, D.C., 1981.
Harrison, Selig S. and Kemp, Geoffrey, *India and America After the Cold War*, The Carnegie Endowment, Washington, 1993.
Hasan, Sarwar, ed., *Documents on the Foreign Relations of Pakistan: The Kashmir Question*, Pakistan Institute of International Affairs, Karachi, 1966.
Horelick, Arnold L., 'Perspectives on the study of comparative military doctrine' in *Comparative Defence Policy*, eds. Frank E. Horton et al., The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1974.
Human Development Report 1997, United Nations Development Programme, New York, 1997.
Ismay, Lord, *Memoirs*, Heinemann, London, 1960.
Ispahani, Mahnaz, 'Pakistan: dimensions of insecurity', *Adelphi Paper No. 246*, Brassey's for IISS, London, Winter 1989–90.
Jalal, Ayesha, *The State of Martial Rule*, Vanguard, Lahore, 1991.
——*Democracy and Authoritarianism in South Asia*, Sang-e-Meel Publications, Lahore, 1995

Johnston, William C., 'Jammu and Kashmir 1947–49' in *Challenge and Response in Internal Conflict* edited by D.M. Condit, Best H. Cooper Jr. and others, Centre for Research in Social Systems, The American University, Washington D.C., 1968.

Jones, Rodney W. and McDonough, Mark G., *Tracking Nuclear Proliferation: a Guide in Maps and Charts*, Carnegie Endowment, Washington D.C., 1998.

Keesing's Contemporary Archives, Keesing's Publications Limited, Bristol, 1947.

Khan, Maj. Gen. Akbar, *Raiders in Kashmir*, National Book Foundation, Karachi, 1970.

Khan, Maj. Gen. Fazal Muqeem, *Pakistan's Crisis in Leadership*, National Book Foundation, Islamabad, 1973.

——*The Story of Pakistan Army*, Oxford University Press, Karachi, 1963.

Khan, Lt. Gen. Gul Hassan, *Memoirs*, Oxford University Press, Karachi, 1993.

Khan, Mohammad Ayub, *Friends Not Masters*, Oxford University Press, Lahore, 1967.

Khatri, Sridhar K., ed., *Regional Security in South Asia*, Centre for Nepal and Asian Studies, Katmandu, 1987.

Korbel, Josef, *Danger in Kashmir*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1966.

Lamb, Alastair, *The Kashmir Problem*, Praeger, New York, 1966.

——*Kashmir: A Disputed Legacy*, Oxford University Press, Karachi, 1992.

——*Birth of a Tragedy: Kashmir 1947*, Oxford University Press, Karachi, 1994.

LaPorte, Robert, 'Another try at democracy' in *Contemporary Problems of Pakistan* edited by J. Henry Korson, Westview Press, Boulder, 1993.

Lyon, Peter, 'Epilogue: Pakistan in the early 1990s', in *Pakistan Chronicle*, Hurst & Company, London, 1993.

Majumdar, R.C., Raychaudhuri, H.C. and Datta, K., *An Advanced History of India*, Macmillan India Limited, Madras, 1985.

Maniruzzaman, Talukder, *The Bangladesh Revolution and its Aftermath*, Bangladesh Books International Limited, Dhaka, 1980.

Mehrotra, L.L., Chopra, H.S. and Kueck, G.W., eds, *SAARC 2000 and Beyond*, Omega Scientific Publishers, New Delhi, 1995.

Michel, A.A., *The Indus Rivers*, Yale University Press, Princeton, 1967.
Mosley, Leonard, *The Last Days of the British Raj*, Weidenfeld & Nicholson, London, 1961.
Musa, General (Retd.) Mohammad, *My Version: India–Pakistan War 1965*, Wajidalis, Lahore, 1983.
Navias, Martin, 'Ballistic missile proliferation in the Third World, *Adelphi Paper 252*, The International Institute for Strategic Studies, Brassey's, London, Summer 1990.
Nyrop, Richard F. et al., *Area Handbook for Pakistan*, US Government Printing Office, Washington D.C., 1975.
——*Pakistan: A Country Study*, US Government Printing Office, Washington D.C., 1983.
Preventing Nuclear Proliferation in South Asia, The Asia Society's Report, New York, 1995.
Provisional Results of Fifth Population and Housing Census Held in March 1998, Population Census Organisation, Statistical Division, Government of Pakistan, Islamabad, July 1998.
Qadri, Rear Admiral R.A., 'We sank the *Khukri*' in *Sentinels of the Sea: The Pakistan Navy (1947–1997)*, compiled by Public Relations Directorate, PN Book Club, Islamabad, 1997.
Rahim, Commodore Arshad, 'Pakistan Navy in the 1971 war' in *Sentinels of the Sea: The Pakistan Navy (1947–1997)*, compiled by Public Relations Directorate, PN Book Club, Islamabad, 1997.
Raza, Rafi, *Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto and Pakistan 1967–1977*, Oxford University Press, Karachi, 1997.
Riza, Maj. Gen. (Retd.) Shaukat, *The Pakistan Army*, Services Book Club, Lahore, 1990.
Rizvi, Hasan Askari, 'Pakistan' in *Arms Production in Developing Countries* edited by James Everett Katz, Lexington Books, Massachusetts, 1984.
——*The Military and Politics in Pakistan 1947–86*, Progressive Publishers, Lahore, 1986.
——*Pakistan and Geostrategic Environment*, Macmillan, London, 1993.
Roberts, Andrew, *Eminent Churchillians*, Weidenfeld & Nicholson, London, 1994.
Rose, Leo E., 'A regional system in South Asia: problems and prospects' in *Asian Security Issues: Regional and Global* edited by Robert A. Scalapino et al., Berkeley, 1988.
Salik, Naeem Ahmed, 'Pakistan's nuclear programme: technological dimensions' in *Nuclear Non-Proliferation in India*

and Pakistan edited by P.R. Chari, Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, Iftekharuzzaman, Regional Centre for Strategic Studies, Manohar, 1996.

Sayigh, Yazid, 'Arms production in Pakistan and Iran: the limits of self-reliance' in *Military Capacity and the Risk of War: China, India, Pakistan and Iran*, edited by Eric Arnett, Sipri, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1997.

Seervai, H.M., *Partition of India: Legend and Reality*, Emmenem Publications, Bombay, 1990.

Sentinels of the Sea: The Pakistan Navy (1947–1997), PN Book Club, Islamabad, 1997.

Shehab, Rafiullah, *History of Pakistan*, Sang-e-Meel Publications, Lahore, 1989.

Siddiqi, Aslam, *A Path for Pakistan*, Pakistan Publishing House, Karachi, 1964.

——*Pakistan Seeks Security*, Longman, Green and Co., Lahore, 1960.

Singh, Major General Sukhwant, *The Liberation of Bangladesh*, Vikas Publishing House, New Delhi, 1980.

Spear, Percival, *A History of India*, Vol. Two, Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, 1970.

Stephens, Ian, *Pakistan*, Ernest Benn Limited, London, 1963.

Story of the Pakistan Navy 1947–1972, compiled by PN History Section, Naval Headquarters, Elite Publishers, Karachi, 1991.

Tahir-Kheli, Sherin, *The United States and Pakistan*, Praeger, New York, 1982.

——'Defence planning in Pakistan' in *Defence Planning in Less Industrialised States* edited by Stephanie G. Nedmar, Lexington, 1984.

Thapar, Romila, *A History of India*, Vol. One, Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, 1968.

The Military Balance 1997–98 (also *1998–99)*, International Institute for Strategic Studies, Oxford University Press, London, 1997 (1998).

The Story of the Pakistan Air Force, Shaheen Foundation, Islamabad, 1988.

Thomas, Raju G.C., *Indian Security Policy*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1986.

Tormans, Guy, 'The Pakistan Navy in transition' in *Sentinels of the Sea: The Pakistan Navy (1947–1997)*, compiled by Public Relations Directorate, Naval Headquarters, Islamabad, 1997.

Tracking Nuclear Proliferation, Carnegie Endowment, Washington D.C., 1998. (Also on Internet: www.ceip.org/programs/npp.)

Uchida, Admiral Kazutomi, 'Naval competition and security in East Asia' in *Sea Power and Influence: Old Issues and New Challenges* edited by Jonathan Alford, International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, 1980.

Waseem, Mohammad, *Politics and the State in Pakistan*, Progressive, Lahore, 1986.

——'Ethnic conflict in Pakistan: the case of the Mohajir Qaumi Movement' in *Regional Security, Ethnicity and Governance* edited by Justus Richter and Christian Wagner, Manohar, New Delhi, 1998.

Westacott, Allan, *Mahan on Naval Warfare*, Little Brown and Company, Boston, 1942.

Wilcox, Wayne, *The Emergence of Bangladesh*, American Enterprise Institute for Policy Research, Washington, 1973.

Wright, Denis, *Bangladesh: Origins and Indian Ocean Relations*, Sterling Publishers, New Delhi, 1988.

Ziring, Lawrence, *Bangladesh: From Mujib to Ershad—An Interpretive Study*, Oxford University Press, Karachi, 1992.

——'The Rann of Kutch arbitration' in *Pakistan in a Changing World* edited by Masuma Hasan, Pakistan Institute of International Affairs, Karachi, 1973.

JOURNAL ARTICLES AND REPORTS

Ahmed, Samina, 'The (nuclear) testing of Pakistan', *Current History*, December 1998.

Burki, Shahid Javed, 'Pakistan under Zia, 1977–1988', *Asian Survey*, vol. 38, October 1988.

Cheema, Pervaiz Iqbal, 'Pakistan's nuclear option', *Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies*, vol. vii, no. 4, Summer 1984.

——'Security in South Asia: an approach' *South Asia Journal*, vol. 4, no. 3, 1991.

——'Implications of the arms build-up in South Asia', *Regional Studies*, vol. xviii, Winter 1995.

——'Nuclear arms control in the Indian Ocean' (co-authored with Zafar Iqbal Cheema), *Defence Journal*, vol. xx, no. 5–6, 1994. Also published in *Indian Ocean: Security and*

Stability in the Post Cold War Era, Directorate of Naval Educational Services, Islamabad, 1995.
Cheema, Zafar Iqbal, 'Security studies in Pakistan: current trends and future directions', conference paper presented at RCSS (Regional Centre for Strategic Studies) Conference on *Future of Security Studies in South Asia*, Sri Lanka, 14–16 July 1998.
Cohen, Stephen P., 'Pakistan: Army, society, and security', *Asian Affairs*, vol. x, no. 2, Summer 1983.
Dupree, Louis, 'First reflections on the second Kashmir war', *South Asia Series*, vol. ix, no. 5, 1965.
Heisbourg, Francois, 'The prospect of nuclear stability between India and Pakistan, *Survival*, vol. 40, no. 4, Winter 1998–99.
Gordon, Sandy, 'South Asia after the Cold War', *Asian Survey*, vol. xxxv, no. 10, October 1995.
Kaul, Lt. Gen. B.M., 'Confrontation with Pakistan', *Defence Journal*, vol. v, no. 9, 1979.
Kaul, Lieutenant Commander Ravi, 'The Indo–Pakistani war and the changing balance of power in the Indian Ocean', *US Naval Proceedings, Naval Review*, vol. 99, no. 843, 1973.
Khan, Farzana, 'The Rann of Kutch Award', *Pakistan Horizon*, vol. xxi, no. 2, Second Quarter, 1968.
Khana, Captain R.P., 'Indian Navy comes of age', *Proceedings: US Naval Institute*, April 1989.
Military Technology, vol. xxiii, no. 1, 1999.
Moore, Raymond A., 'The use of the Army in nation building: the case of Pakistan, *Asian Survey*, vol. ix, no. 6, June 1969.
Munshi, Aziz A., 'The background and basis of the Rann of Kutch Award', *Pakistan Horizon*, vol. xxiii, no. 1, First Quarter 1970.
Qureshi, Pervaiz Mehdi, 'An interview with Air Chief Marshal Pervaiz Mehdi Qureshi', *Defence Journal*, vol. 2, no. 2, February 1998.
Rizvi, Hasan Askari, 'Pakistan's defence policy', *Pakistan Horizon*, vol. xxxvi, no. 1, 1983.
——'Civil–military relations in contemporary Pakistan', *Survival*, vol. 40, no. 2, Summer 1998.
Samad, Yunas, 'The military and democracy in Pakistan', *Contemporary South Asia*, vol. 3, no. 3, 1994.
Sassheen, R.S., 'The Pakistan armed forces: the need for integration' (Part I and Part II), *Asian Defence Journal*, September and October 1991.

Siddiqui, A.R., 'Interview with Maj. Gen. Akbar Khan', *Defence Journal*, vol. xi, nos. 6–7, 1985.
Singer, David J., 'Threat perceptions and the armament–tension dilemma', *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, vol. II, no. 1, March 1958.
Staff Study, 'Some aspects of the Rann of Kutch dispute', *Pakistan Horizon*, vol. xix, no. 1, First Quarter, 1966.
Tellis, A.J., 'The Pakistan Navy: analysis and review part 1)', *Naval Forces*, vol. viii, no. vi, 1987.
Wilcox, Wayne Aryes, 'The Pakistan coup d'etat of 1958', *Pacific Affairs*, vol. xxxviii, no. 2, Summer 1965.
Wirsing, Robert G., 'Pakistan's security in the ''New World Order'': going from bad to worse', *Asian Affairs*, vol. 23, no. 2, Summer 1996.
Yahya, Jamil-ul-Haq, 'Defence production and its role in Pakistan', *Military Technology*, MILTECH, special supplement to '50 Years of the Pakistan Armed Forces', 1998.

NEWSPAPERS AND MAGAZINES

Ahmad, Anwar, 'The spirit of September 1965', *The News International*, September 6, 1995.
Ahmad, Aziz-ud-Din, 'The Army and civil affairs', *The Nation*, November 26, 1998.
Ahmad, Masud, 'A personal account of the 1965 war', *The Muslim*, September 6, 1986.
Ahmed, Brig. (Retd.) Sultan, 'The spirit of '65', *The Frontier Post*, September 6, 1993.
Asian Aviation, July 1996.
Aslam, Talat, 'The changing face of the Army', *The Herald*, July 1989.
Bhagat, Rasheeda, 'Popular perceptions', *Frontline*, vol. 16, no. 23, November 6–19, 1999.
Cheema, Pervaiz Iqbal, 'A question of credibility', *The Muslim*, December 2–4, 1982.
Eirabie, Ghani, 'The ghazi that defied the Indian Navy', *The Pakistan Times* and *The Muslim*, October 3, 1995.
Haq, Mahbub ul, 'The nuclear race in South Asia', *The News*, July 25, 1998.
India News, November 20, 1947.
India Today International, June 8, 1998.

'Informal economy growing at 9 per cent of GDP: IMF', *The News International*, January 19, 1998.
Iqbal, Wing Commander Arif, 'An eye-witness account of the PAF–IAF encounter', *The Pakistan Times*, September 6, 1997.
Iqbal, Wing Commander S.M.A., 'Air Force that Quaid willed', *The Muslim*, September 11, 1984.
Hali, Group Captain Sultan M., 'Quaid-e-Azam & the Pakistan Air Force', *The Frontier Post*, September 7, 1997.
Lifschultz, L., 'The US–Pakistan strategic relationship', *The Muslim*, October 30, 1986.
Lilienthal, David E., 'Another Korea in the making', *Colliers Magazine*, no. 4, August 1951.
Martin, R.P., 'Pakistan's fears', *Eastern World*, vol. II, nos. 10–11, November 1948.
Masood, Lt. Gen. (Retd.) Talat, 'Al-Khalid: the challenges that lie ahead', *The News*, July 27, 1991.
Matinuddin, Kamal, 'Battle of Khem Karan', *The News*, September 6, 1995.
——'Conflict in the Rann of Kutch: a trial of strength', *The Frontier Post*, September 6, 1995.
Qureshi, Pervaiz Mehdi, 'An interview of the Air Chief Marshal', *Defence Journal*, February 1998.
Rahman, S.M., 'Motivation: the ultimate weapon', *The Dawn*, September 6, 1984.
Rashid, Ahmed, 'Chasing mirages', *The Herald*, July 1996.
Saleem, Farrukh, 'Pakistan under a mountain of debt', *The News International*, March 18, 1997.
Shahbaz, Hassan Ali, 'Change of tone in the US', *The News*, October 22, 1999.
Shafi, Wing Commander Saqib, '50 Years of the Pakistan Air Force', *The Frontier Post*, September 7, 1997.
Sehgal, Ikram, 'Rule of law in Sindh', *The Nation*, September 6, 1993.
Shehab, Rafi Ullah, 'Jehad in Islam', *The Muslim*, September 6, 1989.
Siddiqui, Aziz, 'Return of the generals', *Frontline*, vol. 16, no. 23, November 6–19, 1999.
The Dawn, June 12, 1998; November 16, 1999.
The Herald, July 1992.
The Hindu, April 5, 1971; November 13, 1999.
The Nation, June 15, September 7, 1996; April 7, December 23 and 24, 1998.
The New York Times, March 10, 22, 1951; June 6, 1953.

The News, January 9, 1992; April 7, May 19, October 22, 1999.
The Times, April 9, August 1, 1951.
Ziring, Lawrence, 'The Pakistan experience', *The News*, November 17, 1999.

Index